APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Putnam County trial court revoked the probation of the defendant, James Cravens, and ordered him to serve his original sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's probation revocation order; (2) his sentence is excessive; and (3) the trial court erred in placing certain conditions on his bond pending appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Pamela J. Moses, pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to aggravated assault and numerous misdemeanors. The plea agreement encompassed the length of the sentences, but left the manner of service for the trial court's determination. The trial court denied an alternative sentence and ordered the Defendant to serve her terms in confinement. The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with her plea. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief and this appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Chett Allen Walker, was indicted for first degree premeditated murder, setting fire to personal property, and abuse of a corpse. Prior to trial, the Defendant expressed his intent to plead guilty to setting fire to personal property and abuse of a corpse, which he did. However, the trial court submitted those charges to the jury, along with the charge of first degree murder, to which the Defendant pled not guilty. Following the jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of all three charges. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises six issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion to suppress his confession; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing the charges of setting fire to personal property and abuse of a corpse to be determined by the jury after the Defendant expressed his desire to plead guilty to those charges; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing the jury to view certain photographs and the car that the Defendant burned; (4) whether the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to display a photograph of the remains of the victim to the jury during his closing argument; (5) whether the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion with respect to the jury instructions; and (6) whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the Defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Vidal L. Strickland, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony; and felony possession of a weapon, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender by the trial court to ten years for the aggravated robbery conviction, four years for the attempted aggravated robbery conviction, and two years for the felony possession of a weapon conviction, with the robbery sentences ordered to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of fourteen years in the Department of Correction. Following the denial of his motion for a new trial, the defendant filed a timely appeal to this court, arguing: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his robbery convictions; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the results of the victims' pretrial identifications; (3) the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing; and (4) the trial court erred in granting the State's motion in limine to suppress the defendant's statements to law enforcement officers. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the indictments against him were fatally defective and that this Court's reduction of one of his convictions for aggravated rape to rape violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. The trial court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. Following a review of the record in this matter, we affirm the order of the trial court's dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Carl Watson, of rape, and the trial court imposed a ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the State’s bill of particulars was inadequate; (3) the trial court erred in failing to grant him a continuance or a mistrial due to the State’s failure to comply with discovery; (4) the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim’s alleged gang affiliation and initiation as a possible source of her hymenal tear; and (5) the trial court erred in not recusing itself following an ex parte communication with jurors after trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A jury in the White County Criminal Court found the appellant, Hershel David Standridge, guilty of theft of property valued under $500 and resisting arrest. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration in the White County Jail but suspended service of the sentence and immediately placed the appellant on probation. Later, subsequent to his timely filing a notice of appeal, the appellant's probation was revoked. On appeal, the appellant raises issues concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, sentencing, and the jury instructions. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Patrick J. Gray, pled guilty in the Cumberland County Criminal Court to vehicular homicide and was placed on judicial diversion. During his probationary period, the appellant violated the terms of his probation. Accordingly, the trial court revoked the appellant's probation and ordered him to serve a six-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant complains that the trial court erred in its rulings during the probation revocation hearing. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the Petitioner of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the conviction, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied the Defendant's application for permission to appeal. The Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief, alleging that he was denied due process and effective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and this appeal ensued. We affirm the dismissal of the petition.

A Hardin County jury convicted the defendant, Jeffery P. Beckham, of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him to five years incarceration as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; (2) his sentence is excessive; and (3) the trial court erred in denying probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Marshall County grand jury indicted the defendant, Charles Wayne Sawyer, for aggravated sexual battery. The defendant filed a motion to suppress a statement that he allegedly made to the police without first being advised of his rights under Miranda. He made the alleged statement in response to a police officer's reading of the affidavit of complaint supporting his arrest warrant. The trial court, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, granted the defendant's motion to suppress his statement, finding that the reading of the affidavit was the functional equivalent of interrogation and therefore should have been prefaced by an admonishment of the defendant's constitutional rights. The state, with the trial court's permission, filed an interlocutory appeal, and pursuant to the state's Rule 9 application, this Court agreed to review the state's appeal. After reviewing the evidentiary hearing and other materials presented to this Court, we find that the trial court properly suppressed the defendant's statement and therefore affirm the judgment below.

The Defendant, William Paul Eblen, was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated rape and one count of aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to two concurrent terms of twenty-four years for the rapes, and to a concurrent term of eleven years for the kidnapping, all to be served in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence; alleges that the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct during closing argument; and complains that the trial court erred in overruling his petition for writ of error coram nobis. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Everet L. McNeil, entered guilty pleas to possession with intent to sell less than .5 grams of cocaine, simple possession of marijuana, and simple possession of cocaine. The Shelby County trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective three-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A jury convicted the appellant of two counts of attempted first degree murder. The trial court imposed concurrent twenty-five-year sentences on each count. On appeal, the appellant argues (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and (2) his sentences are excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After several opportunities to comply with the conditions of his probation, the trial court ordered the appellant, Aaron Blake Franz, to serve thirty months in confinement, the original sentence imposed for the appellant's burglary conviction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court was without jurisdiction to revoke his probation because the revocation warrant was filed after the first extension of the probationary period expired. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Rita Davis, appeals the trial court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner entered an open plea of guilty to felony failure to appear, a charge apparently stemming from another case in which Petitioner was charged with possession of a schedule II narcotic for resale, a Class B felony. Petitioner was convicted by a jury on the drug possession charge, and on August 18, 1999, she was sentenced on both convictions. Petitioner filed a pro se petition for relief from her conviction and sentence in the failure to appear case. The trial court denied post-conviction relief, but granted a delayed appeal. Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed Petitioner’s sentence, but reversed the denial of post-conviction relief, remanding the case for dismissal of the petition without prejudice. Petitioner filed another post-conviction petition, alleging that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that her plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the petition. In this direct appeal, Petitioner challenges the trial court’s denial of her petition. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Steven D. Tarter, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to multiple offenses and received a total effective sentence of four years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a State appeal. The grand jury indicted the Defendants, William Timothy Carter and Virginia Darlean Carter, on several counts relating to the manufacture and possession of various drugs and the possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court granted the Defendants' motion to suppress evidence based upon an illegal residential search. On appeal, the State contends the trial court erred in granting the Defendants' motion to suppress. We conclude that even if the officers made an unlawful entry into the residence, the evidence was subsequently seized pursuant to a valid search warrant which was not based upon any observations made during the alleged unlawful entry. Because the independent source doctrine applies, the seizure of evidence was proper. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Alden Joe Daniel, Jr., appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In his initial brief filed with the assistance of retained counsel, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in finding that Petitioner’s plea of guilty was voluntary and knowing and in finding that Petitioner’s trial counsel rendered effective assistance of counsel during the interval between Petitioner’s first and second trial and during plea negotiations. After the filing of his initial brief, this Court granted Petitioner’s counsel leave to withdraw as counsel and denied Petitioner’s motion for the appointment of substitute counsel. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider post-judgment facts pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and a pro se supplemental brief. In his brief, Petitioner alleges that his post-conviction counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court based its findings on erroneous facts. Petitioner requests that this Court remand the matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing as to factual matters not presented at Petitioner’s post-conviction proceeding. For the reasons discussed herein, we deny Petitioner’s motion to consider post-judgment facts and affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.

A Knox County jury convicted the Petitioner of first degree murder, and the trial court imposed a life sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the conviction, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied the Defendant's application for permission to appeal. The Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and this appeal ensued. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Douglas Lee Overall, was convicted by a Tipton County Circuit Court jury of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of twelve years for the aggravated kidnapping conviction, twelve years for the aggravated assault conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the possession of drug paraphernalia conviction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The State appeals contending the trial court erred in allowing the defendant to receive jail credit from an unrelated charge against the 150-day mandatory minimum sentence he received in his plea to sixth offense D.U.I. Also, the State alleges error in the trial court modifying the defendant's payment plan for paying fines and costs to less than the defendant agreed to pay when the trial court accepted the defendant's plea agreement. We conclude it was error to allow this defendant to receive any jail credit toward his mandatory minimum of 150 days for his sixth D.U.I. offense where the credit accumulated on an unrelated charge. We further conclude the trial court was within its discretion to modify the payment plan, not the overall fine, upon determining the defendant did not have the ability to pay. We reverse in part and affirm in part the judgments of the trial court and remand for entry of a corrected judgment consistent with this opinion.

The Petitioner, Antonio Vantress Brown,¹ appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He originally pled guilty to various offenses and received an effective sentence of thirty years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel in entering his guilty pleas; and (2) his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Elmore Lewis Baker, Jr., pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to eight offenses: counts one through four, delivery of a Schedule VI controlled substance, a Class E felony; count five, possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; count six, possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver, a Class E felony; and counts seven and eight, delivery of drug paraphernalia, a Class E felony. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to one year on counts one through three, two years on count four, eleven months and twenty-nine days on count five, two years on count six, one year on count seven, and two years on count eight. The plea agreement stipulated the sentences were to run concurrently, and the trial court determined that the sentences should be served as ninety days in jail and the remainder on probation. The defendant appeals, claiming that his sentences are excessive and that he should have received full probation. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.