APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The pro se petitioner, James P. Hyde, appeals from the trial court's order denying the petitioner's motion to reopen his post-conviction petition. The states moves the court to affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of this court's rules. The motion was properly denied for lack of merit. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant entered a guilty plea to driving under the influence. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served forty-eight hours of confinement followed by probation. As a part of the guilty plea, the defendant reserved for appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(i). The judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, James Clark, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. Because the petitioner has no appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b), the appeal is dismissed.

The Appellant, Johnnie Darrell Rice, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of driving under the influence (DUI), first offense. Following a sentencing hearing, Rice was ordered to serve twenty days in periodic confinement. Rice appeals both his conviction and sentence arguing that: (1) the arresting officer had no reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle; (2) the trial court erred in ruling that Sergeant Ben Cook was an "expert" witness; and (3) his twenty-day sentence was excessive. Finding no reversible error, the judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.

This is a habeas corpus appeal. A jury convicted the petitioner of seven counts of rape of a child, one count of incest, and three counts of aggravated sexual battery. He received an effective sentence of twenty-two years incarceration. In April 2003, the petitioner submitted a pro se petition for habeas corpus relief, alleging the sentences for child rape committed in 1992 are illegal because the record is unclear as to whether these offenses were committed before or after July 1, 1992, the effective date of the child rape statute. The trial court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appeals the dismissal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Terry Wayne Perkins, was indicted on charges of driving under the influence, fourth offense, operating a motor vehicle after being declared an habitual motor vehicle offender, violation of the implied consent law, and driving on a revoked license. He was acquitted of the D.U.I. charge. A jury convicted him of violation of the implied consent law and driving on a revoked license. He was sentenced to an 11- month-and-29-day sentence at 75% for the violation of the implied consent law and six months at 75% for the driving on a revoked license conviction. The two sentences were ordered to run concurrently and the trial court ordered the appellant to serve 15 days of the sentence in the county jail, after which he would be released on probation, and assessed a $100 fine for each conviction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's decision to order him to serve 15 days in jail. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, James C. Murray, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief relating to his convictions for premeditated first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. On appeal, the petitioner contends: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; and (2) the post-conviction court erred in refusing to admit Leonard Rowe's testimony. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Anthony Carrier, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, felony theft, and misdemeanor vandalism. Pursuant to his plea agreement, he received an effective sentence of three years, with the manner of service of the sentences to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentences in confinement. It is from this order that the Defendant appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Marty Lavern Pyburn, was convicted by a jury in the Marion County Circuit Court of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the admission of his prior conviction of aggravated robbery for impeachment purposes; (3) the admission of photographs of the crime scene; (4) the expert testimony of Dr. Charles Harlan; and (5) the trial court's charge to the jury. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Albert Yarbrough, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of rape, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the petitioner as a violent offender to fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Following an unsuccessful appeal of his conviction, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, among other grounds, ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition, finding the petition to be barred by the statute of limitations and the petitioner’s allegations to be without merit. The petitioner now brings this appeal challenging the denial of his petition for relief. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the petitioner timely filed his petition for post-conviction relief. However, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition on the merits.

The Defendant, Danny Joe Wright, was convicted of driving under the influence second offense and violating the open container law. He was also found to have violated the implied consent law. In this direct appeal, he argues that the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination of the arresting officer and that the trial court erred by refusing to admit the testimony of an expert witness in field sobriety testing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial on April 23, 2003, the defendant was convicted of one count of sale of a controlled substance more than .5 grams. He was sentenced to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction and fined $3000. He appeals this conviction. The defendant argues two issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction; and (2) whether the trial court erred by not allowing the defendant’s uncle to testify at trial as to the identity of an individual in the videotape of the drug sale. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Appellant, Kenneth Anthony, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Anthony was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and attempted second degree murder. On appeal, Anthony argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for a new trial.

The defendant appeals his conviction for attempted first degree murder. The defendant’s sole issue on appeal is a claim that the jury venire was unconstitutionally empaneled by failing to include adequate representation of African-Americans. The defendant failed to prove a prima facie case, and the conviction is affirmed.

The Appellant, John C. Walker, III, was convicted of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to twenty-five years of incarceration. In this direct appeal, Walker alleges that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the action due to destruction of evidence; (3) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on certain lesser included offenses and by giving other improper jury instructions, such as instructing on “flight,” giving substantive instruction at the beginning of the trial, and providing papers to the jury unseen by counsel; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing Walker to the maximum sentence of twenty-five years. After review of the record, we find no error and affirm the conviction and resulting sentence.

The Appellant, Ronnie Simpson, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Simpson pled guilty to especially aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary and received an effective fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, Simpson challenges the validity of his guilty plea upon grounds of: (1) voluntariness and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition.

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part I join with the majority in affirming the appellant’s conviction and resulting sentence. I dissent, however, from that portion of the opinion which holds that aggravated assault and assault are not lesser included offenses of first degree (premeditated) murder. In State v. Paul Graham Manning, No. M2002-00547-CCA-R3-CD, 203 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 117, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Feb. 14, 2003), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2003), a panel of this Court reasoned that: [f]irst degree premeditated murder is the “premeditated and intentional killing of another.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1). An aggravated assault is committed, on the other hand, when the accused intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes serious bodily injury to another. See id. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A). Similarly, an assault is committed when one “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.” Id. § 39-13-101(a)(1). The mens rea of intentional includes the mens rea of knowing and reckless. See id. § 39-11-301(a)(2). A killing certainly includes serious bodily injury (as well as bodily injury). Thus, all of the statutory elements of these forms of aggravated assault and assault are included within the statutory elements of first degree premeditated murder, and they are therefore lesser included within the statutory elements of first degree premeditated murder, and they are therefore lesser included offenses under Part (a) of the Burns test.

The defendant, Stefanie M. Henson, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to robbery, a Class C felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant received a sentence of four years for the offense, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's request for an alternative sentence and ordered that she serve her sentence in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering that she serve her sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A jury found the Defendant, Carl Creason, guilty of driving on a revoked driver's license. After conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial judge sentenced the Defendant to six months in the county jail. The Defendant appeals his sentence, arguing that the trial court erred by not allowing him to serve his sentence on probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court, but remand for entry of a uniform judgment document.

Defendant, Michael A. Prechtel, appeals the trial court's revocation of probation. On September 6, 2001, Defendant pled guilty in the Cumberland County General Sessions Court to possession of drug paraphernalia and was sentenced to serve 11 months and 29 days with all but two days suspended and placed on supervised probation. Following three separate probation revocation proceedings in the general sessions court, defendant's probation was revoked and he was ordered to serve his sentence in the Cumberland County jail. Defendant appealed to the Cumberland County Criminal Court. Following a de novo hearing, the criminal court affirmed the general sessions court's decision to revoke defendant's probation and ordered him to serve 11 months and 29 days in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the Cumberland County Criminal Court.

The Petitioner, Garry Lynn Vernon, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The appellant, Phillip Lowell Bledsoe, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court of Gibson County of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of first degree murder. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Don Allen Coleman petitioned the Hickman County Circuit Court for habeas corpus relief, contending that the two rape of a child judgments against him impose illegal sentences. We agree that the sentences are illegal and we vacate them, thereby reviving the two indictments and pleas for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Leslie E. Raymond, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court dismiss the appeal or, in the alternative, affirm the trial court's action pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The motion is without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Eric T. Davis, pled guilty to robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to six years probation. The petitioner subsequently pled guilty to possession of cocaine with the intent to sell, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years probation, to be served consecutively to his prior sentence. The petitioner's probation was revoked in both cases. He appealed the trial court's order revoking his probationary sentences, and this court affirmed the revocation of his probation. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged, among other things, that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at his probation revocation hearing. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, holding the petitioner failed to assert a colorable claim for post-conviction relief. After reviewing the record and applicable law, we conclude that the post-conviction court was correct in summarily dismissing the petition. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.