APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Appellant, James Mario Starnes, was indicted by the Bedford County Grand Jury for first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Starnes pled guilty to attempted second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Following a sentencing hearing, Starnes received concurrent sentences of ten years, nine months for attempted second degree murder and twenty-five years for especially aggravated robbery. Starnes now appeals his especially aggravated robbery conviction, contending that the evidence is insufficient to establish his guilt for that offense. Because the error complained of was waived as a matter of law by Starnes’ plea of guilty, this issue is not reviewable upon direct appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. 

The defendant, Charles E. Jones, pled guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, and unlawful possession of a weapon. For these convictions, the trial court classified the defendant as a Range I standard offender and ordered him to serve an aggregate one year sentence, consisting of concurrent sentences of one year for his possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver conviction, eleven months and twenty-nine days for his possession of drug paraphernalia conviction, and thirty days for his unlawful possession of a weapon conviction. The state agreed to suspend the two latter sentences, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to serve four years of probation and one year of incarceration, which was to be suspended after the defendant served ninety days in the county jail. The defendant now appeals his sentence, alleging (1) that the trial court erroneously modified his plea agreement with the state after it had been submitted to the trial court for approval, (2) that the trial court improperly denied his request to serve the entirety of his sentence on probation, and (3) that the trial court improperly weighed and applied various enhancement and mitigating factors. After reviewing the record, we find that none of the defendant's allegations merit relief and therefore affirm the defendant's sentence.

The defendant, Shani Carr, appeals as of right from her three-year jail sentence imposed by the Coffee County Circuit Court following her guilty plea to manufacturing methamphetamine, a Class C felony. She contends that the trial court should not have sentenced her to incarceration based upon the need for deterrence because the record is devoid of proof for such need. We agree, reverse the trial court's sentence of incarceration, and sentence the defendant to split confinement.

The petitioner, Delivetrick Dewon Blocker, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Scott Benn, who was originally charged with felony murder and aggravated child abuse, was convicted of one count of aggravated child abuse. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-five years. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of felony murder and aggravated child abuse; (2) that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence; and (3) that the sentence is excessive. Although the trial court erred by failing to instruct on the lesser included offenses, the error can be classified as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The judgment is, therefore, affirmed.

The Appellant, Donald E. Bryant, entered guilty pleas to the offenses of evading arrest, class D felony theft, misdemeanor theft, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and two violations of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender Act (MVHO). Under the terms of the plea agreement, Bryant received an effective twenty-year sentence as a range II multiple offender for these crimes. The plea agreement provided that the manner of service of the sentences would be submitted to the trial court. Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the sentences be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Bryant argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant him a sentence of community corrections. Finding this argument without merit, the judgment of the Blount County Circuit Court is affirmed.

The Appellant, Roger D. Harrison, was convicted, following a bench trial, of DUI, second offense. On appeal, Harrison challenges his conviction upon grounds that: (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence of driving under the influence because there was insufficient probable cause to stop his vehicle and his pre-arrest period of detention was excessive and unreasonable, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Although not raised as an issue on appeal, we find it necessary to address the question of whether a federal law enforcement officer, when acting beyond his assigned federal duties and jurisdiction, may lawfully stop or seize a person who commits a state traffic offense in his presence. After review, we find the federal officer in this case had state authority to stop Harrison's vehicle. Moreover, finding Harrison's issues on appeal without merit, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence after being convicted by a Davidson County jury of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Upon his plea of guilty, the Defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle after having been ordered not to under the terms of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act. For this Class E felony, the Defendant was sentenced as a Range II multiple offender to serve four years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by not allowing his sentence to be served in community corrections. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Stanley Mills, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder and resulting twenty-year sentence. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney did not (1) prepare for trial adequately; (2) object to the trial court's erroneous jury instruction regarding his possible sentences; and (3) object to the trial court's amending his judgment of conviction to reflect that he was to serve one hundred percent of his sentence instead of thirty percent. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petition.

The defendant was convicted of assault, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-101 and sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with ninety days to be served in the county jail and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, in addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, he argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence and erred by ordering that he serve ninety days in confinement. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and the record supports the trial court’s sentencing determinations. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Jared Michael Christein, was convicted by a jury in the Sullivan County Criminal Court of second degree murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The appellant's second degree murder conviction was merged into his felony murder conviction and he was sentenced to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court also sentenced the appellant to twenty-five years incarceration for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for our review: whether sufficient evidence existed to support his convictions and whether the trial court properly charged the jury on the appropriate lesser-included offenses. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Ricky Woods, of aggravated burglary, theft of property valued over $500, and vandalism of property under $500. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II multiple offender for the convictions for aggravated burglary and theft and imposed concurrent sentences of eight years for aggravated burglary, three years for theft, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for vandalism. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; and (2) the sentences are excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the defendant, Donnie Thompson, of voluntary manslaughter and attempted voluntary manslaughter. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I standard offender to the maximum sentences of six years for voluntary manslaughter and four years for attempted voluntary manslaughter, with the sentences to run consecutively. On appeal, the defendant contends his sentences are excessive. We reduce the sentence for voluntary manslaughter to five years, affirm the four-year sentence for attempted voluntary manslaughter, and order the sentences to run concurrently.

The petitioner, Ronald Paul, appeals the Robertson County Criminal Court's disposition of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petition alleged ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The lower court ruled that, because appellate counsel's single issue raised on direct appeal was deemed waived by the appellate court, the petitioner would be entitled to a delayed appeal. The court also dismissed without prejudice the remaining allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, indicating that the petitioner could file a new petition for post-conviction relief after the conclusion of the delayed direct appeal. Because we lack jurisdiction in this appeal, we dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, Jerry Wayne Pointer, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced as a violent offender to life imprisonment without parole. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence seized from his person and his home, in ruling that his prior convictions were admissible for impeachment purposes, in allowing testimony of a prior violent incident between him and the victim, and, additionally, that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Tommy William Davis, was convicted of Class D theft of property over $1,000 and was sentenced to a term of six years incarceration, as a Range II offender. On appeal, he argues that the trial court should have granted a judgment of acquittal at the close of the state’s proof, and he challenges the length of his sentence as premised on an invalid enhancement factor. Our review convinces us that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction and that, although improper enhancement factors were applied, a sentence of six years is appropriate.

While I concur with the majority that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for theft of property over $1,000, I reach that result from a somewhat different approach than that taken in the principal opinion. The majority concludes that the defendant’s presence in and operation of a borrowed vehicle is sufficient proof to support a finding of constructive possession of contraband contained therein. Concededly, this has been the conclusion reached by this Court in a number of its decisions. See, e.g., State v. Gonzalo Moran Garcia, No. M2000-01760-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 146, at *111 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nashville, Feb. 20, 2002); State v. Brown, 915 S.W.2d 3, 7-8 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). However, having re-read the opinion of the Tennessee Supreme Court in State v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d 900 (Tenn. 2001), I am convinced that mere presence in and operation of a vehicle containing contraband is, without other proof of a power or intention on the part of the defendant to exercise dominion and control over the contraband, insufficient to establish “constructive possession.” Nevertheless, I believe that the record of the instant case provides sufficient other proof that, when coupled with the proof of the defendant’s presence in and operation of the vehicle containing contraband, establishes the constructive possession necessary in this case to sustain a theft conviction.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree felony murder, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He argues that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) the post-conviction court erred in finding that his statement taken by law enforcement officers did not violate his constitutional rights. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

The defendant, Donald P. Wilcox, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court's denial of his request for probation for his guilty pleas to violating a habitual traffic offender order, a Class E felony; violating the registration law, a Class C misdemeanor; and possession of alprazolam pills, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia, Class A misdemeanors. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

A Hardin County jury convicted the defendant of two counts of aggravated assault. On appeal, he contends: (1) the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial during jury voir dire; (2) the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for new trial based on alleged juror misconduct; and (3) the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Wilmore Hatfield, was indicted for attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, felony possession of a weapon, and driving under the influence (DUI). Following a jury trial, Hatfield was found guilty of felony reckless endangerment, as a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault, and DUI. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of two years for the felony reckless endangerment conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the DUI conviction. On appeal, Hatfield raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether felony reckless endangerment is a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault as charged in the indictment; (2) whether the trial court's DUI instruction was proper; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts; and (4) whether his sentences were excessive. We hold that felony reckless endangerment is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault committed by intentionally or knowingly causing bodily injury to another by use or display of a deadly weapon. Therefore, the felony reckless endangerment conviction must be reversed and remanded for a new trial on the lesser charge of misdemeanor assault. Regarding Hatfield's DUI conviction, we conclude that the trial court properly charged the jury and the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. However, we find that the trial court erred by ordering Hatfield to serve his entire eleven-month and twenty-nine-day sentence in the county jail. Accordingly, his DUI conviction is affirmed; however, his sentence is modified to reflect a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with all time suspended except forty-eight hours to be served in the county jail.

The Defendant, Terry Wayne Luna, was convicted by a jury of aggravated sexual battery. He was sentenced to twenty years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a mistrial because the Defendant was unduly prejudiced by a non-responsive answer to a question asked by defense counsel on cross-examination. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Bobby Earl Ferrell, Jr., appeals as of right the sentences imposed by the Bedford County Circuit Court following the defendant's guilty pleas to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000, a Class D felony. He contends that the trial court should not have ordered him to serve his effective four-year sentence consecutively to a prior Rutherford County sentence. We affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court.