APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Reginald Almo, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petition fails to grant a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

This matter is before the Court upon the motion of appointed counsel seeking permission to withdraw from further representation of the Appellant in the above-captioned appeal pursuant to Rule 22, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Counsel claims that there are no
meritorious issues available for appellate review. Counsel has complied with the procedural requirements of Rule 22, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Kelvin Hooks, has failed to submit a responsive brief pursuant to Rule 22(E), Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. After careful review of the motion, the accompanying Anders brief, and the appellate record, including the transcripts of the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, we agree with counsel’s assertion that the appeal has no merit and is, accordingly, frivolous within the meaning of Rule 22, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Defendant was convicted by jury verdict of two counts of aggravated burglary, two counts of aggravated assault, and misdemeanor resisting arrest. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II offender to ten years for each felony conviction and six months for the misdemeanor conviction, with the first three felony conviction sentences to be served consecutively and the remaining sentences to be served concurrently, resulting in an effective sentence of thirty years. On appeal, the Defendant raises four issues: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support his two aggravated burglary convictions and one aggravated assault conviction; 2) the trial court erred in failing to allow the defense to impeach the testimony of one of the State's witnesses by means of a prior juvenile conviction; 3) the trial court erred in imposing excessive sentences in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004); and 4) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Lewis A. Grimes, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition was filed outside the applicable statute of limitation and is, therefore, time-barred. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

The Petitioner, Miqwon Leach, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the Petitioner has failed to allege aground for relief which would render the judgment void, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court

The defendant challenges the District Attorney General's denial of pretrial diversion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. Specifically, he avers that the District Attorney General abused his discretion and failed to consider all relevant factors. Upon careful consideration, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for the District Attorney General's further consideration of all applicable factors, discussion of the evidence supporting those factors, and an explanation of the weight accorded to each.

Terry Edward Jones pleaded guilty to solicitation of first degree murder, for which he received an eight-year incarcerative sentence. Aggrieved of the trial court's failure to grant his request for alternative sentencing, he brings the instant appeal challenging his manner of service. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jeffery Hayes, entered an open guilty plea to one count of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, two counts of the sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine, Class B felonies, and one count of possession with intent to sell more than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of ten years as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence and denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals the trial court's revocation of her probation based upon a new law violation, to wit: introduction of contraband into a penal facility. Specifically, she contends that: (1) no proof was presented that Soma is a controlled substance or legend drug; (2) the trial court improperly took judicial notice that Soma is a controlled substance; (3) no proof was presented of unlawful intent; and (4) the revocation order does not properly state the evidence relied upon and reason for revoking probation. Upon our review, we conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the finding of a new law violation; we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Antonio Dewayne Bledsoe, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Davidson County Criminal Court. On appeal, Bledsoe contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and, as a result, his nolo contendere plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Howard Duty, Jr., appeals from the post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Kenya Davis, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Christopher Robertson, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to file a timely notice of appeal document. This Court finds that justice does not require waiver.  Accordingly, the above-captioned appeal is dismissed.

The defendant, Jonathan Harris, was convicted by jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony; and theft of property valued between $10,000 and $60,000, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years for the attempted second degree murder conviction, six years for the voluntary manslaughter conviction, and five years for the theft of property conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively for an effective sentence of twenty-three years. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred in not suppressing the defendant’s statements and journal; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (3) and the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Kelvin Lee Howard, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel which caused him to enter unknowing and involuntaryguilty pleas. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

The Petitioner, Joseph L. Tims, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Tyrone Chalmers, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petition for post-conviction relief is time-barred by the statute of limitations, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Petitioner, James Eugene Yates, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Jerry L. Sandridge, was convicted by a jury of two counts 1 of aggravated robbery.  On direct appeal, this Court modified one of the convictions to aggravated assault and remanded for re-sentencing. State v. Franklin, 130 S.W.3d 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). At a subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a career offender to fifteen years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant presents the single issue of whether the trial court properly classified him as a career offender. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Johnny Maxwell, of five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, and one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of twenty-four years for each especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, to be served at one hundred percent, and to eleven years for the aggravated robbery conviction, to be served consecutively to the other sentences for an effective sentence of thirty-five years. On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) his especially aggravated kidnapping convictions cannot stand under State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991), because the victims’ detention was incidental to the aggravated robbery; (2) the trial court improperly commented on the evidence during the jury instructions; and (3) his sentences are improper in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Raymond Bailey, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of especially aggravated kidnapping and carjacking. Following a sentencing hearing, Bailey was sentenced to consecutive sentences of twenty-eight years for especially aggravated kidnapping and twelve years for carjacking.  On appeal, Bailey raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of undisclosed evidence; (3) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to present evidence of his drug possession at the time of his arrest; (4) whether Bailey’s sentences violate Blakely v. Washington; and (5) whether the cumulative errors require a new trial. After review of the record, we conclude that issues (1), (2), (4), and (5) are without merit. With regard to issue (3), we conclude that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence but conclude that the error was harmless. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant appeals his convictions for attempted second-degree murder and aggravated robbery.  Specifically, he avers that, (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts; (2) the State’s failure to disclose the statement of an unindicted co-conspirator constitutes a Brady violation and entitles him to a new trial; (3) the sentence was issued in error, in light of Blakely v. Washington; and (4) the cumulative effect of all errors merits a new trial. Following our review, we affirm the convictions and the sentences imposed.

The petitioner appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to properly investigate and prepare his case for trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of two counts of sale of a Schedule III controlled substance (Lortab), a Class D felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender, to concurrent four-year sentences. He appeals to this Court contending that: (1) the evidence presented was insufficient to show that the defendant acted knowingly; (2) the evidence presented was insufficient to show that the transaction constituted a sale; (3) the trial court erred in finding that the dispensing of prescription drugs creates a high risk of harm to human life; and (4) the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.

The Appellant, James C. Breer, appeals the Henry County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Breer argues that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to investigate and prepare for trial, and (2) failing to advise him of his right to testify at trial in violation of Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999). After review, we conclude that issue (1) is without merit. However, with regard to issue (2), we conclude that the record does not support the trial court’s finding that Breer personally waived his right to testify as required by Momon.  Moreover, because the procedural guidelines adopted in Momon for determining whether the error was harmless were not followed, we find it necessary to remand for resolution of this issue.