APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing there was no substantial evidence he violated the terms of his probation, the trial court erred in allowing his probation officer to testify that he failed a drug screen, and the reinstatement of his original sentence resulted in too harsh a punishment under the circumstances of his case. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Muhammed Nuridden, was found guilty by a jury in the Hamilton County Criminal Court of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. Additionally, the appellant pled guilty to driving on a revoked license and possession of marijuana. The appellant received a total effective sentence of nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises numerous issues for our review, including evidentiary issues and the sufficiency of the evidence. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the appellant's conviction for possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver and remand for new trial.

The Defendant, Christopher Demotto Linsey, pled guilty to simple possession of cocaine, a Class A misdemeanor. As part of his plea agreement, he expressly reserved with the consent of the trial court and the State the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). The certified question of law stems from the trial court's denial of the Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of a police officer stopping the Defendant's automobile. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A jury convicted the defendant of premeditated first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to the police; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial due to jury misconduct; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We reduce the conviction to second degree murder and remand for sentencing.

The Defendant, Charlie M. Gardner, was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault. In this post-conviction proceeding, the Defendant alleges that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial; that he was denied due process by being denied the right to testify; and that the trial court erred in one of its jury instructions. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief and this appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Marion Shawn Laughrun, pled guilty to two counts of theft in the Washington County Criminal Court and received a total effective sentence of two years and one day in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court granted the appellant probation on both of his sentences. While on probation, the appellant pled guilty to attempted robbery and received a sentence of four years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. As a result of the new conviction, the trial court revoked the appellant's probation on the theft convictions and ordered the original sentences to be served in confinement. Additionally, the court refused to grant the appellant an alternative sentence on the attempted robbery conviction. The appellant appeals both the probation revocation and the denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review of the record and parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Faris Abd Al-Ali, of rape of a child. The Defendant was subsequently sentenced to twenty-two years of incarceration for this offense. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it refused to suppress his statement, and also contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the State failed to elect upon which offense it was seeking a conviction. Finding no merit in the Defendant's contentions, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Fred L. Maines, was indicted by the Sullivan County Grand Jury for driving under the influence, fourth offense, a Class E felony. The appellant subsequently pled guilty to driving under the influence, first offense, a Class A misdemeanor, with the sentence to be determined by the trial court. Following a hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days confinement in the county jail, to be served at seventy-five percent. The trial court also imposed a three hundred fifty dollar ($350) fine and suspended the appellant's driver's license for one year. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by ordering the appellant to serve seventy-five percent of his sentence in confinement. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Richard Daniel Filauro, appeals as of right the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to two counts of rape of a child, Class A felonies. At the guilty plea hearing, the trial court imposed two concurrent twenty-five-year sentences, as provided in the plea agreement. In addition, the agreement stipulated that the defendant would not receive pretrial jail credit for the eighteen months he spent in jail before agreeing to plead guilty. The defendant contends that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas (1) because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to accept his pleas and (2) because his guilty pleas are manifestly unjust. We conclude that the defendant's sentence is illegal, that his guilty pleas are manifestly unjust, and that he should be allowed to withdraw his pleas.

The petitioner, Annie Ruth Gilkerson, appeals from the post-conviction court's dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. Because the petition is barred by the statute of limitations, the judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, Donna Jean Sexton, appeals from the judgment of the Carter County Circuit Court denying her post-conviction relief from her convictions for first degree murder and aggravated robbery. The petitioner contends that (1) the post-conviction court erred by concluding that her amended, comprehensive petition was invalid because it was not properly verified under oath; (2) she received the ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorneys misinformed her as to the length of her sentence for first degree murder; and (3) her nolo contendere pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made because the trial court never informed her that she was waiving constitutional rights and there was an insufficient factual basis for the petitioner's pleas. Although we conclude that the amended petition was not properly verified, we conclude the trial court correctly proceeded on all issues raised by the petitioner. We also hold that the trial court's findings and conclusions relative to the petitioner's claims are affirmed.

The appellant, Ricky Allen Davis, was convicted by a Franklin County Jury of one count of assault, a Class A misdemeanor; two counts of vandalism under $500, Class A misdemeanors; and one count of disorderly conduct, a Class C misdemeanor. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant on each of the Class A misdemeanors to eleven months and twenty-nine days confinement and on the Class C misdemeanor to thirty days confinement to be served in the county jail at seventy-five percent. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the victim's mother to testify at the sentencing hearing regarding the victim's nightmares resulting from the assault. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Monoleto D. Green appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claims that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel in the conviction proceedings and, as a result, his guilty plea was involuntary. Because he has failed to demonstrate error in the lower court's ruling, we affirm.

The Defendant, Thomas Farr, pled guilty to one count of second degree murder and two counts of solicitation to commit first degree murder. In accordance with the plea agreement, the Defendant was sentenced to thirty years on the murder charge and to eight years on each of the solicitation charges, which terms were concurrent to each other but consecutive to the thirty year term, for an effective sentence of thirty-eight years. The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief on the grounds that his lawyer was ineffective and that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After a hearing, the trial court denied relief. This appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Corey Lamont Radley, of second degree murder. The trial court subsequently sentenced him as a Range I offender to twenty-five years of incarceration. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence; contests the admission of certain evidence; and complains that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of reckless homicide for the stabbing death of her adult daughter. The trial court sentenced the defendant to a maximum sentence of four years for a Class D felony as a Range I offender. The defendant appeals this sentence claiming it is excessive and that the trial court erred in permitting the judge who presided over the defendant’s preliminary hearing to testify at the sentencing hearing. We find these issues do not merit a reversal of this case and affirm the trial court’s decision to impose the maximum sentence.

The Appellant, Allison L. Brewington, appeals the decision of the Davidson County Criminal Court revoking his probation and ordering reinstatement of his original sentence. Brewington pled guilty to the aggravated assault of his girlfriend on October 28, 2002, and received a four-year suspended sentence. On December 5, 2002, a warrant was issued, alleging that Brewington violated his probation by harassing the victim on two occasions and failing to report his arrests for these offenses to his probation officer. On appeal, Williams raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in revoking his probation because the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was guilty of harassment, (2) whether the trial court erred by requiring him to serve his entire sentence in confinement, and (3) whether the trial court improperly considered allegations not contained within the violation warrant. After review, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Brewington’s probation and ordering reinstatement of his original four-year sentence.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant of arson, a Class C felony, and two counts of reckless homicide, Class D felonies. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II multiple offender to ten years confinement for the arson conviction and seven years for each reckless homicide conviction with all sentences to run consecutively, for an effective sentence of twenty-four years. The defendant challenges his sentence on appeal, arguing the trial court’s consideration of enhancement factors was improper and his sentences should run concurrently. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, David K. Wachtel, III, was convicted in the Sumner County Criminal Court of three counts of domestic assault. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration in the Sumner County Jail for each conviction, with one sentence consecutive to the other two, and placed the appellant on probation. On appeal, the appellant raises issues concerning the trial court's rulings, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, and sentencing. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Jerry Mitchell appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he claimed that his guilty plea to the offense of attempted first degree murder was involuntary because his attorney erroneously advised him that he would serve only three years of his fifteen year sentence. The lower court found that the petitioner failed to prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence and denied relief. Because the petitioner has not carried his appellate burden of demonstrating error in the lower court's ruling, we affirm.

The defendant, Anthony Lamont Singleton, pled nolo contendere to aggravated assault, a Class C felony; possession of marijuana, fourth offense, a Class E felony; evading arrest and possession of drug paraphernalia, Class A misdemeanors; and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to an effective five-year sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that he serve his sentences in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court should have sentenced him to community corrections. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Joseph Rushing, was indicted for one count of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery. Following a jury trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of count one, rape of a child. The State entered a nolle prosequi as to count two, aggravated sexual battery. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-three years imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in allowing Defendant's statements to the police to be introduced at trial; (2) the sentence imposed on Defendant was excessive; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant's conviction for rape of a child; and (4) Defendant's conviction and sentence violated principles of fundamental fairness. After a careful review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of theft of property valued over $1,000. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction with one year of incarceration and the remainder to be served on community corrections. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction and raises issues regarding the length and manner of service of her sentence. We remand to delete the reference to the Department of Correction but otherwise affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Clifton Brown, was indicted on one count of first degree felony murder of John Maupin, one count of premeditated first degree murder of John Maupin, one count of aggravated burglary of Ricky Howard's home, and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping of John Maupin. Prior to the case going to the jury, the State asked for and received a nolle prosequi as to the charge of premeditated first degree murder. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated burglary. The jury found Defendant not guilty of first degree felony murder, and found Defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of reckless homicide. Defendant waived a sentencing hearing and agreed to be sentenced as a Range I, standard offender, to twenty years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, three years for the aggravated burglary conviction and two years for the reckless homicide conviction, with all sentences to run concurrently. Defendant appealed the sufficiency of the convicting evidence for all three convictions. In his brief, however, Defendant limits his argument on appeal to the sufficiency of the evidence pertaining to his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping, and Defendant does not present any argument to support his contention that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for reckless homicide and aggravated burglary. Defendant has thus waived a review of the issues pertaining to his aggravated burglary and reckless homicide convictions. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 10(b). After a thorough review of the record, we affirm all three judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals from the denial of his post-conviction petition. The petitioner had pled guilty to rape of a child under age thirteen in exchange for a sentence of fifteen years at 100%. On appeal, the petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner also contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying his request to call two witnesses and by denying his request to make an offer of proof regarding the testimony of those witnesses. The post-conviction court also excluded certain medical records of the victim. After thorough review, we reverse the post-conviction court’s judgment and remand the case to the post-conviction court for a new hearing. At the new hearing, the post-conviction court should admit the testimony of the petitioner’s two witnesses and the victim’s medical records. Should the court exclude certain portions of the testimony, offers of proof shall be allowed in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Evidence 103.