APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Brandon Ronald Crabtree, was found guilty of (1) selling marijuana, a Schedule VI controlled substance in an amount of not less than one-half ounce nor more than ten pounds, a Class E felony, and (2) selling a counterfeit controlled substance, a Class E felony. After a sentencing hearing, Defendant was sentenced to two years for each conviction, and the trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively. The trial court also determined at the sentencing hearing that Defendant was then (or at that time) on probation for a prior conviction and that Defendant was in violation of that probation. The trial court revoked Defendant's probation and ordered the original sentence of eighteen months to run consecutively to the sentences imposed for the two felony convictions for an effective sentence of five and one-half years. In his appeal, Defendant does not contest his conviction for selling a Schedule VI controlled substance. However, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for the sale of a counterfeit controlled substance. Defendant also challenges the length of his sentences arguing that the trial court failed to follow the principles of the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 and failed to properly weigh mitigating and enhancing factors. After a careful review of the record, we affirm Defendant's conviction for the sale of a counterfeit controlled substance and affirm the trial court's judgments as to Defendant's sentences.

The appellant, Stephen Massey, was convicted by a jury in the Giles County Circuit Court of two counts of selling less than .5 grams of crack cocaine, Class C felonies, and three counts of selling .5 grams or more of crack cocaine, Class B felonies. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range II multiple offender to an effective sentence of eighteen years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, (2) the trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion to sever, (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to exclude two African-Americans from the jury based on their race, and (4) the sentences imposed by the trial court were excessive. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Clorie L. Jackson, was convicted by a jury of forgery and money laundering. The trial court subsequently merged the forgery conviction into the money laundering conviction,¹ and sentenced the Defendant to nineteen years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the money laundering conviction, as well as the trial court’s jury instructions on that offense. Because we find the evidence insufficient to support the money laundering conviction, we reverse that conviction and dismiss the charge. The conviction for forgery is reinstated. The case is remanded to the trial court for sentencing on the forgery conviction.

Petitioner, Charles Roy Cole, filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court of Madison County. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant was indicted for one count of rape of a child and for two counts of child abuse and neglect. A jury convicted the Defendant of all three counts. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-five years for rape of a child and to four years for each count of child abuse. The trial court ordered that the sentences run concurrently for an effective sentence of twenty-five years. The Defendant now appeals, arguing the following: (1) that insufficient evidence was presented to convict him of the charged offenses, (2) that the trial court erred by admitting a note found at the scene and attributing it to the Defendant, and (3) that the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Brandon Charles Cain, was convicted by a jury of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises two evidentiary issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress statements he gave to law enforcement officers; and (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to show the jury a videotape in which the victim's injuries were depicted. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Kathryn L. Byrd, was convicted by a jury of one count of theft over $1,000. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to four years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to a previous sentence. The Defendant now appeals, contesting the sufficiency of the evidence; claiming reversible error because the State was not required to elect the offense for which it was seeking a conviction; and contesting the trial judge's order of consecutive sentencing. We affirm the Defendant's conviction. We reverse the imposition of consecutive sentences and order the Defendant's sentences to run concurrently.

The Defendant, Rita Ellis, was convicted upon a jury verdict of theft under the value of five hundred dollars, a Class A misdemeanor. She was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail, but her sentence was suspended, and she was placed on probation. She was fined two hundred and fifty dollars. The Defendant presents two issues for review, which she states as follows: (1) failure of counsel to request recording of proceedings denied right of effective appeal; and (2) appellant denied ability to properly argue that verdict was against the weight of the evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In September 1998, the Petitioner pled guilty to attempted rape, three counts of reckless endangerment, three counts of forgery, and three counts of theft of property. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of nine years, with eleven months and twenty-nine days of confinement followed by eight years of probation. The Petitioner served approximately six months of his sentence in jail and was released on probation. In December 1999, the trial court revoked the Petitioner's probation on seven of the ten felony charges based upon the Petitioner's acquisition of new charges, failure to pay restitution, failure to attend counseling, and violation of curfew. The Petitioner did not appeal the trial court's revocation of his probation. In September 2002, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition without a hearing, and this appeal ensued. Concluding that the Petitioner has failed to state a proper claim for post-conviction relief and that the post-conviction petition is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of especially aggravated robbery and criminal attempt to commit second degree murder for his role with a codefendant in robbing and shooting the owner of a Memphis jewelry store. He was sentenced by the trial court to consecutive terms of twenty-three years at 100% for the especially aggravated robbery conviction and twelve years at 30% for the attempted second degree murder conviction. In a timely appeal to this court, the defendant raises the following four issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by overruling his motion to suppress the victim's identification testimony; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying his request for a special jury instruction; (3) whether the trial court committed plain error in its instruction of the definition of "knowingly"; and (4) whether the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing. Based on our review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and sentenced by the trial court as a Range III, persistent offender to fifteen years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, he raises two issues: whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction and whether the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of facilitation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this direct appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in revoking his probation and requiring him to serve his four-year sentence in the Department of Correction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On January 5, 2001, the petitioner pled guilty to filing a false police report, aggravated burglary, theft over $1000, vandalism, carjacking, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of aggravated robbery and received a fifteen-year sentence. On February 2, 2001, he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, which was determined to be untimely and was treated as a petition for post-conviction relief. Because of the subsequent decision of our supreme court in State v. Green, __ S.W.3d __ (Tenn. 2003), we conclude that the petitioner's motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty was timely and should have proceeded pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(f), Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty. We reverse the order of the post-conviction court and remand for the petitioner's motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty to be considered as timely.

The State appeals the ruling of the Cocke County Circuit Court amending its judgments pertaining to the sentencing of Defendant, Brian Webb, pursuant to Rule 36 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under the terms of a plea agreement involving Defendant's four theft convictions in Cocke and Jefferson counties, the trial court sentenced Defendant on January 8, 2001 to an effective three-year sentence to be served concurrently with Defendant's federal sentence of twenty-four months arising out of the same incident. The trial court's judgment was entered on January 30, 2001 following Defendant's incarceration in federal prison on January 29, 2001. On August 22, 2002, Defendant filed a motion to correct a mistake in the trial court's judgment. After a brief hearing, the trial court granted Defendant's motion and ordered that Defendant's state sentences be modified to time served and the balance served on probation to reflect the trial court's understanding at the time of sentencing that Defendant's sentences would run "coterminous" rather than "concurrently" with his federal sentence. The State argues that the record in this matter does not contain any clerical errors, and the trial court was without jurisdiction to modify Defendant's sentence. After a careful review of this matter, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, and this case is remanded for reinstatement of the judgments of conviction as originally entered.

Convicted of burglary and theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, the defendant, Jeffery W. Alexander, claims on appeal that the convictions are unsupported by sufficient evidence, that the trial court erred in admitting copies of photographs of the crime scene, and that the trial court erroneously sentenced him as a career offender. Because our review of the record, the briefs, and the applicable law exposes no reversible error, we affirm.

The Appellant, Jeremiah Wiseman, pled guilty to carjacking, a class B felony, and was sentenced as a mitigated offender to the Department of Correction for a term of 7.2 years. On appeal, the Appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying him a probated sentence. Finding no error in the record, we affirm.

The defendant, Steve A. White, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony; theft of property valued $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony; and violating the sales tax law, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to an effective sentence of thirty-one years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming (1) that the evidence is insufficient; (2) that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a bill of particulars; (3) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to exclude evidence; (4) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury after the prosecution asked a witness an inappropriate question; (5) that the trial court improperly excluded impeachment evidence; (6) that the trial court made several errors regarding the victim's testimony; (7) that the trial court improperly restricted the defense expert's testimony; and (8) that the trial court improperly allowed the state to make inappropriate comments during its closing argument. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Clint Ray McCoy, pled guilty to twelve counts of theft: one Class C felony, nine Class D felonies, one Class E felony, and one Class A misdemeanor. Sentencing was left to the discretion of the trial court. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of eight years, with one year to be served in confinement and the balance to be served in the Community Corrections program. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by enhancing his sentences and by ordering him to serve one year in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Stephon Harden, appeals from the judgment of the Sullivan County Circuit Court revoking his probation and remanding him to the Department of Correction. In March of 1999, Harden pled guilty to two counts of class E felony theft, one count of forgery, aggravated burglary, and failure to appear. He received an effective six-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. Harden was released following completion of the "boot camp" program and was administratively granted probation by the Commissioner of Correction. Warrants alleging violations of his probationary sentence were issued on February 21st and 28th of 2002. Following a hearing, he was found in violation of his probation and resentenced to the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by failing to consider alternatives to revocation. Finding no merit to Harden's claim, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Christopher Curry, filed in the Lake County Circuit Court a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his confinement was illegal due to the expiration of his sentence. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition and the petitioner appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus relief and remand to the habeas corpus court for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the petitioner's sentence has expired.

The Appellant, Steve Kyger, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Rutherford County Circuit Court. On December 21, 1987, Kyger was convicted of first degree murder, armed robbery, and joyriding, and received a sentence of life imprisonment plus thirty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Kyger challenges these convictions raising the single issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Thurman G. Ledford appeals a certified question of law whether the strong odor of ammonia emanating from his residence supported probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, which resulted in his arrest for drug-related activities. Because we conclude that the issue is not dispositive of the defendant's case, we dismiss his appeal.

The Defendant, Mario Antoine Leggs, was convicted by a jury of theft, robbery, two counts of reckless endangerment, aggravated robbery, two counts of evading arrest, three counts of reckless aggravated assault, leaving the scene of an accident, and driving on a suspended license. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of twenty-three years, eleven months, and twenty-eight days in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion to sever the offenses; (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting prior identification testimony; (3) whether the Defendant is entitled to a new trial based upon improper remarks made by the prosecutor during closing argument; (4) whether the trial court erred by not reducing the Defendant's three convictions for reckless aggravated assault to simple assault; (5) whether the trial court erred by not merging one of the Defendant's convictions for evading arrest with his conviction for leaving the scene of an accident; and (6) whether the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant. We hold that the trial court erred by not severing the offenses that occurred on November 16, 2000. However, we deem the error harmless. Because we find insufficient evidence to support the Defendant's second conviction for evading arrest, we reverse it and dismiss that charge. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.