APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Lauderdale County jury convicted the Defendant, Robert Sanford Barnes, of reckless endangerment, attempted rape, robbery, aggravated burglary, and assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant, as a career offender, to an effective sentence of forty-five years for the felony convictions, plus consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the two misdemeanor convictions. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain any of his five convictions; (2) the trial court improperly classified the Defendant as a career offender; and (3) the trial court erred when it ordered that the Defendant’s sentences run consecutively. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 1992, the petitioner, William T. Yelton, was found guilty by a jury of theft of property, two counts of coercion of a witness, fabricating evidence and harassment. As a result, he was sentenced to an effective twenty-one-year sentence. After his convictions in Tennessee, the petitioner was sent to Alabama presumably to serve time on a life sentence from which he had previously been paroled in that state. Six years later, the petitioner was returned to prison in Tennessee. In 2001, he filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus relief alleging that he was unlawfully detained on an expired/pardoned sentence. The petitioner filed a second petition in January of 2004. The trial court denied the second petition after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the trial court's denial of the petition for habeas corpus relief.

The Petitioner, Darvell S. Owens, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to satisfy the procedural requirements of the habeas corpus statutes, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The defendant, James Gary Turner, was indicted for reckless endangerment, felony evading arrest with risk of death or injury, and driving on a revoked license, fourth offense. The State subsequently dismissed the reckless endangerment charge, and the defendant pled guilty to driving on a revoked license, fourth offense, a Class A misdemeanor, and was convicted by a Bedford County Circuit Court jury of felony evading arrest with risk of death or injury, a Class D felony. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent terms of eight years for the felony evading arrest conviction and one year for the driving on a revoked license conviction, to be served consecutively to his federal sentence for a prior conviction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his Class D felony evading arrest conviction; the trial court erred in sentencing him to one year for the misdemeanor conviction; and the trial court imposed an excessive sentence for the felony evading arrest conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellants, Jessica Trotter-Lawson and Andrew Sheriff, pled guilty to theft of property over sixty thousand dollars. As a result of the plea agreement, each appellant received an eight-year sentence. Both appellants applied to the trial court for alternative sentencing. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered the appellants to serve the entire sentence in incarceration. Both appellants filed timely notices of appeal, challenging the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing. After a review, we determine that a sentence of split confinement would best serve the interests of the public and the appellants. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are reversed and remanded for entry of sentences of split confinement reflecting a period of twelve months of incarceration in the Shelby County Correctional Facility with the remainder of the eight-year sentence to be served on supervised probation.

The defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction ("TDOC"). On appeal, he asserts the trial court should have given him pretrial jail credit for time served in federal prison on an unrelated federal conviction. Following our review, we affirm the sentence but remand for entry of a corrected judgment.

The Appellant, Darrell Jones, Jr., appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Jones was indicted for first degree murder; however, the plea agreement permitted Jones to enter a guilty plea to the reduced charge of second degree murder. As part of the agreement, he accepted a forty-five year sentence as a Range III offender despite only meeting the statutory criteria for a Range I offender. On appeal, Jones raises the issue of whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform Jones of the ramifications of pleading outside his range. Following review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Colia Louis Streeter, was convicted of one count of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and one count of delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. The trial court merged Defendant's conviction in count two into his conviction in count one, and sentenced Defendant to twelve years as a Range I, standard offender. In his sole issue on appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that, at most, the transaction constituted a casual exchange of cocaine rather than an unlawful sale. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Perry Franks, pled guilty pursuant to a "best interest" plea to one count of aggravated rape and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping. The plea agreement provided that the Defendant would receive a Range I sentence of fifteen years for each offense, to run concurrently. The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that his lawyer was ineffective and that his dual convictions violate due process under State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991). After a hearing, the trial court denied relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was found guilty of attempted first degree murder, attempted especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of aggravated robbery. He contends on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing, and that the defendant was sentenced in violation of Blakely. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgment forms to reflect that the two convictions for aggravated robbery merge.

The petitioner, Vinson D. Mason, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to second degree murder and received a sentence of eighteen years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Leonard J. Young, appeals as of right his conviction and sentence resulting from the 1999 murder of Hillary Johnson. On  August 23, 2002, a Shelby County jury convicted the appellant of one count of premeditated first degree murder, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of theft of property over $1,000.00. Following a separate sentencing hearing on August 24, 2002, the jury unanimously found the presence of three statutory aggravating circumstances: the appellant had previously been convicted of a violent felony offense, the murder was committed to avoid prosecution, and the murder was committed during the perpetration of a theft. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (6), (7) (Supp. 2002). The jury further determined that these aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances and imposed a sentence of death. The trial court approved the sentencing verdict. On November 8, 2002, the trial court entered judgments of
conviction sentencing the appellant to death for the murder, sixty years  as a violent offender for the especially aggravated kidnapping, and twelve years as a career offender for the theft. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. The appellant now appeals as of right, presenting for our review the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying the appellant’s motion to suppress; (2) whether the trial court erred by failing to declare a mistrial when as a result of a death in his immediate family he was unable to continue to preside over the trial; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to establish venue of the murder in Shelby County; (4) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the appellant’s conviction of premeditated first degree murder; (5) whether the trial court erred by permitting the State to introduce various photographs of the victim; (6) whether the trial court erred by admitting certain victim impact evidence; (7) whether the trial court’s instruction to the jury that the appellant’s prior offenses were offenses in which the statutory elements involved the use of violence violated the United States Constitution; (8) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the finding of the (i)(6) aggravating circumstance; and (9) whether Tennessee’s death penalty statutory scheme is unconstitutional.  Finding no reversible error, we affirm the appellant’s convictions and sentence of death.

The defendant, David Sever Watkins ¹, was convicted by a White County jury of sale of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance, cocaine, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he asserts: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) the trial court erred in imposing a ten-year sentence. Following our review, we affirm the conviction and the sentence.

The majority concludes that modification of the defendant’s sentence is required in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). I must respectfully dissent.

The defendant, Randolph Anderson, appealed a conviction in the Sumner County General Sessions Court for simple possession of marijuana. In the trial court, the defendant filed a motion to suppress which was granted. In this appeal from the order of suppression, the state argues that the trial court erred by concluding that the arresting officer lacked any basis to stop the vehicle driven by the defendant. The judgment is affirmed.

The Appellant, Derrell Bender, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his "Motion for Reduction or Modification of Sentence" filed pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 35(b). Bender pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and received an agreed-upon sentence of ten years as a Range III career offender. In his motion, Bender requested that the trial court impose a sentence within the sentence range of a Range I standard offender. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Bender was "not an appropriate candidate for a suspended sentence." Bender seeks review pursuant to a "Petition for Common Law Writ of Certiorari." Because the trial court's order fails to address Bender's request for sentencing as a Range I offender, we reverse and remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the Rule 35 motion.

Defendants Ronald Eugene Hall and Henry Lee Dixon were each indicted on one count of first degree felony murder, one count of first degree premeditated murder and one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery. Following a jury trial, Defendant Hall was convicted of the lesser included offense of second degree murder on counts one and two and was found not guilty on count three, attempted especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged Defendant Hall's conviction of second degree murder in count two with his second degree murder conviction in count one and sentenced him to twenty years. Defendant Dixon was found not guilty in counts two and three and convicted in count one of the lesser included offense of facilitation of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant Dixon to nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Defendant Hall argues on appeal that (1) the trial court erred in its instruction to the jury on the definition of reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court erred in providing the jury with an instruction on the introduction of fingerprint evidence; (3) the trial court erred in admitting certain photographs during Officer George Bouton's testimony; and (4) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to facilitation as a lesser included offense of the indicted offenses. Defendant Dixon challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the trial court erred in not admitting a video animation portraying the sequence of events described during Defendant Dixon's testimony. Defendant Dixon also argues that his sentence is excessive. Defendant Hall did not appeal the length of his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Tiffany Lea Packard, pled guilty in the Sevier County Circuit Court to manufacturing methamphetamine, a Class C felony, and simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. She received a total effective sentence of four years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court denied the appellant alternative sentencing, and the appellant now appeals that denial. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Eric Phillips, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was subsequently amended.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the petition for post-conviction relief was dismissed. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel both at trial and on appeal. After a thorough review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Thomas L. Jackson, was convicted of possessing drugs in a penal facility, and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years in prison. This conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied the Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, contending that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The defendant, Christy Mechelle Thompson,¹ broke into a private residence and stole personal property worth more than $500.00. The Cocke County Grand Jury indicted her for one count of aggravated burglary and one count of theft over $500.00. The defendant pled guilty. As part of her plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the defendant to three (3) years as Range I offender for the aggravated burglary and one (1) year for the theft over $500.00. She also agreed to pay restitution in the amount of $1,016.85. Under the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine the method and manner of sentence. The trial court sentenced the defendant to incarceration with the Tennessee Department of Corrections. The defendant appeals her sentence, arguing that: (1) the trial court improperly weighed the enhancing and mitigating factors; and (2) the trial court erred in denying the defendant probation. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant was convicted by a jury of voluntary manslaughter and especially aggravated robbery. The Defendant received an effective thirty-year sentence for these crimes. This court affirmed the judgments on direct appeal. See State v. Carlos C. Beasley, No. W1999-00426-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 527715 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, May 2, 2000). The Defendant subsequently filed for postconviction relief on the ground that his trial lawyer provided ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief. This appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Billy Ray Sanlin, was convicted by jury of two counts of aggravated robbery and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. On appeal he contends that: (1) he was substantially prejudiced when the trial court improperly allowed the State to call his codefendant to testify after the codefendant previously indicated his unwillingness to testify; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to allow his defense counsel to argue the difficulties inherent in cross-racial identification in closing argument; and (3) the evidence relating to the defendant’s identification as the perpetrator of the offenses was insufficient to support his convictions. Because we determine that reversible error occurred in the State’s direct examination of the codefendant as a witness, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Freddie Alton Moss, appeals the trial court's revocation of probation. The single issue presented for review is whether the trial court abused its discretion by revoking the probation based upon charges for driving under the influence and violation of the implied consent law. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.