APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Roger Lynn Perry, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to allege a ground for relief which would render the judgment void, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Appellant, Ricky Hill Krantz, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Davidson County Criminal Court. Krantz is currently incarcerated as a result of his jury convictions for first degree felony murder and aggravated assault. On appeal, Krantz raises the single issue of whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After review of the issue, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Appellant, David G. Housler, of four counts of felony murder. Housler's convictions stem from the robbery of a Clarksville Taco Bell and the execution-style murders of four of its employees. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed four consecutive life sentences. Housler appeals, presenting the following issues for our review: (1) Whether his confessions were properly admitted into evidence when the State and the trial court knew the confessions were false and unreliable; (2) Whether the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by using the recanted testimony of Robert Eastland, Robert Dawson, and Michael Miller and by failing to inform defense counsel or the trial court that Jeremy Thompson had recanted his statement; (3) Whether he is entitled to a new trial based upon the newly recanted testimony of Larry Underhill; (4) Whether the trial court erred in denying a new trial when a juror fell asleep during the trial; (5) Whether the Mathews time-line proves his innocence; (6) Whether the State prosecuted Housler and Courtney Mathews under inconsistent theories; and (7) Whether consecutive sentencing was proper. After review, we find no error of law requiring reversal. Accordingly, we affirm Housler's convictions and the imposition of four consecutive life sentences.

Defendant, Michael David Totty, was indicted on one count of burglary of a building other than a habitation, a Class D felony, and one count of theft of property over $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. The jury found Defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of a burglary other than a habitation on count one and guilty on count two, theft of property. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III persistent offender to ten years on the theft conviction and six years on Defendant’s conviction of facilitation of a burglary. The trial court ordered Defendant’s sentences to run concurrently for an effective sentence of ten years. Defendant does not appeal his sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court’s denial of his motion for a continuance prevented Defendant from securing a material witness for trial and denied his counsel an adequate opportunity to evaluate Defendant’s competency to stand trial. Defendant also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of DUI, second offense. He contends that 1) the evidence was insufficient, 2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on reasonable doubt, 3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to the inference from refusal to submit to a chemical test, and 4) the trial court erred in failing to grant the motion to strike the enhancement count. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Appellant Dennis Ray Jones was convicted in the Henry County Circuit Court of manufacturing methamphetamine and was sentenced to three years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant Pamela Kay Barker was convicted of criminal responsibility for facilitating the manufacturing of methamphetamine and was sentenced to two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellants raise numerous issues, including the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, the sufficiency of the evidence, and sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for a correction of Appellant Barker’s judgment of conviction.

This is an appeal by the petitioner from the denial of his post-conviction relief petition. The petitioner was originally convicted of especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to 60 years at 100% service. After careful review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. However, I question whether a “reasonable certainty” equates to a “moral certainty” relative to the definition of reasonable doubt in Tennessee. Also, I believe that trial courts in this state should not be using varying definitions of reasonable doubt.

I concur in affirming defendant Jones’s conviction of manufacturing methamphetamine but respectfully dissent from affirming Barker’s conviction of facilitation of the same offense.

Pursuant to Rule 9, Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, both the defendant and the State were granted appeals from an interlocutory order of the trial court granting in part, and denying in part, Defendant's motion to exclude Rule 404(b), Tennessee Rules of Evidence, testimony. After a careful review of the evidence, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court's order.

The defendant was convicted of robbery under a theory of criminal responsibility for the conduct of another. The defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. We conclude a reasonable jury could have inferred the defendant's intent to assist in the robbery based upon his contemporaneous assault on the victim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Cecil Moss, appeals from the trial court's order revoking his probation and reinstating his original sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to consider any alternative sentencing options other than incarceration. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner is appealing the trial court's denial of habeas corpus relief. The Petitioner fails to assert a ground of relief entitling him to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant pled guilty to two counts of attempted second degree murder. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed two consecutive ten-year sentences. The defendant contends on appeal the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Robert E. Allen, pled guilty to aggravated assault, three counts of domestic assault, vandalism, evading arrest, public intoxication and reckless burning. The trial court sentenced him to five years in prison for the aggravated assault and eleven months and twenty-nine days on each of the other charges, with the sentences to run concurrently. The Petitioner did not perfect an appeal of his sentence, but petitioned for post-conviction relief on the grounds that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing on the post-conviction petition, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel for the following reasons: (1) trial counsel failed to properly advise him as to the potential sentences for all the charges covered in the plea agreement; and (2) trial counsel failed to advise him of his right to appeal the sentence imposed by the trial court. Finding no error, we affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition.

A Fayette County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher Jerome Taylor, of possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver, possession of more than 0.5 ounces of marijuana with intent to deliver, and felony possession of a handgun. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of eighteen years for cocaine possession, three years for marijuana possession, and three years for felony possession of a handgun. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) that insufficient evidence exists in the record to support his convictions; and (2) that his sentence is excessive. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The petitioner, Donald W. Rhea, Jr., pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to robbery and attempted robbery and received a nine-year sentence. Subsequently, the petitioner filed for habeas corpus relief in the Wayne County Circuit Court, alleging that his sentence was illegal and that the indictments underlying his conviction were fatally defective. The trial court dismissed the habeas corpus petition and the petitioner timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals his conviction for false reporting on the basis of insufficient evidence to support the verdict. After review, we conclude the evidence to be sufficient to support the conviction and affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The petitioner originally entered an open guilty plea to aggravated robbery and child neglect and
received concurrent sentences of eight years and eleven months and twenty-nine days, respectively, to be served in incarceration. She timely sought post-conviction relief, which was denied. In this appeal, the petitioner asserts defense counsel was ineffective and, thus, her guilty plea resulted from defense counsel’s ineffectiveness. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Jimmy W. Rogers, was convicted of aggravated assault. In this direct appeal, he raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow him and a co-defendant to compare jury strikes; (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting a video tape and an audio tape into evidence; (3) whether the trial court erred by denying him discovery of the victim's medical records; (4) whether the trial court erred by refusing to grant him a continuance; (5) whether the trial court erred by limiting his cross-examination of the victim; (6) whether the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial based on improper comments by the prosecutor during closing argument; (7) whether the trial court erred in its jury instruction; (8) whether the trial court improperly sentenced the Defendant; and (9) whether the trial court erred by refusing to suspend the Defendant's sentence pending the appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A jury convicted the defendant of four counts of child rape and four counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty-five years on each of the child rape convictions and twelve years on each of the aggravated sexual battery convictions, with two of the child rape sentences to run consecutively and all other sentences to run concurrently, for an effective sentence of fifty years. On direct appeal, this Court reversed and dismissed three of the convictions for child rape. We remanded the case for a determination of whether the remaining sentences should run consecutively. Following a re-sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered two of the aggravated sexual battery sentences and the child rape sentence to run consecutively, for an effective sentence of forty-nine years. The defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing. We conclude that the record supports the grounds for consecutive sentencing under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b)(5), and the sentence is "justly deserved in relation to the seriousness of the offenses" and is "no greater than that deserved for the offenses committed."

The Appellants, Michael Dwight Stewart and James Henry Brown, appeal the sentencing decisions of the Davidson County Criminal Court. Stewart pled guilty to aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping and received an effective twelve-year sentence. Brown pled guilty to aggravated rape and received a twenty-four-year sentence in the Department of Correction. In this consolidated appeal, Stewart and Brown raise the single issue of whether the sentences imposed were excessive. After review of the record, the sentencing decisions are affirmed.

I concur in the result reached by the majority, and the reasoning used in the majority opinion on all issues except its conclusion that enhancement factor (7), that Defendant Brown was motivated by a desire to satisfy his pleasure or excitement, is inapplicable.

The appellant, William Herbert Stitts, was convicted by a jury in the Madison County Circuit Court of two counts of robbery, Class C felonies. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant on each count as a Range II multiple offender to ten years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to one another and consecutively to sentences for previous, unrelated convictions. On appeal, the appellant asserts that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction of robbery as charged in count one of the indictment, and (2) the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, William Romero Padilla, was convicted in the Haywood County Circuit Court of rape of a child and was sentenced to twenty-five years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, he filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that counsel was ineffective and that “fundamental fairness” dictated that a different prosecutor should have represented the State at trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appealed. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.