APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Roger L. Smith, pled guilty to three counts of child rape in 1998. He subsequently filed for post-conviction relief and for DNA testing. The trial court summarily dismissed the post-conviction petition on the grounds that it is time-barred. The trial court further summarily denied the Defendant's request for DNA testing. The Defendant now appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the Defendant's claim for post-conviction relief, but reverse and remand for further proceedings the trial court's dismissal of the Defendant's request for DNA testing.

The petitioner appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of relief. He contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After careful review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

The defendant entered pleas of guilt to possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with the intent to deliver or sell, possession of a Schedule III controlled substance with the intent to deliver or sell, and possession of marijuana. The trial court imposed concurrent Range I sentences of eight years, two years, and 11 months and 29 days, respectively. The defendant was required to serve one year in jail followed by seven years in community corrections. Later, the community corrections sentence was revoked and an eight-year sentence imposed. An appeal resulted in a remand by this court with directions to credit both jail time and the length of service within the program. In this appeal, the defendant argues that the trial judge erred in the imposition of the resentence. The judgment is affirmed.

The Defendant, Joel Anthony Davenport, pled guilty to multiple counts of passing worthless checks and was sentenced to probation. The Defendant's probation was violated and revoked. Upon revocation, the trial court sentenced the Defendant, and the Defendant asserts that he was sentenced to four years of incarceration, plus an additional year for the count which violated his probation, to be served consecutively to a six year sentence in another county. Accordingly, the Defendant asserts that his sentence was to total eleven years. The Tennessee Department of Corrections report showed that the Defendant was sentenced to fourteen years, not eleven, and the Defendant filed a motion with the trial court to enter an order correcting the "clerical mistake." The trial court denied that motion and the Defendant appeals. Finding no error in the trial court's denial of the Defendant's motion, we affirm.

The defendant pled guilty to one count of delivering a Schedule II controlled substance (Hydromorphone). He was sentenced to 50 months to be served with Corrections Management Corporation, a community-based alternative, after service of 180 days in the county jail. The defendant appealed the sentence, contending that it was excessive. We hold that the trial court properly rejected mitigating factor one because drug dealing inherently involves the risk of bodily injury and that the defendant’s prior criminal behavior justified the sentence imposed. Finding no error, the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant appeals the trial court's denial of judicial diversion contending that the court abused its discretion by not articulating specific reasons on the record for the denial. We agree with the defendant and remand for a new sentencing hearing in order for the trial court to place its reasoning upon the record.

A Hardin County jury convicted the defendant, Donald Franks, of rape of a child. The trial court sentenced the defendant to thirty-seven years as a Range II multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on flight; and (3) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Based upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his motion for correction of an illegal sentence. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the defendant entered a nolo contendere plea to a Class B felony and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to ten years, two years above the presumptive minimum sentence in the range. Subsequently, the defendant filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the trial court violated the requirements of the 1989 Sentencing Reform Act by failing to state enhancement factors to support the increase in his sentence from the presumptive minimum eight-year sentence. The trial court dismissed the motion, and the defendant appealed to this court. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the defendant's motion to correct illegal sentence.

The Sullivan County grand jury indicted Defendant Woodrow Gifford, Jr. for possession of over 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Schedule II drug, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The Sullivan County grand jury indicted Defendant Carl Monk for possession of over 26 grams of cocaine, a Schedule II drug, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. Following the trial court's denial of the Defendants Motions to Suppress evidence, the Defendants both pled nolo contendere to possession with intent to sell drugs, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-17-417, and possession of drug paraphernalia, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-17-425. Both Defendants reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law regarding the trial court's denial of their Motions to Suppress. Finding no error in the trial court's judgment, we affirm.

Following a conviction for DUI, third offense, after entering a guilty plea, Defendant James H. Thompson appeals, asserting that he has presented a certified question of law for review. Because we conclude that the question of law, even if properly reserved at the guilty plea hearing, is not dispositive of the case, we dismiss the appeal.

The defendant appeals the trial court's revocation of his probation, arguing that his due process rights were violated because (1) the trial court allowed the State to amend the revocation petition to include as additional grounds his subsequent convictions for theft and criminal impersonation, without providing him prior written notice; and (2) the trial court failed to issue adequate findings of fact in support of its decision. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Sidney Joseph Ogle, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range I standard offender to three years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court denied the appellant's request for probation and the appellant timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Tommy Dickerson, appeals from the trial court's summary dismissal of Appellant's second petition for post-conviction relief. After a review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals from the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After careful review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief.

Petitioner, Kena Hodges, appeals from the dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. After a review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Glen Bernard Mann, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. In 1994, the petitioner was sentenced to death by a jury for the premeditated first degree murder of Anne Lou Wilson, a sixty-two-year-old widow. He was also convicted and sentenced to twenty-five years for aggravated rape and six years for aggravated burglary of the same victim. The convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal by both this Court and the Tennessee Supreme Court. The petitioner is seeking post-conviction relief for, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel at both the guilt and penalty phase of his trial. The post-conviction court, after a hearing, found the petitioner failed to carry his burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that his trial counsel was ineffective. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief.

On May 3, 2002, a Sevier County jury convicted the defendant, Rodney M. Spurgeon, of arson and the burning of personal property. For these offenses the jury levied fines of $10,000 and $2,500, respectively. After denying the defendant's motion for new trial, the trial court sentenced him to ten years for the arson conviction and four years for setting fire to personal property. These convictions are to run concurrently as a Range II offender. The defendant appeals these convictions. His sole argument on appeal is whether unfair prejudice resulted from the trial court's failure to comply with the strict guidelines of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). We find no reversible error and therefore affirm the convictions.

The defendant pled guilty to theft under $500 and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail at zero percent work release eligibility, to be served consecutively to a two-year sentence in a separate case. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying him probation. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Dedric D. Phillips, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his post-conviction relief petition. The petitioner entered guilty pleas to possession with intent to deliver less than .5 grams of cocaine and simple assault, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of ten years as a Range III persistent offender. On appeal, the petitioner contends: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) his guilty pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily entered. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant of first degree felony murder, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to imprisonment for life with the possibility of parole. The Defendant now appeals, contending the following: (1) that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his statement to police; (2) that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for mistrial based upon a witness's non-responsive statement; (3) that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to assert matters not in evidence during closing arguments; and (4) that the trial court committed plain error by incorrectly instructing the jury with respect to the culpable mental state of "knowingly." Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Lonnie Walter Hurd, appeals from his Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convictions of driving under the influence (DUI) and possession of cocaine. On appeal, he claims that the convicting evidence is insufficient, that certain evidence was improperly admitted, that the testimony of a state's witness violated the witness sequestration rule, and that the trial court erred in permitting a defense witness to be cross-examined about her prior drug convictions. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Brian Larice Cureton, was convicted of one count of first degree felony murder and one count of aggravated child abuse. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for the felony murder conviction. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years imprisonment for the aggravated child abuse conviction as a Range I offender and ordered the sentence for aggravated child abuse to run concurrently with Defendant's life sentence. Defendant now appeals his convictions and sentencing alleging (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support Defendant's convictions for first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) that the trial court erred in not allowing Defendant to cross examine Kinoltra Ewing about her willingness to take a polygraph test; (3) that the trial court erred in not redacting portions of Defendant's statement to the police; (4) that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on facilitation of aggravated child abuse and felony murder as lesser included offenses; (5) that the trial court erred in permitting the State's expert witness to offer opinions outside her area of expertise; and (6) that Defendant's sentence for aggravated child abuse was excessive. After a thorough review of the record and the arguments and briefs of counsel, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Fred Taylor Smith, entered pleas of guilt to driving under the influence and driving under the influence per se. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401(a)(1)-(2). The trial court merged the two convictions and imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days with a requirement of service of 75%. As a part of the plea agreement, the defendant reserved a certified question of law challenging the validity of the investigatory stop. The judgment is affirmed.

The Appellant, Brian L. Woods, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of second degree murder and received a twenty-four-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, Woods raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by permitting a witness to testify in violation of the rule of sequestration; (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction; and (3) whether his sentence of twenty-four years is excessive.  After a review of the issues presented, we conclude that Woods’ challenges are without merit. The judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.

The defendant appeals the revocation of his probation contending that the trial court abused its discretion. We hold that the record contains substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that a violation had occurred, and there was no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments.