APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Appellant, Raymond Bailey, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of especially aggravated kidnapping and carjacking. Following a sentencing hearing, Bailey was sentenced to consecutive sentences of twenty-eight years for especially aggravated kidnapping and twelve years for carjacking.  On appeal, Bailey raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of undisclosed evidence; (3) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to present evidence of his drug possession at the time of his arrest; (4) whether Bailey’s sentences violate Blakely v. Washington; and (5) whether the cumulative errors require a new trial. After review of the record, we conclude that issues (1), (2), (4), and (5) are without merit. With regard to issue (3), we conclude that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence but conclude that the error was harmless. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant appeals his convictions for attempted second-degree murder and aggravated robbery.  Specifically, he avers that, (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts; (2) the State’s failure to disclose the statement of an unindicted co-conspirator constitutes a Brady violation and entitles him to a new trial; (3) the sentence was issued in error, in light of Blakely v. Washington; and (4) the cumulative effect of all errors merits a new trial. Following our review, we affirm the convictions and the sentences imposed.

The petitioner appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to properly investigate and prepare his case for trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of two counts of sale of a Schedule III controlled substance (Lortab), a Class D felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender, to concurrent four-year sentences. He appeals to this Court contending that: (1) the evidence presented was insufficient to show that the defendant acted knowingly; (2) the evidence presented was insufficient to show that the transaction constituted a sale; (3) the trial court erred in finding that the dispensing of prescription drugs creates a high risk of harm to human life; and (4) the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.

The Appellant, James C. Breer, appeals the Henry County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Breer argues that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to investigate and prepare for trial, and (2) failing to advise him of his right to testify at trial in violation of Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999). After review, we conclude that issue (1) is without merit. However, with regard to issue (2), we conclude that the record does not support the trial court’s finding that Breer personally waived his right to testify as required by Momon.  Moreover, because the procedural guidelines adopted in Momon for determining whether the error was harmless were not followed, we find it necessary to remand for resolution of this issue.

The petitioner appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Dyer County jury convicted the defendant, Syrus Maurice Coleman, of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a multiple offender to fourteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Upon our review of the evidence, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Otis Miller, III, pled guilty to four (4) counts of aggravated sexual battery. As a result of the guilty plea, the trial court sentenced the appellant to ten (10) years on each conviction and ordered the first two counts to be served concurrently and the last two counts to be served concurrently. The trial court ordered that the first two counts be served consecutively to the remaining two counts, for an effective sentence of twenty (20) years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's application of certain enhancement factors in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and the trial court's decision to order consecutive sentences. Because our supreme court recently determined that Blakely has no application in Tennessee, we have reviewed the appellant's sentence de novo. Despite the trial court's improper application of several enhancement factors, we affirm the appellant's sentence because we determine that the existence of enhancement factor (16) justifies enhancement of the sentence from eight (8) to ten (10) years. We also affirm the trial court's decision to order consecutive sentences.

The appellant, Joseph D. Taylor, was convicted of attempted rape, attempted sexual battery, and aggravated kidnapping. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant was sentenced as a career offender to fifteen (15) years for attempted rape, eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days for attempted sexual battery, and twelve (12) years as a violent offender for aggravated kidnapping. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the conviction for attempted rape and reversed the other two convictions. See State v. Taylor, 63 S.W.3d 400 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). The appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied by the trial court after a hearing. On appeal, this Court set aside the appellant's sentence for attempted rape because he was improperly sentenced as a career offender. See Joseph D. Taylor v. State, No. M2003-00138-CCA-R3-PC, 2004 WL 350641, at *11 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 20, 2004). On remand, the trial court sentenced the appellant to fifteen (15) years as a Range III offender. A timely notice of appeal was filed. The appellant challenges his sentence, arguing that his sentence violates Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), because the trial court improperly applied enhancement factors that were not admitted by the appellant or determined by a jury. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.

The petitioner, Matthew Melton Jackson, appeals as of right the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Robertson County Circuit Court. He seeks relief from his convictions for two counts of aggravated rape, one count of aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, and effective sentence of twenty-five years. The petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not voluntary or knowing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Bud Cash, Jr., was indicted on sixteen counts of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and three counts of possession of an altered serial number weapon. After the statute of limitations had expired, the State filed two subsequent superceding indictments. The trial court dismissed all three indictments, holding that the original indictment was insufficient to provide the Defendant notice of the charges and insufficient to protect the Defendant from double jeopardy, and that the subsequent indictments were untimely filed. The State appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it dismissed the indictments. We agree with the State, and, accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Henry Ford Williams, Jr., entered a plea of guilt to the unlawful possession of a firearm. Tried by a jury on a charge of possession of .57 grams of cocaine with intent to sell within one thousand feet of a school and simple possession of cocaine, the defendant was convicted on each count. The trial court merged the two illegal drug convictions. Concurrent sentences of three years for the firearm conviction and thirty-two years, six months, for the cocaine conviction were imposed upon the defendant. The single issue presented for review is whether the evidence was sufficient. The judgments are affirmed.

The petitioner, William Brown, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After reviewing the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Douglas F. Jordan, Jr., was convicted of second degree murder and ordered to serve twenty-three years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient, that the trial court committed certain evidentiary errors, that the trial court erred by denying his motion for continuance, and that the sentence was excessive. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The appellant, Steve Brian Hannah, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to one count of theft of property over $10,000, three counts of theft of property over $1,000, and one count of possession of marijuana with intent to resell. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the appellant received an effective five-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the appellant to serve one year in confinement and the remainder of his sentence on community corrections. On appeal, the appellant claims the trial court erred by refusing to grant his request for full probation. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments as to the thefts.

The petitioner, Douglas L. Brown, has appealed from the Bledsoe County Circuit Court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The petition attacked the petitioner's two 1998, Davidson County, guilty-pleaded convictions of rape of a child. The state has moved the court pursuant to Rule 20 of this court's rules to summarily affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. We sustain the motion and affirm the judgment.

The appellant, David James Wiley, pled guilty in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to arson and received a probationary sentence of six years. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the appellant's probation. The appellant now appeals, contesting the trial court's evidentiary rulings during the revocation hearing and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the revocation. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new hearing.

Following a jury trial, Defendant Mack Transou was convicted of aggravated burglary and rape. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of fifteen years for aggravated burglary and sixteen years for rape. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury's verdict, that the trial court erred in admitting DNA evidence, and that his sentence was improper in light of Blakely v. Washington. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant's convictions, the DNA evidence was properly admitted, and that the trial court did not err in its application of one enhancement factor when sentencing Defendant. Accordingly, we affirm Defendant’s convictions and sentences.

The petitioner, Milta D. Blanchard, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of habeas corpus relief and claims that his 1992 conviction of reckless endangerment is void because the charging instrument did not charge the offense of reckless endangerment. We affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Harlen Roy L. Zirker, aka Anthony Lamont Zirker, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and four counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and received an effective sentence of seventy-two years. The defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike two jurors for cause, in admitting evidence of the defendant's prior criminal convictions, and in imposing consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

The petitioner, Prentiss Phillips, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, Douglas E. Copeland, was convicted by a Putnam County Criminal Court jury of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor, and driving on a suspended license, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days for the DUI conviction, with probation after ten days in jail, to be served concurrently with his sentence of six months on probation for the driving with a suspended license conviction. The trial court also ordered that the defendant pay fines totaling $860.00. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his DUI conviction and that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that his inoperable vehicle was a defense to the DUI offense. We affirm the trial court.

The defendant appeals his dual convictions for possession of marijuana with intent to sell and with intent to deliver. We affirm the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress. We remand for merger of the offenses as the dual convictions are violative of double jeopardy. Further, we modify the sentence to two years in our de novo review, due to error in failure to make findings of fact in sentencing.

The petitioner appeals from the dismissal of his Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Petition. Dismissal followed an unfavorable result for the petitioner after DNA analysis of a portion of the evidence. Upon review, we affirm the dismissal.

A Coffee County jury convicted the Defendant, Nathaniel Champion, of the sale of a controlled substance, cocaine, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to three years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for the sale of cocaine; and (2) the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant's motion for dismissal of appointed counsel. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.