APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Giles County jury convicted the defendant, Timothy Maurice Reynolds, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty years as a Range II multiple offender. On direct appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for aggravated robbery; (2) whether the trial court erred in prohibiting defense counsel, during cross-examination and closing arguments, from referring to the United States Attorney General's comments on eyewitness identification; and (3) whether the trial court erred in finding the defendant to be a Range II multiple offender. We affirm the conviction; however, because essential exhibits relating to sentencing are missing from the record without fault of the parties, we remand for resentencing.

The defendant, Colin Reed Wells, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of carjacking (Class B felony), robbery (Class C felony), aggravated assault (Class C felony), resisting arrest (Class B misdemeanor), violation of driver's license law (Class B misdemeanor), evading arrest (Class A misdemeanor), evading arrest (Class D felony), and assault (Class A misdemeanor). Following his convictions, the trial court merged some convictions and imposed an effective sentence of 32 years as a multiple offender in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he claims his carjacking conviction is infirm because the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Javonni Jones, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as being barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Paul Hayes, appeals his convictions by a Shelby County jury for aggravated burglary and two counts of aggravated robbery. In this appeal as of right, Hayes raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by prohibiting defense counsel from addressing the jury during entry of the plea; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying Hayes' motion for a mistrial following a detective's testimony that Hayes was a suspect in uncharged similar crimes; (3) whether the trial court committed plain error by limiting the scope of cross-examination of a co-defendant testifying for the State; (4) whether the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to support the convictions; and (5) whether the cumulative effect of all errors amounted to a denial of due process of law. After a review of the record, we hold that Hayes' issues are without merit and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Ann Marie Thornton Kelly, was indicted by the Giles County Grand Jury on twenty counts relating to incidents involving the sexual abuse of her children. She was ultimately convicted of two counts of rape of a child, three counts of criminal responsibility for rape of a child, one count of aggravated sexual battery, one count of criminal responsibility for aggravated sexual battery, and one count of incest. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of sixty-two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the State concedes that the appellant was not competent to stand trial. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioners, brothers, were tried and convicted, jointly, of first degree murder, aggravated arson, and conspiracy to commit arson against personal property. They filed petitions for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. After careful review, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Anthony Hodges, was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of life without parole and twenty-five years, respectively, to be served in the Department of Correction. The Defendant's convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Hodges, 7 S.W.3d 609 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). The Defendant subsequently petitioned for post-conviction relief, which the trial court denied. The Defendant now appeals, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that his due process rights were violated by the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on second degree murder; by the State's employment of inconsistent theories of guilt at his and his co-defendant's separate trials; and by the denial of his right to testify. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Ricky Lee Netherton, was convicted by a jury in the Criminal Court of Cumberland County of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced the petitioner as a violent offender to twenty-four years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction to be served at one hundred percent (100%). Following an unsuccessful appeal of his conviction, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, among other grounds, ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner now brings this appeal challenging the post-conviction court's denial of his petition. After reviewing the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, arguing: (1) his "best interest" plea was not entered voluntarily and intelligently; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective in representing him at sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Andre Kimbrough, appeals his conviction in the Davidson County Criminal Court for second degree murder. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by: 1) failing to act as a thirteenth juror; 2) permitting the State to impeach the Defendant using prior bad acts without giving proper notice to the Defendant; and 3) not applying certain mitigating factors in sentencing Defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jerome F. Sawyers, pled guilty on July 16, 2001, to possession of cocaine less than .5 grams for resale and felony possession of a firearm and was sentenced, respectively, to six years and two years as a Range I, standard offender, with both sentences to be served concurrently. A violation of probation warrant was issued on August 8, 2001, alleging that he had violated probation by being in possession of a weapon and failing to report to his probation officer as ordered. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation; and he timely appealed, arguing that the proof was insufficient that he had violated the terms of his probation. We conclude that the evidence supports the revocation of probation.

The defendant was charged with twenty-four separate counts including one count of driving under the influence, nine counts of reckless endangerment involving a deadly weapon, one count of reckless driving, eight counts of aggravated assault, two counts of failure to give notice of an accident, two counts of evading arrest creating a risk of death, and one count of false imprisonment. Eight of the reckless endangerment and reckless driving counts merged with other charges. The defendant entered guilty pleas to the other sixteen counts. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty years and six months. The defendant appealed the sentence as excessive, arguing that the trial court erred in calculating his total sentence. After review of the record, we affirm the judgments of conviction but remand for entry of corrected judgments.

The defendant, Ruben Joseph Knight, Jr., appeals the Blount County Circuit Court's revocation of his community corrections sentence. Following our review of the record, the parties' briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm.

The Defendant, Adrian Lumpkin, was indicted for aggravated assault. He pled guilty and agreed to a sentence of three years with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court granted the Defendant judicial diversion subject to several conditions. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by placing unreasonable conditions on its grant of judicial diversion. We conclude that the trial court had no legal authority to impose a term of incarceration as a condition of judicial diversion. However, with respect to the remaining conditions, we dismiss the Defendant's appeal because a defendant to whom judicial diversion was granted has no appeal as of right.

The defendant, David L. Baker, was convicted of driving under the influence, fourth offense, and sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with 210 days to be served in the county jail and the balance on supervised probation. He was ordered to pay a fine of $1100 and to complete an alcohol education safety program, and his driver's license was suspended for four years. He timely appealed, presenting as the single issue his claim that the evidence presented was insufficient to support the verdict. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

The Appellants, Lloyd E. Ferrell and Debra L. Ferrell, appeal the denial of post-conviction relief by the Hardin County Circuit Court. On appeal, both contend that the post-conviction court erred by not finding ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition, Debra Ferrell asserts: (1) that she should be granted a new trial because the State failed to provide Brady/Bagley material: (2) that the postconviction court erred by not making written findings of fact on each issue raised in the petition, and (3) that the cumulative effect of all errors at trial, in addition to counsel’s ineffectiveness, deprived her of a meaningful defense. After review, we affirm the dismissal of the petitions.

A Williamson County jury convicted the defendants of DUI, first offense. Defendant Daniel was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, all suspended except for 90 days incarceration. Defendant Echols' eleven-month and twenty-nine day sentence was suspended after 30 days incarceration. The sole issue on appeal is whether their sentences are excessive. We find the defendants failed to file their notices of appeal within 30 days of the trial court's orders overruling their motions for new trial; therefore, their appeal is dismissed.

The defendant pled guilty to one count of Class D felony theft over $10,000, received an agreed three-year sentence, and agreed to allow the trial court to determine the manner in which her sentence would be served. The trial court ordered the sentence to be served in incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Carla Moten, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for aggravated burglary and intentional aggravated assault. Defendant was convicted by a jury of the lesser-included offense of reckless aggravated assault. The jury also found Defendant guilty of aggravated criminal trespass as a lesser-included offense of aggravated burglary. Defendant was sentenced to two years for her reckless aggravated assault conviction and six months for her aggravated criminal trespass conviction, to be served concurrently. In her appeal as of right, Defendant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support her conviction for reckless aggravated assault. We disagree, and affirm the judgment of the trial court regarding the conviction for reckless aggravated assault. However, we find plain error in the conviction for aggravated criminal trespass as a lesser-included offense of aggravated burglary and therefore reverse and dismiss the conviction for aggravated criminal trespass.

A Shelby County jury found the Defendant guilty of especially aggravated robbery and felony murder in the perpetration of a robbery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I violent offender to life imprisonment for the felony murder conviction and to twenty-two years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to give a requested jury instruction on lost or destroyed evidence, that the evidence presented by an accomplice was not sufficiently corroborated to support the convictions, and that the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant for the especially aggravated robbery conviction by not including in the record specific findings regarding the enhancement and mitigating factors considered in sentencing him. We affirm the Defendant's convictions, but remand to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing for the especially aggravated robbery conviction.

The petitioner, Michael Edmondson, appeals as of right the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He challenges his convictions pursuant to guilty pleas contending that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to investigate and prepare his case for trial. We affirm the trial court's denial of the post-conviction petition.