APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Leon Terrell Phillips, pled guilty in the Bedford County Circuit Court to attempted first degree murder and received a sentence of thirty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, which sentence was to be served at thirty percent. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Frank Chester Bright, Jr., of possession with intent to deliver over twenty-six grams of a substance containing cocaine, a Class B felony, and facilitation of possession of a deadly weapon, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a career offender to thirty years in prison on the possession count and eleven months and twenty-nine days in prison on the facilitation count, with the sentences to run concurrently. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the conviction, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied the Petitioner's application for permission to appeal. The Petitioner then filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief in the trial court, which the court dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition finding that there was no merit to his claims that: (1) he was denied effective assistance of counsel at his sentencing hearing; (2) the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct at the sentencing hearing; and (3) the trial court's instructions to the jury violated his due process rights. Finding no error, we affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Terry R. McCulloch, pled guilty to DUI, third offense, and driving on a revoked license, reserving as a certified question of law whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a driver's license roadblock stop. On appeal, he argues that the roadblock stop was unconstitutional. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the charges against the defendant.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Frank Chester Bright, Jr., of possession with intent to deliver over twenty-six grams of a substance containing cocaine, a Class B felony, and facilitation of possession of a deadly weapon, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a career offender to thirty years in prison on the possession count and eleven months and twenty-nine days in prison on the facilitation count, with the sentences to run concurrently. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the conviction, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied the Petitioner's application for permission to appeal. The Petitioner then filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief in the trial court, which the court dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition finding that there was no merit to his claims that: (1) he was denied effective assistance of counsel at his sentencing hearing; (2) the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct at the sentencing hearing; and (3) the trial court's instructions to the jury violated his due process rights. Finding no error, we affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Carey Stanford Richmond, appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's imposition of incarcerative sentencing for numerous conviction offenses and for an additional probation violation. She claims that she was entitled to alternative sentences, and because we disagree, we affirm.

In 1998, the defendant, through former counsel, entered into a letter agreement with the Blount County District Attorney General which provided that he would be granted immunity for the murder of Andre Jackson if he provided information and cooperated in the prosecution of the murder of Gary Huskey and passed a polygraph examination administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") as to the Huskey murder. The defendant subsequently was indicted for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. He then filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, claiming, inter alia, that the polygraph was unfair, that he had not failed the test, and that the State breached its agreement to provide another polygraph. Following hearings, the trial court dismissed the motion, and the defendant filed an interlocutory appeal. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the motion, but remand for entry of corrected minutes reflecting that the trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss.

A Marshall County jury convicted the Defendant, Shawn Edward Hazeltine, of three counts of aggravated assault and three counts of reckless endangerment. The trial court merged the reckless endangerment convictions with the aggravated assault convictions and then sentenced the Defendant to an aggregate seven years and seven months in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) insufficient evidence exists to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred in not consolidating the three counts of reckless endangerment; and (3) the trial court erred by not ordering alternative sentencing and by ordering consecutive sentencing. We conclude that sufficient evidence exists in the record to support the Defendant's convictions and that the trial court did not err in sentencing the Defendant. However, we conclude that the trial court erred by failing to consolidate the three reckless endangerment convictions into one conviction. We further conclude that the trial court erred by entering a judgment form for Count 2 showing a conviction for reckless aggravated assault, because the trial court dismissed Count 2 of the indictment. Therefore, we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Bobby R. Dyer appeals from his Williamson County Circuit Court convictions of aggravated burglary and theft of property valued at $1,000 to $9,999. He claims that his theft conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence and that he was improperly sentenced. Because we are unconvinced of reversible error, we affirm.

Following an evidentiary hearing on the issue whether Bernard Kane Johnson, the petitioner, had been denied effective assistance of counsel, the post-conviction court determined that no constitutional violation had been shown and that the petitioner's sexual battery, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated assault convictions were not void or voidable. Finding no error, we affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Brandon Shawn Jones, pled guilty to burglary of a motor vehicle and possession of burglary tools. The Knox County Criminal Court ordered the defendant to serve an effective two-year sentence with 120 days in confinement followed by probation. The defendant appeals the denial of total probation. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, James Ray Barlett, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Wayne County Circuit Court, alleging that his sentence was expired. After examining the record, the trial court dismissed the petition. The petitioner appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Harold Garland Mabry, Jr., pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine and possession of a firearm during a felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the appellant received a total effective sentence of eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. As a condition of his plea, the appellant reserved a certified question of law concerning the validity of the search warrant underlying the search of his residence. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Bryan Christopher Hester, of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, violent offender to twenty-five years in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to continue when the state revealed three days before trial that the victim had been taking an antidepressant and seeing a psychiatrist; (3) the trial court erred by allowing hearsay into evidence; (4) the trial court erred by allowing the state to introduce a bow saw into evidence; (5) the trial court erred by allowing a witness to testify about experiments conducted on the murder weapon when the state failed to prove the chain of custody; (6) the trial court erred by allowing the state medical examiner to testify; and (7) the defendant's sentence is excessive. We conclude that the trial court erred by allowing hearsay into evidence but that the error was harmless. We also conclude that the defendant's sentence is not excessive, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the Anderson County Criminal Court's denial of habeas corpus relief relating to his convictions for aggravated rape and rape. On appeal, the petitioner contends the original sentencing court erred in amending the judgments to reflect 100% release classification after they became final. We affirm the lower court's judgment denying habeas corpus relief.

The petitioner, Larry Stephen Brumit, filed for post-conviction relief from 1996 convictions for two counts of first degree murder and one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The post-conviction court denied the petition. In this appeal, the petitioner argues (1) that the petition was not barred by the applicable statute of limitations; and (2) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment is affirmed.

Ray D. Driver appeals the Campbell County Criminal Court’s judgment requiring his bail bonding company, Driver Bail Bonds, to pay $570.50 as a bond forfeiture because Stanley Ray Davis failed to appear at a general sessions court probation hearing. The appellant contends that T.C.A. § 40-11-138(b) relieved his company from liability under the bond because the defendant already had pled guilty and been sentenced. He also claims that his company is not liable for the defendant’s fine and costs because his company did not assume such obligations in the defendant’s bond. We hold that appellant remained obligated under the bond and that the trial court did not require him to pay the defendant’s fine and costs. The trial court is affirmed.

The appellant, Jama Elaine Penley, was convicted by a Greene County jury of facilitation of first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range I standard offender to twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the denial of her motion for judgment of acquittal and the sentence imposed by the trial court. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we remand to correct a clerical error in the judgment but otherwise affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I agree that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-130 governs the issue of the duration of Driver Bail Bonds' obligation. The current statute, passed in 1996, permits the trial court to extend the liability of the surety on a bail bond for the length of a sentence of probation by providing in a written order that the current bond is sufficient. In this case, the General Sessions Court noted on the judgment form that the defendant and surety were to remain liable under the original bond. Thus, Driver remained obligated under the terms of the original bond to secure the defendant's appearance at the March 11, 2002, hearing.

This appeal involves review of a certified question of law following the Defendant, James D. Rowland's, guilty plea to DUI. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(1). Because we find that the certified question is not dispositive, we are without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The defendant, Jarret A. Guy, was convicted of facilitation of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and robbery. The trial court merged the facilitation of premeditated first degree murder conviction into the conviction for felony murder and, after finding the existence of five aggravating circumstances, the jury imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. The trial court imposed a concurrent sentence of fifteen years for the robbery conviction. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court included erroneous definitions of "knowing" and "intentional" in its instructions to the jury; (3) the trial court erred by severing his trial from that of his co-defendant, Jacob Edward Campbell; (4) the sentence is excessive; and (5) the cumulative effect of the errors at trial require reversal. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner, Patrick D. Paris, appeals the denial of his post-conviction relief petition relating to his convictions for attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, the petitioner contends: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; and (2) the trial court erred in failing to charge attempted voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of attempted first degree murder. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Henry Rankins, filed a petition for post-conviction relief based on the Post- Conviction DNA Analysis Act. The trial court denied relief and Petitioner now seeks review of the lower court’s decision. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the petition fails to satisfy the criteria of the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Ronald L. Johnson, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He argues that his convictions for two counts of passing worthless checks are void because they were not ordered to be served consecutively to a sentence from which he had been paroled at the time of the check offenses, his parole subsequently being revoked. The habeas corpus court dismissed his petition without a hearing, and we affirm that action.

The petitioner, Don Wesley McMillen, entered a plea of guilty to two (2) counts of attempted rape of a child in May of 1998. In exchange for the guilty pleas, the petitioner received concurrent, seventeen-year sentences at 35% as a Range II Offender. The petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary because the trial court violated the provisions of State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1977). The trial court denied the petition following an evidentiary hearing and this appeal followed. We affirm the dismissal of the post-conviction petition.

Following a bench trial, the defendant, Roxanne R. Vance, was convicted of DUI per se, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days, all suspended except seven days with the balance to be served on probation. In addition, her driver's license was suspended for one year and she was ordered to pay a fine of $350 and attend alcohol and drug safety school. On appeal, she argues that the trial court erred in finding that her breath alcohol test results created an irrebuttable presumption of DUI per se and that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.