APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Stanley Adams, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The defendant, Ginger Jackson, was convicted of solicitation of first degree murder. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of eight years and six months. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the trial court erred by the admission of certain testimony; (2) that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence certain audiotape recordings; (3) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding the inaudible portions of the audiotape recordings; (4) that the trial court erred by failing to suppress the audiotape recording of the defendant's arrest; (5) that the trial court erred by denying the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the state's proof; (6) that the trial court erred by excluding certain evidence offered by the defendant; (6) that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence testimony regarding lawsuits involving the defendant and various public entities; (7) that the trial court erred by failing to require the state to elect the specific date on which the offense occurred; (8) that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing; and (9) that the sentence is excessive. The defendant has also asked this court to review her sentence under the guidelines of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The sentence is modified and the cause is remanded for consideration of the defendant's suitability for probation.

The defendant, Anthony D. Aziz, appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's denial of alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment.

The Appellant, Cornelius Boales, was convicted by a Henderson County jury of one count of felony possession of cocaine with the intent  to sell, a class B felony, and one count of felony possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, a class E felony. For these crimes,  Boales received an effective twelve-year sentence as a Range I offender. In addition, the trial court imposed a $100,000 fine as assessed by the jury for the cocaine conviction. On appeal, Boales  argues (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support either of his  convictions and (2) that the trial court erred in imposing the maximum sentence and the maximum fine for his class B felony conviction. After review, we conclude that the evidence supports the convictions and the length of the sentence imposed.  However, we modify Boales’ fine of $100,000 to reflect assessment of a fine in the amount of $50,000.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary and that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to adequately explain the consequences of the pleas and for failing to raise the issue of his mental competency at the sentencing hearing. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

The defendant attempts to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37 while a motion is pending in the trial court. The trial court has held the defendant’s remaining motion in abeyance because the defendant has pursued this appeal. We find this appeal premature and remand the case to the trial court to complete the proceedings and issue a final judgment, from which the defendant may then appeal.

The petitioner, Christopher Lee Tuttle, appeals as of right the judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for drug-related offenses and effective forty-year sentence. The petitioner contends (1) that the state breached his plea agreement which undermined the voluntariness of his guilty plea and (2) that the state engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by acting vindictively and violating Rule 8(a), Tenn. R. Crim. P., requiring mandatory joinder. We affirm the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Preston U. Pendergrass, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the indictment, which charged him with two counts of attempted first degree murder, failed to state the facts constituting an offense, thereby depriving the convicting court of jurisdiction and rendering his judgments void. The petitioner further argues that the court erred by not appointing appellate counsel as requested. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The petitioner, Jesse David Teasley, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, request for writ of error coram nobis, and petition for post-conviction relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's action pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The trial court properly denied relief as the pleadings were untimely filed and without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Appellant, Jerry Yates, appeals the denial by the trial court of a motion to suppress all evidence in a prosecution for driving under the influence, alleging an illegal warrantless misdemeanor arrest because he left the scene of the accident. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

The defendant, Barry Wayne Dunham, was convicted by a Macon County Criminal Court jury of the first degree premeditated murder of his father and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by: (1) restricting defense counsel’s voir dire of the jury venire; (2) interfering with defense counsel’s examination of a witness and denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on the court’s allegedly prejudicial commentary on the witness’s testimony; and (3) disallowing a defense expert witness on the subject of domestic violence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The Hamilton County Criminal Court Grand Jury indicted the defendant, George Lebron Johnson, on two counts of attempt to commit first degree murder. He entered into an agreement with the state to plead guilty to two counts of aggravated assault in exchange for concurrent six-year, Range I sentences. The agreement provided that the trial court would determine the manner of service of the effective six-year sentence. On January 9, 2004, the trial court ordered him to serve the effective sentence in confinement. On February 6, 2004, the defendant moved the court to allow him to withdraw his guilty pleas and for a new trial on the issue of the manner of service of his sentences. The trial court denied both motions, and the defendant has appealed. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur in most of the reasoning and results reached in the majority opinion. I respectfully disagree, though, with the conclusion that Dr. Goetting was not qualified to testify as an expert in this parent-child homicide case. The trial court excluded her testimony because it was the first time she had testified in such a case, she was a sociologist, and she relied on facts that were not in evidence. It concluded that her testimony would not be a substantial help to the jury.

The petitioner, Stevie W. Caldwell, was convicted in 1995 in the White County Criminal Court of first degree felony murder, aggravated arson, and conspiracy to commit arson against personal property, for which he was sentenced, respectively, to life, nineteen years, and six months, to be served concurrently. In a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, he claimed that the indictment was defective, thereby depriving the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the petition, and this timely appeal followed. After review, we affirm the dismissal.

The petitioner, Michael Holman, appeals the Marshall County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of possession of one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to deliver and sentence of twenty years. This court affirmed the judgment of conviction. See State v. Michael Andrae Holman, M2002-01471-CCA-R3-CD, Marshall County (Tenn. Crim. App. July 23, 2003). The petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed (1) to interview and subpoena witnesses adequately; (2) to obtain phone records and motel documents; (3) to contact witnesses who could provide the petitioner with an alibi defense; (4) to cross-examine the informant and co-defendant thoroughly; (5) to argue sufficiently that the petitioner could not have been in constructive possession of the drugs found; and (6) to prepare adequately for trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Faron Douglas Pierce, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief and request for a delayed appeal. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the petitioner argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to allow him to testify at his sentencing hearing, and in failing to file a Rule 11 application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. After review of the record, we grant the petitioner a delayed appeal, and we stay further proceedings on his remaining post-conviction claim.

The defendant, Steven Skinner, was convicted by jury of two counts of first degree premeditated murder for which he received consecutive sentences of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions because there is no proof connecting him to the crimes other than uncorroborated accomplice testimony, and (2) the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant to two consecutive life sentences.  Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Annette Reynolds, was convicted of facilitation of possession of cocaine for resale, a Class C felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a career offender to concurrent sentences of fifteen years and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and contends that there was prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. She also claims that the trial court made several errors: by denying discovery regarding the identity of the confidential informant whose information led to the search warrant for her residence; by denying her motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search; by admitting the presentence report at sentencing; and by sentencing her as a career offender. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner, Paul K. Flannigan, appeals pro se from the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court dismissed the petition for failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that his judgments, indictments, and jury
verdicts are invalid. He further argues that the trial judge and district attorney have acted improperly.  Finding no merit in this appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Patrick Harris, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree murder. In this appeal, he insists that he acted in self-defense and that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction. Finding that the evidence is sufficient and that it entitled the jury to reject the defendant’s claim of self-defense, we affirm the defendant’s conviction.

The petitioner, Phyllis Hathaway, appeals from the trial court’s order modifying her probation and setting her restitution. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the trial court erred in (1) imposing consecutive sentences and probation on December 7, 1989 because the judgments had become final; and (2) in determining restitution fourteen (14) years after the sentencing hearing. Following review, we conclude that the judgment expiration issue is without merit. In addition, we affirm the trial court’s modification of the petitioner’s probation. However, after review of the record, we conclude that the trial court failed to follow the criteria set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-304 when setting restitution. Therefore, regarding the issue of restitution, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new sentencing hearing consistent with this opinion.

The defendant challenges the imposition of consecutive sentences, based on the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Blakely v. Washington. Our courts have previously held that neither Apprendi nor Blakely affect the trial court’s ability to impose consecutive sentences. Furthermore, upon reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court properly imposed consecutive sentences based on the defendant’s extensive record, consisting of twenty prior convictions. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Ronald Joseph Reece pleaded guilty to statutory rape for which he received a two-year probationary sentence. Aggrieved of the trial court’s refusal to grant judicial diversion, he now appeals his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the sentence imposed by the lower court.

This is an appeal as of right from the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. Upon entering guilty pleas, the two Defendants were convicted of attempted first degree murder and attempted second degree murder respectively, and received sentences of fifteen and ten years’ incarceration.  The Defendants filed petitions for post-conviction relief, and after a consolidated evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief to both Defendants. The Defendants now appeal to this Court raising the issues of ineffective assistance of counsel and involuntary pleas. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.