APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Randy L. Johnson, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to two counts of aggravated assault and one count of theft of property valued over $1,000. He received a total effective sentence of nine years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court granted the appellant probation. Subsequently, his probation was revoked because of new offenses and a positive drug screen. The trial court ordered the petitioner to serve his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the appellant challenges the revocation of his probation. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Gary Wayne Young, appeals as of right the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to two Class B felony drug offenses and its imposition of concurrent sentences of twenty-one years as a Range II, multiple offender. He contends that his guilty pleas were involuntary and unknowing because he was under the influence of narcotics when he entered them and that the sentences are illegal because they are outside of the range for a multiple offender convicted of a Class B felony. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a direct appeal as of right from a conviction on a jury verdict of evading arrest by motor vehicle with risk of death or injury. The trial court determined that the Defendant, Daniel Livingston, was a career offender and sentenced him to twelve years for the felony evading arrest conviction and time served for a misdemeanor resisting arrest conviction. On appeal, the Defendant argues five issues: (1) the evading arrest statute is unconstitutional because it violates the "Caption Clause" of the Tennessee Constitution; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction for felony evading arrest with risk of death or injury; (3) the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant as a career offender because the State's notice of enhanced punishment was defective; (4) the Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; and (5) the Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated because the trial court made findings of fact for sentencing purposes. We affirm the Defendant's conviction, but modify the sentence to four years to be served as a Range I standard offender.

The petitioner, Shirley Mason, appeals as of right the dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief by the Bedford County Circuit Court. She seeks relief from her conviction for delivering less than one-half gram of cocaine and resulting sentence of eight years in confinement. The petitioner contends that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel which caused her to enter an involuntary guilty plea. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Upon entering a "best interest"guilty plea, the Defendant, Jeremy Miller, was convicted of attempted aggravated child abuse, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to eleven years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant raises the issue of whether the trial court erred in ordering an excessive sentence by: (1) improperly weighing enhancement and mitigating factors; and (2) denying alternative sentencing. We modify the sentence of the trial court to comply with the dictates of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ____, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We remand for the trial court to consider the Defendant's suitability for probation.

The defendant, Rebecca G. Ratliff, appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's revocation of her probation. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in ordering her to serve her original two-year sentence in the Department of Correction. Because the record supports the trial court in its discretionary determination to order incarceration, we affirm.

The Appellant, Sonya Gosnell, appeals the Greene County Criminal Court's denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Gosnell raises the single issue of whether she was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Gary Alden Bowers, pled guilty in the Carter County Criminal Court to three counts of aggravated burglary, one count of burglary, two counts of theft of property over $500, two counts of theft of property under $500, and one count of felony failure to appear. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of twenty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sentences imposed by the trial court in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Gary Lee Marise, was convicted by a Carroll County jury of possession of anhydrous ammonia with the intent to manufacture a controlled substance, a class E felony, and the misdemeanor offenses of possession of methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. For his conviction for the possession of anhydrous ammonia, Marise received a two-year sentence, with service of ninety days confinement, followed by supervised probation. On appeal, Marise raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions and (2) whether his sentence for possession of anhydrous ammonia is excessive. After review of the record, we affirm the judgments of conviction and resulting felony sentence.

A Bledsoe County grand jury indicted the defendant, Nona Pilgram, for assault and vandalism resulting in $1,000 to $10,000 in damages to the vehicle of the victim, Molly Myers. A jury acquitted the defendant of assault but convicted her of vandalism resulting in $500 to $1,000 in damages. For this conviction, the court ordered the defendant to serve a six-year probationary sentence. The defendant now appeals her conviction and sentence, arguing that she is entitled to a new trial or resentencing on the following grounds: (1) The trial court erred by refusing to allow testimony regarding the victim's prejudice towards the defendant; (2) the trial court erred by allowing hearsay evidence regarding the fair market value of the victim's vehicle; (3) the trial court erred by refusing to allow the introduction of an internet-based estimate of the victim's vehicle; and (4) the trial court erred by failing to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-102 through 121 when determining whether the defendant was a viable candidate for judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.

The Petitioner, Lawrence Montgomery, appeals the trial court's denial of his application for writ of habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. It appears from the record before us that the notice of appeal was not timely filed and this Court cannot conclude that justice requires that this Court waive the timely filing requirement. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the above-captioned appeal is dismissed.

The Petitioner Marvin Anthony Matthews appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has failed to establish either that this sentence has expired or that his conviction or sentence is void. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner is appealing the trial court's denial of habeas corpus relief. A review of the record reveals that the Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Appellant, Clifford L. Taylor, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for arrest of judgment. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition is not proper as either a motion in arrest of judgment, petition for post-conviction relief, or application for writ of habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Petitioner, Joseph L. Coleman, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to show either that his sentence has expired or that the trial court was without jurisdiction, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Rico Raybon, appeals the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. The petition was filed outside the applicable statute of limitation and is, therefore, time-barred. Accordingly, we affirm the
dismissal of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Darren Ray Case, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that the Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the appeal is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The petitioner, Kelvin Wade Cloyd, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. He alleges that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, claims that the state knowingly used false testimony during his trial, and asserts that he was erroneously assessed costs. The judgment is affirmed.

The appellant, Jason Allen Needel, pled guilty in the Sumner County Criminal Court to aggravated burglary, theft over $1000, and theft under $500. He received a total effective sentence of fourteen years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the imposition of consecutive sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Robert Shawn Clark, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Danny Ray Applegate, pled guilty to three counts of the sale of methamphetamine and one count of possession of more than 100 grams of methamphetamine with the intent to sell. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of eleven years in prison. The Defendant appeals, contending: (1) that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence upon him; and (2) the trial court erred when it failed to sentence him to a community corrections sentence. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the Defendant’s sentence.

The defendant appeals his conviction for sexual battery, contesting the sufficiency of the evidence and asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The issue of ineffective assistance is waived for failure to perfect the record, cite to relevant authority, or reference the record. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Chad Allen Conyers, pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. The trial court deferred entry of a judgment of conviction and placed the Defendant on judicial diversion for fifteen (15) years. The Defendant was subsequently charged with violating the terms of his probation. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to four years, split confinement. The Defendant now appeals both the revocation of his probation and the manner of service of his sentence. Finding that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking the Defendant's probation, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and order that the Defendant's probation be reinstated.

Defendant, Latwan R. Coleman, pled guilty to possession of over 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, in case number 2003-A-265, and to sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, in case number 2003-A-280. The plea agreement contained a recommended sentence of nine years for the Class B felony conviction and a sentence of three years for the Class C felony conviction. Defendant's request for community corrections was left for the trial court to determine. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied Defendant's request for a community corrections sentence, and ordered Defendant to serve the recommended sentences in confinement. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of nine years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request that he be sentenced to community corrections rather than incarceration. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Luis Castanon, was charged with and convicted of four counts of aggravated rape and one count of aggravated burglary. He was sentenced to twenty years for each of the aggravated rape offenses and three years for aggravated burglary. Three of the aggravated rape sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to each other, with the remaining aggravated rape sentence and the aggravated burglary sentence to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of sixty years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury's verdict and that the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences was improper.  We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant's convictions and hold that the imposition of consecutive sentencing was appropriate. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.