APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Byron M. Edwards appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief attacking his jury conviction for aggravated robbery and for which he was sentenced to 30 years. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a plea offer by the state that he rejected. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

Defendant, Phillip Howard White, Jr., was indicted on one count of felony murder and one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of second degree murder and not guilty of attempted especially aggravated robbery. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve twenty-five years. In his appeal, Defendant alleges that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in not instructing the jury to refrain from sleeping; (3) the trial court erred in not granting Defendant's request for a continuance because of Defendant's physical appearance at trial; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing Defendant to twenty-five years. After a careful review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Greene County jury convicted the Defendant of aggravated burglary and theft of property. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of six years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the appropriateness of the sentences imposed. He also argues that the trial court should have declared a mistrial when evidence of other crimes by the Defendant was introduced at trial. Because we conclude that the evidence is sufficient, the sentences are appropriate, and a mistrial was not required, we affirm the convictions.

This appeal arises pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9. The appellant, Darrell Wayne Taylor, seeks interlocutory review of the question of whether a trial court in a post-conviction proceeding involving a capital case is authorized following an ex parte grant of fees for expert services pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 40-14-207(b), to issue ex parte orders directing the transportation of evidence in state custody to a defense expert for independent forensic tests. After careful consideration of the applicable law, we hold that there is no right on the part of an accused in a criminal case, capital or otherwise, to obtain permission ex parte for independent forensic testing of physical evidence in the custody of the State. However, following an adversarial hearing where both the prosecution and the defense may be heard, the trial judge may grant a defense request for independent testing of such physical evidence under such conditions as the trial court may in its discretion deem appropriate to protect the interests of both parties. Accordingly the judgment of the trial court staying the ex parte order to transport physical evidence for independent testing is affirmed and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

The Defendant, Ashley Nesbitt, was convicted by a jury of one count of first degree murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and one count of aggravated robbery. The Defendant now appeals as of right, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Finding the evidence insufficient to support one of the attempted murder convictions, we reverse and dismiss the Defendant's conviction for the attempted first degree murder of Carl Turner. We affirm the remaining convictions.

The petitioner, Randall Eugene Best, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. The judgment is affirmed.

The Appellant, William K. Robison, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Hickman County Circuit Court. Robison is currently serving an effective sentence of fifteen years as a result of his guilty pleas to aggravated assault, setting fire to personal property, escape and theft over $10,000. On appeal, Robinson argues the post-conviction court erred in finding that: (1) he received effective assistance of counsel and (2) his guilty pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered. Finding no error, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The petitioner pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault and one count of aggravated kidnapping on September 10, 1998, and was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent sentences of eight years at 35% for each count of aggravated assault and as a Range I, standard offender to eight years at 30% for the aggravated kidnapping charge, with the sentence suspended and the petitioner placed on eight-year probation. As a result of a probation violation, the trial court, on September 14, 2001, revoked probation and amended the judgments so that the sentence to be served for aggravated kidnapping was modified to eight years at 100%. Challenging the amendment, a pro se petition for post-conviction relief was filed on January 2, 2002, which was denied as being untimely. On appeal, the petitioner argues that, because the one-year statute of limitations began to run at the time of entry of the amended judgment for the kidnapping conviction, his post-conviction petition was timely. We agree and reverse the order of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition as untimely.

The petitioner, Danyelle Dewain Parker, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, George Mears, was found guilty of theft of property of not less than $1,000 nor more than $10,000, a Class D felony. In his motion for a new trial, Defendant raised one issue, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Defendant contended that his counsel failed to adequately investigate and develop all available defense strategies and failed to adequately prepare for trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Defendant's motion for a new trial. The trial court concluded that Defendant's counsel should have interviewed two witnesses prior to the day of trial but that Defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced by counsel's delayed interviews. As to all other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court found that Defendant failed to show that his counsel's performance was deficient. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted by a jury of possession of more than 300 grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I standard offender to twenty years incarceration. The defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We conclude the evidence is sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The co-defendants pled guilty to conspiracy to sell "ecstasy," a Schedule I controlled substance. After a sentencing hearing, each received a sentence of eight years to be served in split confinement, with all but eight months on probation. The co-defendants contend that the trial court erred in not granting them full probation. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that his guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary and that he received the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C felony and received a three-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the defendant serve his three-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to grant the defendant probation or alternative sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Dock Walker appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claims that the court should not have dismissed the petition without appointing counsel and affording him the opportunity to amend the petition. He also claims that based upon due process principles, his petition should not be barred by the statute of limitations. Because the lower court properly discerned that the petitioner had not presented a timely claim for relief, we affirm.

The Maury County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for selling less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, and following a trial, a Maury County jury convicted the defendant of the casual exchange of a controlled substance. The trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days' incarceration and suspended all but forty-five days of the sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to introduce evidence concerning the source of the cocaine and by denying him full probation. We find no error by the trial court and therefore affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.

The defendant appeals her Sullivan County conviction, pursuant to a bench trial, of tampering with or fabricating evidence. On appeal, the defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Because we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, we reverse the conviction and dismiss the charge.

Defendant, Gregory Lance, appeals his convictions in the Putnam County Criminal Court for two counts of first degree premeditated murder, especially aggravated burglary, and arson. For the first degree murder convictions, the trial court imposed two concurrent sentences of life imprisonment. For the especially aggravated burglary conviction and arson conviction, defendant was sentenced to serve eight years and three years respectively, to be served concurrently with his life sentences. In this direct appeal, defendant argues: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; (2) the trial court erred in denying his requested jury instruction regarding circumstantial evidence; and (3) there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Marcus Tramane Green, appeals the sentence imposed by the Montgomery County Circuit Court following his guilty pleas to especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced him to respective concurrent terms of seventeen years as a Range I, violent offender and four and one-half years as a Range I, standard offender to be served in the Department of Correction. The defendant contends that his sentences are excessive, arguing that the trial court misapplied enhancement factors and failed to apply certain mitigating factors. We affirm the effective seventeen-year sentence imposed by the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of burglary, a Class D felony, after a jury trial and was sentenced to two years, six months, with all but fifteen days suspended, and the balance to be served on supervised probation. The defendant was also ordered to pay $353.95 in restitution to North Elementary School. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in denying full probation and ordering that he serve fifteen days in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Joe Charles Degrafenreid, was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence (DUI) as a second offender. In this direct appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for DUI and that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.