APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Carl E. Muncey, of possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, and possession of Alprazolam, Class A misdemeanors, and the trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days for each conviction and fined him a total of $2,500. The trial court ordered that the defendant serve his sentences for the possession of cocaine and marijuana convictions consecutively and that all of the convictions be served consecutively to Washington County sentences. The defendant appeals, claiming (1) that the trial court improperly applied enhancement and mitigating factors; (2) that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing; and (3) that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentences. We conclude that the trial court properly sentenced the defendant relative to the lengths, manner of service, and consecutive nature of the offenses in this case. However, we conclude that the trial court erred in ordering these sentences to be served consecutively to the Washington County sentences, and we remand the case for modification of the judgments by deleting any reference to the Washington County cases.

The petitioner contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for writ of error coram nobis. We conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the petition is time barred and the petitioner has not advanced any grounds for which the statute of limitations should be tolled. We affirm the dismissal by the trial court.

The appellant appeals from an order revoking her probation. After review, we conclude that the violations of probation conditions were supported by a preponderance of the evidence and affirm the trial court's judgment.

Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the probation of Defendant, Marsha Karen Yates, and ordered her to spend the remainder of her sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her probation. After a careful review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Charles Keith, was convicted by a jury in the Sullivan County Criminal Court of one count of possession of marijuana and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced the appellant to consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days confinement in the county jail, to be served at seventy-five percent. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of an investigatory stop of his vehicle. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Larry Arnell Adams, was convicted by a jury in the Knox County Criminal Court of one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated spousal rape, one count of assault, and two counts of rape. He received a total effective sentence of thirty-seven years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises numerous issues for our review, including consolidation and sufficiency. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case presents an appeal to this court after remand by order of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Appellant, Renne Efren Arellano, appeals from the sentencing decision of the Maury County Circuit Court. In a negotiated plea agreement, Arellano pled guilty to arson, eight counts of aggravated assault, and felony possession of a weapon and received an effective twelve-year sentence as a Range I standard offender. The manner of service was to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied any form of alternative sentencing and imposed total incarceration for the twelve-year sentence. On appeal, Arellano contends that the trial court erred in not sentencing him to any form of alternative incarceration. Finding no error, the sentences of the trial court are affirmed.

A Hardin County jury convicted the Defendant, Stephen Keith Frazier, of vehicular homicide and two counts of driving while under the influence of an intoxicant or drug (“DUI”). The trial court merged the two DUI convictions and sentenced the Defendant to ten years for vehicular homicide, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the DUI conviction, with both sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; and (2) the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant by improperly applying enhancement factor (17) to increase the length of the sentence and in not imposing alternative sentencing. Based upon our review, we affirm the conviction for vehicular homicide and vacate the conviction for DUI, this offense being merged into the conviction for vehicular homicide. Additionally, we affirm the Defendant’s sentence for his vehicular homicide conviction, and we vacate the Defendant’s sentence for his DUI conviction. We therefore remand to the trial court for the entry of a single judgment in accordance with this opinion.

The defendant, Brian French, appeals the revocation of his probation. We dismiss the appeal due to the untimely filing of the notice of appeal.

The Defendant, Thaddeaus Medford, was convicted of three counts involving the delivery and attempted delivery of cocaine. In his first appeal, the Defendant contended, in part, that the State used a peremptory challenge to exclude a potential juror based on race. We remanded the case for the trial court to determine whether the State’s challenge was based upon a racially-neutral reason. On remand, the trial court determined that the State’s challenge was based upon a racially-neutral reason, and the Defendant appeals, contending that this finding by the trial court is in error. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Felicia Murphy, appeals the sentencing decision of the DeKalb County Circuit Court following revocation of her probation. In December 2001, Murphy pled guilty to misdemeanor reckless endangerment and received a sentence of eleven months and twenty days, which was to be suspended after service of ten days. While on probation Murphy was found to be in violation of her probation, resulting in the extension of her probationary period for an additional six months. On the day before this extended period was to expire a violation warrant was issued, which alleged numerous violations of conditions of her probation. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked her probation and ordered reinstatement of her original sentence. On appeal, she argues that the trial court "acted too harshly" by revoking her sentence and, instead, should have extended her probationary period for one year. Finding no merit to Murphy's claim, the judgment of the trial court revoking her probation and ordering reinstatement of her original eleven-month and twenty-nine-day sentence is affirmed.

The petitioner, Frank A. Barnard, was convicted in 1992 of first degree murder, aggravated robbery, and aggravated sexual battery, for which he was sentenced, respectively, to sentences of life, eight years, and ten years, with the latter sentence to be served consecutively to the first two. In a petition for writ of habeas corpus, he claimed that the trial court was without jurisdiction to impose judgment for the murder conviction. The trial court dismissed the petition, and this timely appeal followed. After review, we affirm the dismissal.

This case presents an appeal to this court after remand by order of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Appellant, Robert James Yoreck, III, pled guilty to aggravated assault, a class C felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Yoreck, as a Range II multiple offender, to nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Yoreck argues that his sentence was excessive. After a review of the record, we affirm the sentence as imposed by the Montgomery County Circuit Court

This case presents an appeal to this court after remand by order of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Appellant, Mario C. Estrada, appeals the imposition of a sentence of twelve years confinement in the Department of Correction. The sentence arose from a guilty plea entered by Estrada to one count of arson, eight counts of aggravated assault, and one count of possession of a prohibited weapon. In this appeal, Estrada raises the issue of whether the trial court erred by ordering a sentence of total confinement rather than a less restrictive alternative. After review, we find no error. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, Michael R. Lewis, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he claims that ineffectiveness of trial counsel resulted in an invalid, 2001 jury conviction of reckless aggravated assault and that post-conviction relief from the conviction is warranted. Because the record supports the post-conviction court’s findings and conclusion, we affirm.

The Defendant, Dennis James Varner, entered a conditional plea of guilty to driving under the influence following the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence attendant upon his stop at a roadblock. The Defendant reserved for this Court's ruling a certified question of law regarding the constitutionality of his stop by law enforcement officers. Upon our review of the record and pertinent legal authority, we have determined that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and dismiss the charges against the Defendant arising out of his stop at a roadblock conducted in contravention of Tennessee's constitution.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Robert L. Stevenson, of burglary of a building, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a career offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) that the trial court erred by allowing the state to impeach him with prior convictions. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Christopher A. Davis, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner failed to file his petition within the applicable statute of limitations, failed to assert a claim that is cognizable in a petition for writ of error coram nobis, and the statute of limitations should not be tolled. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Carl E. Leggett, Sr., was indicted by the Franklin County Grand Jury for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of facilitation of possession with intent to sell over .5 grams of cocaine. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range II multiple offender to serve nine years in confinement and ordered to pay a $70,000 fine. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. The Defendant also challenges his sentence. After a careful review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court on sufficiency grounds and dismiss the charges against the Defendant.

I concur with the portion of the majority opinion which would affirm the trial court’s judgment regarding sentencing. However, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion which holds that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction of facilitation of possession with intent to sell over .5 grams of cocaine.

The petitioner, James Edward Dicken, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The petitioner, John W. Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed.

On August 1, 2001, Defendant, Anthony Charles Henderson, entered guilty pleas to two counts of sale of cocaine in an amount less than .5 grams, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417. Defendant received concurrent sentences of five years for his convictions with ninety days to be served in confinement and the remainder to be served on supervised probation. Defendant was also ordered to pay $2,000 in fines. On July 24, 2002, a violation of probation warrant was issued. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Defendant violated the conditions of his probation and ordered Defendant to serve his original sentences in confinement. Defendant appeals the trial court’s revocation of probation, arguing that there was no substantial evidence to support the revocation. Defendant also argues that the sentences imposed following the revocation were excessive. After reviewing the record on appeal, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Defendant’s probation and ordering Defendant to serve his original sentences in confinement.

The appellant, Kewan Jackson, was found guilty by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of criminally negligent homicide and reckless aggravated assault. The appellant received a total effective sentence of three years in the Shelby County Workhouse. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the refusal of the trial court to remove a juror. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Terry Shropshire, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction is void or his term of imprisonment has expired. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.