APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to reckless homicide and agreed to a sentence of seven years as a Range II, multiple offender. The manner of service of the sentence was to be determined following a sentencing hearing. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve one year in the county jail followed by six years in community corrections. The defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in requiring any confinement in this case. We conclude that the defendant is not eligible for community corrections and remand for re-sentencing.

The petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. We conclude that the petitioner has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. We also conclude that the petitioner's guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary. Based on the foregoing conclusions and the record as a whole, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner was indicted on charges of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. He pled guilty to a reduced charge of second degree murder, and the other charge was dismissed. As part of the plea agreement, he received a sentence of forty years, to be served at one hundred percent. The petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing. We conclude that the petitioner has failed to show that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We also conclude that the petitioner's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The defendant was convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide, aggravated assault, simple possession, and driving on a suspended license. The defendant contends on appeal that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions for aggravated vehicular homicide and aggravated assault, (2) the trial court erred in allowing evidence of inactive marijuana metabolites found in the defendant's blood after the accident, (3) the trial court erred in allowing evidence concerning extrapolation of the defendant's blood alcohol concentration back to the time of the accident, (4) the trial court erred in not allowing the defendant to plead guilty to driving on a suspended license, (5) the trial court erred in allowing evidence concerning extradition and instructing the jury on flight, and (6) the cumulative effect of the errors requires a new trial. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner contends on appeal that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during the trial of his case. In making his claim, the petitioner alleges ineffective assistance in three areas: (1) failure of counsel to effectively conduct voir dire, (2) inadequate preparation for and examination of witness Riggan, and (3) failure to prepare the petitioner to testify. We affirm the post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Anthony Veasley, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the petitioner as a Range II multiple offender to nineteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Following an unsuccessful appeal of his conviction, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The petitioner now brings this appeal challenging the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition. After reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Joe Robert Osborne, was convicted by a jury of one count of Driving Under the Influence (DUI). As a result, he was sentenced to 11 months and 29 days, with probation after service of 48 hours in jail, revocation of his driver's license for one year, mandatory attendance at Alcohol Safety School and assessed a $350 fine. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the "missing witness" inference. Because we conclude there was no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Humphreys County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Bobby Blair, of manufacturing methamphetamine, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by refusing to grant a continuance when the state announced a few days before trial that it was going to call an expert witness to testify; (3) the trial court erred by denying the defendant's motion to suppress and exclude evidence because the defense was not able to examine and test the equipment and chemicals found at the crime scene; (4) the trial court erred by allowing the state's expert to testify that the defendant was not manufacturing methamphetamine for personal use; (5) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of simple possession of methamphetamine; and (6) the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on "immediate precursor." We conclude that no error occurred, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his appeal and petition for writ of certiorari, arguing that he was entitled to a criminal court review of the general sessions court's ruling on his motion to suppress evidence. Because we conclude we lack jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, James Chitwood, pled guilty in the Clay County Criminal Court to aggravated assault and agreed to a five-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the defendant serve his entire sentence in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming that he should have received an alternative sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Ernest G. Murphy, pled guilty in the DeKalb County Circuit Court to vehicular assault, a Class D felony; driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, a Class E felony; driving on a revoked license, third offense, a Class A misdemeanor; and leaving the scene of an accident, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court was to determine the length and manner of service of the sentences. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the defendant's vehicular assault and DUI convictions and sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to three years, nine months. For each misdemeanor conviction, the trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days and ordered that all of the sentences be served consecutively. The trial court also ordered that the defendant serve four and one-half years in confinement and the remainder of his sentences on probation. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences and by denying full probation. Although we determine that consecutive sentencing and denial of full probation are justified, we conclude that the sentences stated at the sentencing hearing and the sentences reflected in the judgments of conviction are dissimilar. The judgments of the trial court are reversed, and the case is remanded for resentencing pursuant to law.

Defendant, Daniel L. Robinson, entered guilty pleas on December 19, 2001, to the offenses of felony possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine, in case 2000-C-1609, and attempted possession of cocaine with intent to sell, in case 2000-C-902. Defendant was sentenced to five years probation for each conviction, to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of ten years probation. On January 10, 2003, a probation violation warrant was issued against Defendant, alleging that he had violated the terms and conditions of his probation based on a new arrest for homicide. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation and ordered that Defendant's original sentences be placed into effect. After a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court erred in ordering revocation. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the probation violation warrant.

The petitioner, Joseph Brown, appeals pro se the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for facilitation of first degree murder and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. He argues that the trial court’s failure to advise him of his constitutional right against self-incrimination voids his guilty pleas and that the court’s failure to provide him with a transcript of the post-conviction hearing violated his constitutional rights. Additionally, he argues that the record does not reflect that counsel who represented him at the post-conviction hearing was relieved from continuing to represent him on appeal, and that he is entitled to counsel in his appeal to this court. We agree that the petitioner is entitled to be represented by counsel in the first tier appeal of the denial of his post-conviction petition and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal and remand to the post-conviction court with instructions to reenter its findings of fact and conclusions of law, with the petitioner’s time for appeal to start at the date of reentry, and the petitioner to be represented by counsel on appeal.

Petitioner, Jacob Lee Davis, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief and was appointed counsel to assist him during the post-conviction hearing. Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel because they (1) failed to properly conduct voir dire or preserve for appeal the issues concerning the selection of jurors; (2) failed to pursue meaningful plea negotiations; and (3) failed to adequately apprize Petitioner of his right to testify. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Gene Booker, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of
aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, and being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of fifty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that 1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and 2) the trial court erred in determining that the offense of being a felon in possession of a handgun should be tried with the other offenses. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Adrian R. Arnett, timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, attacking his convictions for two counts of aggravated rape, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of setting fire to personal property. Following an evidentiary hearing, the petition was dismissed by the trial court. On appeal, he raises one issue: his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to properly request funding for and obtaining the services of an independent expert in forensic DNA analysis in order to challenge DNA evidence introduced by the State. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, James E. Swiggett, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has not established that the trial court was without jurisdiction to convict or sentence him or that his sentence has expired. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and petition for DNA analysis under the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The post-conviction court denied the petitioner's request for DNA analysis and did not rule on the post-conviction relief claim. The post-conviction relief issue has been waived. The petitioner is not entitled to DNA analysis because he has failed to meet all of the criteria set forth in the statute. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Jason Warren Allen, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition is time-barred and the petitioner asserts no claim which would toll the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Cocke County grand jury indicted the defendant, Stokely J. U. Way, with six counts of rape and six counts of incest. His trial was held on July 31 and August 1 of 2001. The jury convicted the defendant of two counts of rape and two counts of incest. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I Standard Offender to twelve (12) years on each rape conviction, to run concurrently, and three (3) years for each incest count to run concurrently to each other, but consecutively to the rape sentences. However, because there were multiple rape convictions, the defendant's release eligibility for the rape convictions is 100%. The trial court levied the full fines recommended by the jury of $50,000 for the rape convictions and $20,000 for the incest convictions. The defendant brings five issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in allowing the hearsay testimony of the victim's friend, Mary Ann Breeden, as to what the victim told her regarding her father's incestuous relationship with her; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing the defendant's preacher to testify about communications between him and the defendant in violation of the clergy/parishioner privilege; (3)whether the evidence was insufficient to establish the offenses of incest or rape and more specifically, the element of force or coercion; (4) whether the trial court erred in not charging all applicable lesser-included offenses including assault, sexual battery, attempted rape, attempted incest and child abuse; and (5) whether the sentences and fines imposed by the trial court were excessive. We affirm the trial court's judgments.

The petitioner, Thaddeus D. Daniel, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. The petition presents no cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, does not state the cause or pretense of the petitioner's restraint, and was not filed in the appropriate court. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Defendant, Brandon D. Forbes, was indicted on one count of aggravated robbery and one count of theft. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of both counts. The trial court merged the two counts into a single count of aggravated robbery. Following a sentencing hearing, defendant was sentenced to serve ten years. In this appeal as of right, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that his sentence was excessive. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Clifford Ward, Jr., appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty pleas to two counts of rape of a child, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and effective twenty-five-year sentence. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to investigate his case. We affirm the trial court.

Petitioner, Blake E. Hallum, appeals from the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. After a review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the trial court’s finding that the petitioner received effective assistance of counsel both before and during trial. We affirm the denial of the post-conviction relief.