APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This matter is before the Court upon the application of the Petitioner, Michael Dale Rimmer, for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. The Petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to disqualify the Attorney General’s Office from representing the State in his capital post-conviction proceeding. The Petitioner raises numerous constitutional and statutory challenges to 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 182 (“the Act”), which gives the Attorney General “exclusive control over the state’s defense of the request for collateral review” in capital cases. The State has responded in opposition to the application, arguing that the Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the Act and, alternatively, that the Petitioner has failed to establish that this case merits extraordinary review. For the reasons set forth below, the Petitioner’s application is hereby denied.

This matter is before the Court upon the application of the Petitioner, Charles Rice, for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. The Petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to disqualify the Attorney General’s Office from representing the State in his capital intellectual disability proceeding. The Petitioner raises numerous constitutional and statutory challenges to 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 182 (“the Act”), which gives the Attorney General “exclusive control over the state’s defense of the request for collateral review” in capital cases. The State has responded in opposition to the application, arguing that the Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the Act and, alternatively, that the Petitioner has failed to establish that this case merits extraordinary review. For the reasons set forth below, the Petitioner’s application is hereby denied.

Petitioner, Alejandro Avila-Salazar, appeals the denial of his pro se “Petition For a Writ of Habeas Corpus[,] Rule 36.1 Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence[,] Petition for Common Law Writ of Certiorari.” After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Jeffrey Lee Potts, claims the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition for relief from his conviction for attempted second degree murder. On appeal, Petitioner claims (1) that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-110(f), which requires that petitioners prove “allegations of fact by clear and convincing evidence,” is inconsistent with Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and “erects an unconstitutional barrier to relief” and (2) that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to obtain and call a use-of-force expert witness at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendant, Randall Lee Neece, of first degree premeditated murder. On the first day of trial, the Defendant moved for a change of venue, asserting that a newly installed “Victims of Violent Crime” monument outside the courthouse prejudiced prospective jurors. The trial court denied the motion, and the Defendant was convicted as charged. On appeal, the Defendant does not challenge the denial of a venue change or the adequacy of voir dire but instead contends that the sworn jurors were exposed to extraneous prejudicial information through the monument. Upon our review, we conclude that this claim was not preserved for plenary review and does not warrant plain error relief. We therefore respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Charlie Richard Martinez, of first degree
felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective
sentence of life imprisonment plus four years. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the
evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting three different writings attributed to the Defendant as autobiographical rap lyrics;
(3) the trial court committed plain error in allowing the State to amend the especially
aggravated robbery count the morning of trial; (4) the trial court erred in allowing Kendra
Ivey to testify to double hearsay; (5) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
Specific Discovery Request No. 1, which requested materials necessary for his state-funded
expert; and (6) the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of a fair trial. After
review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant of one count of rape of a child. By consent of the parties, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a standard offender to twenty-five years’ incarceration, to be served at one hundred percent. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in limiting his cross-examination of one of the prosecution witnesses. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Lamonte Cole, appeals from the order of the Madison County Circuit Court denying post-conviction relief. Upon review, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Christopher Nicol Cox, appeals from the Scott County Criminal Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues the postconviction
court erred in denying his petition in that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel due to trial counsel’s (1) failure to object, move for a mistrial, or request a curative
instruction after a prospective juror stated she had previously “dealt with” the Petitioner
through her work with child protective services, (2) releasing an alibi witness from his
subpoena when he failed to appear at trial, and (3) failure to adequately advise the Petitioner
regarding his right to testify. The Petitioner also asserts that the cumulative effect of trial
counsel’s errors entitles him to post-conviction relief. Discerning no error, we affirm.

After a second jury trial in the Shelby County Criminal Court, the Defendant, Alan Johnson, was convicted of two counts of first degree felony murder, one count of aggravated child abuse, and one count of aggravated child neglect. The trial court sentenced him to life for each murder conviction and merged those convictions. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years each for the aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect convictions, Class A felonies, and ordered that he serve all of the sentences consecutively for a total effective sentence of life plus fifty years. On appeal, the Defendant claims that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) his second trial violated double jeopardy; (3) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statement to police; (4) the trial court committed plain error by allowing a medical examiner to testify about the victim’s autopsy report when the witness did not prepare the report; (5) the State’s prosecutorial misconduct during cross-examination of the defense’s expert witness constituted plain error; (6) the trial court erred by not admitting his entire 911 call into evidence; (7) the trial court’s denial of his request to have retained counsel represent him on his motion for new trial violated his constitutional right to counsel of choice; (8) his effective sentence is excessive; and (9) he is entitled to relief based on cumulative error.1 Upon our review, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child neglect and that the trial court incorrectly ordered the Defendant to serve one hundred percent of his sentence for aggravated child neglect. Therefore, the Defendant’s conviction of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child neglect in count four is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for correction of the judgment for aggravated child neglect in count three. The Defendant’s remaining convictions and effective sentence of life plus fifty years are affirmed.

The Defendant, Marion Brock Foreman, was convicted at a bench trial by the Henderson County Circuit Court of twenty counts of possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony drug offense and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. See T.C.A. § 39- 17-1307 (Supp. 2021) (subsequently amended) (unlawful possession of a firearm); § 39- 17-425 (2018) (possession of drug paraphernalia). He was found not guilty of ten counts of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous offense involving the felony sale or delivery of a controlled substance and two counts of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver. After merger, he received an effective sentence of eight years with a 35% release eligibility for five counts of possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony drug offense and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence derived from the search of his property and home. We conclude that the trial court erred, reverse the judgments of the court, vacate the convictions, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The pro se Petitioner, Dexter Parker, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This consolidated appeal is before this court on the Petitioner, Jason Lee Fisher’s, application for permission to appeal the Marshall County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis and the denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. The Petitioner argues that the circuit court1 erred in denying both his petition for a writ of error coram nobis and his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings based upon a claim of juror bias during his trial. He also raises constitutional challenges to the error coram nobis and motion to reopen post-conviction statutes. Finally, he contends that the circuit court erred by finding that he failed to establish prejudice on his juror bias claim. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court denying the petition for a writ of error coram nobis, and we deny the Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal the denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings.

This matter is before the Court upon the application of the Petitioner, Sedrick Clayton, for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. The Petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to disqualify the Attorney General’s Office from representing the State in his capital post-conviction proceeding. The Petitioner raises numerous constitutional and statutory challenges to 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 182 (“the Act”), which gives the Attorney General “exclusive control over the state’s defense of the request for collateral review” in capital cases. The State has responded in opposition to the application, arguing that the Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the Act and, alternatively, that the Petitioner has failed to establish that this case merits extraordinary review. For the reasons set forth below, the Petitioner’s application is hereby denied.

This matter is before the Court upon the application of the Petitioner, Urshawn Miller, for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. The Petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to disqualify the Attorney General’s Office from representing the State in his capital post-conviction proceeding. The Petitioner raises numerous constitutional and statutory challenges to 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 182 (“the Act”), which gives the Attorney General “exclusive control over the state’s defense of the request for collateral review” in capital cases. The State has responded in opposition to the application, arguing that the Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the Act and, alternatively, that the Petitioner has failed to establish that this case merits extraordinary review. For the reasons set forth below, the Petitioner’s application is hereby denied.

Defendant, Richard Daran Angel, was indicted for one count of theft by home improvement in an amount of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. Before trial, Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the contractor fraud statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-154, was unconstitutionally vague, both on its face and as applied to him. After a hearing, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion and entered an order dismissing the indictment. The State appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in determining that the contractor fraud statute was unconstitutionally vague at the pretrial stage because Defendant could not show that the statute was vague as applied to him. After review, we agree with the State and reverse and remand the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Richard Daran Angel, was indicted for one count of theft by home improvement in an amount of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. Before trial, Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the contractor fraud statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-154, was unconstitutionally vague, both on its face and as applied to him. After a hearing, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion and entered an order dismissing the indictment. The State appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in determining that the contractor fraud statute was unconstitutionally vague at the pretrial stage because Defendant could not show that the statute was vague as applied to him. After review, we agree with the State and reverse and remand the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Lurry, was charged by the Shelby County Grand Jury in a four-count indictment with first degree premeditated murder, theft of property valued at $60,000 or more but less than $250,000, attempted carjacking, and attempted theft of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000. The Defendant pled guilty to the attempted theft and theft counts of the indictment, the State nolle prosequied the attempted carjacking count, and the Defendant went to trial on the first degree murder count. Following his jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the first degree premeditated murder count of the indictment. He was sentenced by the trial court to life imprisonment for the murder conviction, ten years for the theft conviction, and two years for the attempted theft conviction. Finding the Defendant to be an offender with an extensive criminal history, the trial court ordered that the Defendant serve all his sentences consecutively, for an effective sentence of life plus twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his first degree premeditated murder conviction and argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a prior domestic abuse incident between the Defendant and the victim, by not allowing the Defendant to introduce the victim’s complete Cellebrite cell phone records, by sentencing the Defendant to the maximum and ordering consecutive sentences, and by admitting expert testimony that was outside the scope of the witness’s expertise and when the Defendant was not put on notice of the witness’s proposed areas of expertise. We affirm the Defendant’s convictions but remand for a new sentencing hearing for the trial court to consider the Defendant’s presentence report in determining whether the sentences should be served consecutively.

Defendant, Ashley Dawn Boyce, appeals from the Maury County Circuit Court’s denial of her motion to suppress evidence following her guilty plea to driving under the influence. Defendant reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A). Upon review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the appellate record does not contain a copy of the judgment of conviction. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.

The Petitioner, Johnny B. Brooks, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for driving under the influence (“DUI”), eighth offense, driving on a revoked license due to a DUI, and a violation of the open container law. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Betty Sparks, appeals the denial of her post-conviction petition alleging that the post-conviction court erred in finding that she received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This matter is before the Court upon the application of the Petitioner, Henry Lee Jones, for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. The Petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to disqualify the Attorney General’s Office from representing the State in his capital post-conviction proceeding. The Petitioner raises numerous constitutional and statutory challenges to 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 182 (“the Act”), which gives the Attorney General “exclusive control over the state’s defense of the request for collateral review” in capital cases. The State has responded in opposition to the application, arguing that the Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the Act and, alternatively, that the Petitioner has failed to establish that this case merits extraordinary review. For the reasons set forth below, the Petitioner’s application is hereby denied.

In 2023, the Defendant, Teresa Shinpaugh, pleaded guilty to one count of criminally negligent homicide and one count of aggravated neglect of an elderly or vulnerable adult, in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining counts of her indictment and pursuant to the agreement that the trial court would determine the length and manner of service of her sentence. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent sentences of two and eight years with one year to serve in confinement and the remainder to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it sentenced her to one year of confinement. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The petitioner, Carlos Gonzalez, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.