APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Roger Lee Wilson, was indicted by the Anderson County Grand Jury on 28 counts, including charges of child rape, aggravated sexual battery, and statutory rape, and against multiple victims. The trial court severed the counts, and count five was the only count to be tried by a jury. The jury found Petitioner guilty of the charged offense of rape of a child. Following the jury trial, Petitioner entered "best interest" guilty pleas to several other counts, and the remaining counts were dismissed by nolle prosequi. Pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement, Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal from his conviction and sentence in count five. For all of his convictions, Petitioner received an effective sentence of 22 years. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. Specifically, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise as an issue at trial that there was a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof; failing to call Hubert Wallace, Art Moore, and Dwayne Wilson as witnesses at trial; and requesting to reserve his opening statement until after the close of the State's proof. Petitioner also argues that his counsel who withdrew from representation prior to trial was ineffective for misplacing evidence. Finally, Petitioner argues that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered, and that the waiver of his right to appeal is not valid. The trial court denied post-conviction relief and Petitioner appeals. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Kawisha Price, was indicted for aggravated child abuse. She entered a best- interest plea to aggravated assault with a sentence of eight years as a Range II multiple offender, with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentence. The trial court subsequently ordered her to serve the sentence in confinement. She appeals, arguing that the trial court decided the manner of service of the sentence before any proof was offered on her behalf and erred in ordering her to serve the sentence in confinement. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Bryan K. Miller, appeals his conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense. On appeal, Miller raises the single issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. Finding the evidence legally sufficient, the judgment is affirmed.

The Appellant, Roger Dale Bryan, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, and driving on a revoked license, third offense, by a Bedford County jury. The verdict returned by the jury found Bryan guilty of both driving and being in physical control while under the influence. On appeal, Bryan challenges the legal sufficiency of the proof supporting each basis for conviction. After review of the record, we find the evidence sufficient for both and affirm the judgments of conviction, which were merged into a single conviction for DUI.

In 1998, the defendant, Chad Kilgore, who was indicted for aggravated assault, was determined to be incompetent to stand trial and ordered into a forensic services unit for treatment. The defendant was never transferred from a local mental health care facility. In 2003, the defendant filed a motion seeking relief from the prior order. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion and directed transfer. This extraordinary appeal followed. Because the appeal was improvidently granted, it is dismissed.

The petitioner, Harrison Pearison, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Skyla Sepeda Smith, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the Davidson County Criminal Court. In the petition she alleged that the conviction she received after pleading guilty to one count aggravated child abuse is illegal and void because a conflict between the guilty plea and the judgment effectively resulted in an illegal sentence. The Davidson County Criminal Court dismissed the petition. Because the petitioner does not present a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The defendants, husband and wife Benjamin Bernal Bobadilla and Sheila Teresa Gaye Bobadilla, were each charged by the Greene County Grand Jury with possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. Following the trial court's denial of their motions to suppress, Benjamin Bobadilla pled guilty to the indicted offenses in exchange for an effective eight-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender, and Sheila Bobadilla pled guilty to facilitation of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class D felony, and the misdemeanor drug paraphernalia count of the indictment in exchange for an effective three-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2), both defendants reserved identical certified questions of law; namely, whether the search warrant and accompanying affidavit issued for their home violated the United States and Tennessee Constitutions as well as Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c). Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the probation of Defendant, Calvin Reeves, and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Defendant does not appeal the revocation of his probation but argues that the trial court erred in imposing a sentence of confinement instead of an alternative form of sentencing. After a thorough review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Carl E. Muncey, of possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, and possession of Alprazolam, Class A misdemeanors, and the trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days for each conviction and fined him a total of $2,500. The trial court ordered that the defendant serve his sentences for the possession of cocaine and marijuana convictions consecutively and that all of the convictions be served consecutively to Washington County sentences. The defendant appeals, claiming (1) that the trial court improperly applied enhancement and mitigating factors; (2) that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing; and (3) that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentences. We conclude that the trial court properly sentenced the defendant relative to the lengths, manner of service, and consecutive nature of the offenses in this case. However, we conclude that the trial court erred in ordering these sentences to be served consecutively to the Washington County sentences, and we remand the case for modification of the judgments by deleting any reference to the Washington County cases.

The appellant appeals from an order revoking her probation. After review, we conclude that the violations of probation conditions were supported by a preponderance of the evidence and affirm the trial court's judgment.

The petitioner contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for writ of error coram nobis. We conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the petition is time barred and the petitioner has not advanced any grounds for which the statute of limitations should be tolled. We affirm the dismissal by the trial court.

The appellant, Larry Arnell Adams, was convicted by a jury in the Knox County Criminal Court of one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated spousal rape, one count of assault, and two counts of rape. He received a total effective sentence of thirty-seven years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises numerous issues for our review, including consolidation and sufficiency. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the probation of Defendant, Marsha Karen Yates, and ordered her to spend the remainder of her sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her probation. After a careful review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Charles Keith, was convicted by a jury in the Sullivan County Criminal Court of one count of possession of marijuana and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced the appellant to consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days confinement in the county jail, to be served at seventy-five percent. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of an investigatory stop of his vehicle. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Brian French, appeals the revocation of his probation. We dismiss the appeal due to the untimely filing of the notice of appeal.

The Defendant, Thaddeaus Medford, was convicted of three counts involving the delivery and attempted delivery of cocaine. In his first appeal, the Defendant contended, in part, that the State used a peremptory challenge to exclude a potential juror based on race. We remanded the case for the trial court to determine whether the State’s challenge was based upon a racially-neutral reason. On remand, the trial court determined that the State’s challenge was based upon a racially-neutral reason, and the Defendant appeals, contending that this finding by the trial court is in error. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Felicia Murphy, appeals the sentencing decision of the DeKalb County Circuit Court following revocation of her probation. In December 2001, Murphy pled guilty to misdemeanor reckless endangerment and received a sentence of eleven months and twenty days, which was to be suspended after service of ten days. While on probation Murphy was found to be in violation of her probation, resulting in the extension of her probationary period for an additional six months. On the day before this extended period was to expire a violation warrant was issued, which alleged numerous violations of conditions of her probation. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked her probation and ordered reinstatement of her original sentence. On appeal, she argues that the trial court "acted too harshly" by revoking her sentence and, instead, should have extended her probationary period for one year. Finding no merit to Murphy's claim, the judgment of the trial court revoking her probation and ordering reinstatement of her original eleven-month and twenty-nine-day sentence is affirmed.

The petitioner, Frank A. Barnard, was convicted in 1992 of first degree murder, aggravated robbery, and aggravated sexual battery, for which he was sentenced, respectively, to sentences of life, eight years, and ten years, with the latter sentence to be served consecutively to the first two. In a petition for writ of habeas corpus, he claimed that the trial court was without jurisdiction to impose judgment for the murder conviction. The trial court dismissed the petition, and this timely appeal followed. After review, we affirm the dismissal.

This case presents an appeal to this court after remand by order of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Appellant, Robert James Yoreck, III, pled guilty to aggravated assault, a class C felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Yoreck, as a Range II multiple offender, to nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Yoreck argues that his sentence was excessive. After a review of the record, we affirm the sentence as imposed by the Montgomery County Circuit Court

This case presents an appeal to this court after remand by order of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Appellant, Mario C. Estrada, appeals the imposition of a sentence of twelve years confinement in the Department of Correction. The sentence arose from a guilty plea entered by Estrada to one count of arson, eight counts of aggravated assault, and one count of possession of a prohibited weapon. In this appeal, Estrada raises the issue of whether the trial court erred by ordering a sentence of total confinement rather than a less restrictive alternative. After review, we find no error. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

This case presents an appeal to this court after remand by order of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Appellant, Renne Efren Arellano, appeals from the sentencing decision of the Maury County Circuit Court. In a negotiated plea agreement, Arellano pled guilty to arson, eight counts of aggravated assault, and felony possession of a weapon and received an effective twelve-year sentence as a Range I standard offender. The manner of service was to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied any form of alternative sentencing and imposed total incarceration for the twelve-year sentence. On appeal, Arellano contends that the trial court erred in not sentencing him to any form of alternative incarceration. Finding no error, the sentences of the trial court are affirmed.

A Hardin County jury convicted the Defendant, Stephen Keith Frazier, of vehicular homicide and two counts of driving while under the influence of an intoxicant or drug (“DUI”). The trial court merged the two DUI convictions and sentenced the Defendant to ten years for vehicular homicide, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the DUI conviction, with both sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; and (2) the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant by improperly applying enhancement factor (17) to increase the length of the sentence and in not imposing alternative sentencing. Based upon our review, we affirm the conviction for vehicular homicide and vacate the conviction for DUI, this offense being merged into the conviction for vehicular homicide. Additionally, we affirm the Defendant’s sentence for his vehicular homicide conviction, and we vacate the Defendant’s sentence for his DUI conviction. We therefore remand to the trial court for the entry of a single judgment in accordance with this opinion.

The petitioner, Michael R. Lewis, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he claims that ineffectiveness of trial counsel resulted in an invalid, 2001 jury conviction of reckless aggravated assault and that post-conviction relief from the conviction is warranted. Because the record supports the post-conviction court’s findings and conclusion, we affirm.

The Defendant, Dennis James Varner, entered a conditional plea of guilty to driving under the influence following the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence attendant upon his stop at a roadblock. The Defendant reserved for this Court's ruling a certified question of law regarding the constitutionality of his stop by law enforcement officers. Upon our review of the record and pertinent legal authority, we have determined that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and dismiss the charges against the Defendant arising out of his stop at a roadblock conducted in contravention of Tennessee's constitution.