APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, James David Duncan, was convicted by a Morgan County Criminal Court jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210 (Supp. 2017) (subsequently amended) (second degree murder), 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt), 39-13-102(a)(l)(A)(i) (Supp. 2017) (subsequently amended). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to sixteen years for attempted second degree murder and to eight years for aggravated assault, with the sentences to be served concurrently to each other and consecutively to an Anderson County conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that ( 1) prosecutorial misconduct occurred during voir dire, opening statement, and closing argument, (2) he is entitled to plain error relief because the trial court failed to conduct a hearing pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) regarding prior bad act evidence, (3) the court erroneously instructed the jury, and (4) cumulative trial errors require relief. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Gary Wayne Garrett filed a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion seeking correction of clerical errors in his judgments of conviction.  Mr. Garrett claimed that he was entitled to pretrial jail credit on various counts, several of which were ordered to be served consecutively.  The trial court issued a comprehensive written order finding that the judgments correctly awarded pretrial jail credit and dismissed the motion.  We determine that this appeal is frivolous and affirm the dismissal of the motion.

The Defendant, Sterling White was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of evading arrest, a Class E felony; reckless driving, a Class B misdemeanor; and leaving the scene of an accident, a Class B misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-603 (2018) (subsequently amended) (evading arrest), 55-10-205 (2020) (reckless driving), 55-10-102 (Supp. 2017) (subsequently amended) (leaving the scene). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a persistent offender to six years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a continuance. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Noel Maltese, was convicted in the Williamson County Circuit Court of conspiracy to commit theft of property valued $250,000 or more, a Class B felony, and criminal simulation, a Class E felony, and received an effective eight-year sentence to be served as forty-eight hours in jail followed by supervised probation.  On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court erred by allowing the State to cross-examine her about a codefendant’s having to serve a lengthy prison sentence for similar conduct for which the Appellant was on trial.  Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Danny Ray Lacy, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus for his first degree murder conviction, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred by summarily dismissing his petition.  We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Vernell Evans, appeals the denial of his Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence, asserting his sentences are illegal because the trial court incorrectly imposed 100% service requirements for each sentence.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Andrea Gonzalez Martinez, pleaded guilty to felon in possession of a handgun, and the trial court imposed a sentence of sixteen years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his request for alternative sentencing.  After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.  

The Petitioner, Damarkus Lowe, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree murder conviction, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for advising him not to testify in his own defense. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In March of 2021, Steven C. James, Defendant, filed a “Motion for Relief from Sentence.” The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. Defendant appealed. After a review of the record, we determine Defendant filed an untimely notice of appeal document and that the interest of justice does not favor waiving the timeliness requirement in this case. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Defendant, Darius Henderson, was convicted following a jury trial of one count of theft of property valued over $2,500 but less than $10,000 (Count 1) and one count of evading arrest while operating a vehicle (Count 2). Based on Defendant’s prior Tennessee convictions and a Georgia conviction, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III persistent offender to consecutive sentences of twelve years in Count 1, and six years in Count 2. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him as a Range III persistent offender because he had only four prior Tennessee felonies and the State did not submit proof that Defendant’s Georgia conviction qualified as a felony conviction in a foreign jurisdiction. See T.C.A. §40-35-107. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for Defendant to be sentenced as a Range II offender.

The Petitioner, Yasin Solomon Hawkins, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his waiver of the right to a jury trial was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. 

A Davidson County grand jury indicted the defendant, Keinesa Renee Kyshay Lillard, for one count of attempted first-degree murder, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, one count of especially aggravated robbery, one count of evading arrest by use of a motor vehicle involving risk of death or serious bodily injury to others, and four counts of simple possession of a controlled substance.  Following trial, a jury convicted the defendant of attempted second-degree murder (count one) and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (count two), for which she received an effective sentence of thirty-two years in confinement at 100 percent.  On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support her conviction for attempted second-degree murder, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor reckless endangerment, and her sentence was excessive.  After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for the execution of a amended judgment for the employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction.

The Defendant, Emily L. Williams, appeals the trial court’s denial of her Rule 35 motion for a reduction of her four-year sentence for attempted tampering with evidence. She also attempts to appeal the original sentence imposed by the trial court. After review, we conclude that the time for her to appeal her original sentence has expired and the interest of justice does not require that the timely notice of appeal requirement be waived. We affirm the judgment of the trial court denying the motion to reduce the sentence.

The Defendant, Emily Leanne Brooks, entered an open guilty plea to second degree murder. Prior to sentencing, she obtained new counsel and filed a motion to withdraw her plea one week after it was entered. That motion, along with her subsequent motion to reconsider, was denied following the trial court’s balancing analysis of the factors set forth in State v. Phelps, 329 S.W.3d 436, 446 (Tenn. 2010), and its determination that the Defendant was not a credible witness. The Defendant was, thereafter, sentenced to twentyone years. She appeals as of right, noting that she immediately sought to withdraw her plea and arguing (1) that the significance of her traumatic brain injury on her decision-making process was underappreciated by her prior attorneys and the trial court, and (2) that given her difficulties, she should have been allowed to speak with her parents who were present in the courtroom before being required to accept the take-it-or-leave plea deal that was presented that day. Following our review, we affirm.

Pro-se petitioner, Joseph Smith, filed an untimely notice of appeal from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that the interest of justice does not warrant a waiver of the notice requirement because Petitioner failed to state a colorable claim for relief. Therefore, we dismiss this appeal as untimely.

The Defendant, Daron Hall, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of evading arrest, a Class E felony; driving a motor vehicle while his license was suspended, a Class B misdemeanor; criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor; violating the “light law,” a Class C misdemeanor; and operating a motor vehicle without a proper license plate, a Class C misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-603 (2018) (subsequently amended) (evading arrest), 55-50-504 (2018) (driving on a suspended license), 39-16-301 (2018) (criminal impersonation), 55-9-402 (2018) (motor vehicle light law), 55-5-114 (2018) (proper license plate). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to six years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a continuance. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Robert M. Atwell, Jr., was convicted by a jury of one count of violating the sex offender registry. The trial court imposed a sentence of one year, with ninety days incarceration, and the remainder to be served on probation. On appeal, Defendant argues that: the trial court erred by admitting specific evidence of his prior sexual offenses after he offered to stipulate his status as a sex offender; his conviction for violation of the sex offender registry violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions; there was a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof presented at trial; and there was cumulative error. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Henry Lee Jones, Petitioner, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief with the assistance of the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender (“OPCD”). The post-conviction court determined that the petition stated a colorable claim and appointed the OPCD to represent Petitioner. Shortly thereafter, the effects of COVID-19 began to impact and impede the day-to-day operations of parts of the Tennessee court system. The OPCD, citing the voluminous record and inability to fully investigate potential claims because of the impact of COVID-19, sought several extensions of time in which to file an amended petition. Seven months after the OPCD was appointed to represent Petitioner, the post-conviction court removed the OPCD from representation and appointed private counsel to represent Petitioner without notice or a hearing. The OPCD sought an extraordinary appeal to this Court pursuant to Rule 10 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. This Court granted the application and directed the parties to address the following issues: (1) “whether the post-conviction court abused its discretion in removing the [OPCD] as counsel of record;” and (2) “whether the [OPCD] has the authority to act as counsel of record for [Petitioner] in this Court.” After review, we determine that the OPCD had the authority to appeal the removal and that the post-conviction court improperly removed the OPCD from the case. As a result, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Defendant, Randal Ledon Tate, was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to sell less than fifteen grams of heroin within 1,000 feet of a school (count 1), possession with intent to deliver less than fifteen grams of heroin within 1,000 feet of a school (count 2), simple possession of Alprazolam (“Xanax”) (count 3), possession with intent to deliver Xanax within 1000 feet of a school (count 4), driving without a license (count 5), criminal impersonation (count 6), violation of the financial responsibility law (count 7), violation of the registration law (count 8), and driving a motor vehicle without operational taillights. (count 9). The trial court merged count 2 into count 1 and count 3 into count 4 and imposed an effective fifteen-year sentence as a Range I offender to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues: that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for possession of Xanax and heroin with intent to sell or deliver; that the trial court erred by admitting text messages about prior drugs sales; and that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss based on an alleged Ferguson violation. After hearing oral arguments, and following a review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Earlie M. Jones, pled guilty to burglary, shoplifting, subsequent offense driving on a revoked license, and evading arrest, resolving the charges against him in five separate indictments.  As a result of his plea, he was sentenced to an effective term of four years’ incarceration.  On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his oral motion to withdraw his guilty pleas prior to imposition of the sentence.  After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand the case for entry of corrected judgments in Count 1 of case number 28153 and Count 2 of case number 28152.

The Petitioner, Nathan Scarborough, pleaded guilty to aggravated child abuse of a child eight years of age or less and second degree murder, and he received an effective thirty-three-year sentence. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, contending that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that he did not plead guilty knowingly and voluntarily. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, DeMarco Waters, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief with respect to his convictions for one count of first degree premeditated murder, three counts of attempted first degree murder, one count of attempted second degree murder, and four counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus seventy-seven years. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Seddrick Curry, pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated burglary, one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, and one count of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, and he was sentenced to an effective thirty-year period of incarceration. The Petitioner filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, claiming that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered due, in part, to the ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the Petitioner’s motion, and the trial court’s decision was affirmed on appeal. The Petitioner then petitioned for post-conviction relief on the basis that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied his petition, and the Petitioner appeals. After review, we conclude that the issue presented on appeal has been previously determined, and we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Appellant, Martin Hubert White, pled guilty in the Giles County Circuit Court to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and burglary of an automobile, a Class E felony, and received an effective three-year sentence suspended to time served and supervised probation.  On appeal, the Appellant claims that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion.  Based upon our de novo review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

The Petitioner, Christopher Demotto Linsey, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence obtained from his cell phone, failing to object to evidence presented at trial, and failing to file a timely motion for new trial.   Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying relief.