APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Bobby R. Dyer appeals from his Williamson County Circuit Court convictions of aggravated burglary and theft of property valued at $1,000 to $9,999. He claims that his theft conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence and that he was improperly sentenced. Because we are unconvinced of reversible error, we affirm.

The petitioner, James Ray Barlett, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Wayne County Circuit Court, alleging that his sentence was expired. After examining the record, the trial court dismissed the petition. The petitioner appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Harold Garland Mabry, Jr., pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine and possession of a firearm during a felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the appellant received a total effective sentence of eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. As a condition of his plea, the appellant reserved a certified question of law concerning the validity of the search warrant underlying the search of his residence. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following an evidentiary hearing on the issue whether Bernard Kane Johnson, the petitioner, had been denied effective assistance of counsel, the post-conviction court determined that no constitutional violation had been shown and that the petitioner's sexual battery, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated assault convictions were not void or voidable. Finding no error, we affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Brandon Shawn Jones, pled guilty to burglary of a motor vehicle and possession of burglary tools. The Knox County Criminal Court ordered the defendant to serve an effective two-year sentence with 120 days in confinement followed by probation. The defendant appeals the denial of total probation. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the Anderson County Criminal Court's denial of habeas corpus relief relating to his convictions for aggravated rape and rape. On appeal, the petitioner contends the original sentencing court erred in amending the judgments to reflect 100% release classification after they became final. We affirm the lower court's judgment denying habeas corpus relief.

The petitioner, Larry Stephen Brumit, filed for post-conviction relief from 1996 convictions for two counts of first degree murder and one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The post-conviction court denied the petition. In this appeal, the petitioner argues (1) that the petition was not barred by the applicable statute of limitations; and (2) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment is affirmed.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Bryan Christopher Hester, of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, violent offender to twenty-five years in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to continue when the state revealed three days before trial that the victim had been taking an antidepressant and seeing a psychiatrist; (3) the trial court erred by allowing hearsay into evidence; (4) the trial court erred by allowing the state to introduce a bow saw into evidence; (5) the trial court erred by allowing a witness to testify about experiments conducted on the murder weapon when the state failed to prove the chain of custody; (6) the trial court erred by allowing the state medical examiner to testify; and (7) the defendant's sentence is excessive. We conclude that the trial court erred by allowing hearsay into evidence but that the error was harmless. We also conclude that the defendant's sentence is not excessive, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Patrick D. Paris, appeals the denial of his post-conviction relief petition relating to his convictions for attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, the petitioner contends: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; and (2) the trial court erred in failing to charge attempted voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of attempted first degree murder. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Ray D. Driver appeals the Campbell County Criminal Court’s judgment requiring his bail bonding company, Driver Bail Bonds, to pay $570.50 as a bond forfeiture because Stanley Ray Davis failed to appear at a general sessions court probation hearing. The appellant contends that T.C.A. § 40-11-138(b) relieved his company from liability under the bond because the defendant already had pled guilty and been sentenced. He also claims that his company is not liable for the defendant’s fine and costs because his company did not assume such obligations in the defendant’s bond. We hold that appellant remained obligated under the bond and that the trial court did not require him to pay the defendant’s fine and costs. The trial court is affirmed.

The appellant, Jama Elaine Penley, was convicted by a Greene County jury of facilitation of first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range I standard offender to twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the denial of her motion for judgment of acquittal and the sentence imposed by the trial court. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we remand to correct a clerical error in the judgment but otherwise affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I agree that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-130 governs the issue of the duration of Driver Bail Bonds' obligation. The current statute, passed in 1996, permits the trial court to extend the liability of the surety on a bail bond for the length of a sentence of probation by providing in a written order that the current bond is sufficient. In this case, the General Sessions Court noted on the judgment form that the defendant and surety were to remain liable under the original bond. Thus, Driver remained obligated under the terms of the original bond to secure the defendant's appearance at the March 11, 2002, hearing.

This appeal involves review of a certified question of law following the Defendant, James D. Rowland's, guilty plea to DUI. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(1). Because we find that the certified question is not dispositive, we are without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The defendant, Jarret A. Guy, was convicted of facilitation of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and robbery. The trial court merged the facilitation of premeditated first degree murder conviction into the conviction for felony murder and, after finding the existence of five aggravating circumstances, the jury imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. The trial court imposed a concurrent sentence of fifteen years for the robbery conviction. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court included erroneous definitions of "knowing" and "intentional" in its instructions to the jury; (3) the trial court erred by severing his trial from that of his co-defendant, Jacob Edward Campbell; (4) the sentence is excessive; and (5) the cumulative effect of the errors at trial require reversal. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner, Don Wesley McMillen, entered a plea of guilty to two (2) counts of attempted rape of a child in May of 1998. In exchange for the guilty pleas, the petitioner received concurrent, seventeen-year sentences at 35% as a Range II Offender. The petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary because the trial court violated the provisions of State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1977). The trial court denied the petition following an evidentiary hearing and this appeal followed. We affirm the dismissal of the post-conviction petition.

Following a bench trial, the defendant, Roxanne R. Vance, was convicted of DUI per se, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days, all suspended except seven days with the balance to be served on probation. In addition, her driver's license was suspended for one year and she was ordered to pay a fine of $350 and attend alcohol and drug safety school. On appeal, she argues that the trial court erred in finding that her breath alcohol test results created an irrebuttable presumption of DUI per se and that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Ira Ishmael Muhammed, was convicted of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies; attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony; and felony reckless endangerment which the trial court, acting as thirteenth juror, dismissed at the sentencing hearing. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years for the attempted second degree murder conviction, six years for each aggravated assault conviction, and four years for the attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of twenty-eight years. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred in admitting an audiotape of telephone conversations between him and his ex-wife, one of the victims; (2) the trial court erred in not suppressing an audiotape of statements he made shortly after being shot; (3) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing; and (4) the application of consecutive sentencing is unconstitutional. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Timothy Earl Waters, appeals the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for common law writ of certiorari seeking relief from a post-conviction judgment. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Finding that the lower court properly dismissed the petition, theState's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

On November 30, 1992, the petitioner, Michael Douglas Hughes, entered a plea of no contest to one (1) count of aggravated rape and a plea of guilty to ten (10) counts of aggravated rape. He received an effective eighty-year sentence after a sentencing hearing. The petitioner’s sentence was affirmed in a delayed appeal. See State v. Michael Douglas Hughes, No. 01C01-9701-CR-00021, 1998 WL 301730, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, June 10, 1998), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Feb. 22, 1999). The petitioner sought post-conviction relief on various grounds. After the trial court denied the petition as untimely, the petitioner appealed. This Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. See Hughes v. State, 77 S.W.3d 801 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). On remand, the trial court denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner then presented this appeal, arguing that the trial court erred finding that the petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. We affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner, Patrick E. Simpson, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault and was sentenced to concurrent terms of three years to be served consecutively to his parole violation. He appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief, arguing that the trial court failed to enforce his guilty plea agreement and that his sentence has expired. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The Petitioner, Henry Rankins, filed a petition for post-conviction relief based on the Post- Conviction DNA Analysis Act. The trial court denied relief and Petitioner now seeks review of the lower court’s decision. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the petition fails to satisfy the criteria of the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Ronald L. Johnson, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He argues that his convictions for two counts of passing worthless checks are void because they were not ordered to be served consecutively to a sentence from which he had been paroled at the time of the check offenses, his parole subsequently being revoked. The habeas corpus court dismissed his petition without a hearing, and we affirm that action.

The Appellant, Eddie Wayne Gordon, appeals the Gibson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 1983, Gordon pled guilty to first degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. In 1984, Gordon, proceeding pro se, filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief. For twenty years, Gordon has unsuccessfully sought an evidentiary hearing on his petition. Fundamental fairness dictates that Gordon receive the process that is due him. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this matter is again remanded to the Gibson County Circuit Court for an evidentiary hearing upon Gordon’s petition for post-conviction relief.

A jury convicted the Defendant, James A. Bates, of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of assault (which the trial court merged into a single count), one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, one count of felony evading arrest, and one count of possession of marijuana. The trial court subsequently sentenced the defendant on the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective term of thirty-eight years in the Department of Correction. The defendant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping and the trial court's decision to sentence him as a Range II, multiple offender on those offenses. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Bobby Joe Gentry, of aggravated rape, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a repeat violent offender to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Defendant appeals, contending that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred when it failed to dismiss the indictment; (3) the trial court erred when it charged the jury on the elements of aggravated rape and aggravated sexual battery and on the culpable mental state; (4) he was denied effective assistance of counsel; (5) Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-120 (1997), under which the Defendant was sentenced as a violent offender, is unconstitutional; and (6) the trial court erred when it found that the Defendant qualified as a violent offender pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-120. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court's judgment.