APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Patricia Marie Jenson,² was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of child neglect and possession of drug paraphernalia. She received a total effective sentence of four years, to be served on community corrections. On appeal, the appellant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction for child neglect and the sentence imposed by the trial court on that offense. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion’s upholding the conviction. I do not believe the evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant of child neglect as that offense is described in State v. Mateyko, 53 S.W.2d 666 (Tenn. 2001). In Mateyko, our supreme court held that “a mere risk of harm” was insufficient and that the state was required to show “that the defendant’s neglect produced an actual, deleterious effect or harm upon the child’s health and welfare.” Id. 53 S.W.3d at 671-72.

The petitioner, Rickie Reed, appeals from the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, Kent Ousley, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief.  The single issue presented for review is whether the petition was properly dismissed. The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, Patrick John Marshall, entered pleas of guilt to one count of possession of cocaine with intent to sell and one count of possession of marijuana in exchange for an effective sentence of twelve years, to be served on community corrections. The trial court later revoked the community corrections sentence and, after a sentencing hearing, imposed a Range II sentence of twenty years' incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the sentence is excessive. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Eddrick Johnson, originally charged with two counts of aggravated robbery, was convicted of two counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the convictions and imposed a Range II sentence of seven years. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that he was improperly sentenced as a Range II offender. The judgment is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Raymond A. Clark, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to reopen his post-conviction petition/petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal
Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to allege a ground for relief which would render the judgment void, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The defendant was indicted on one count of aggravated robbery (a Class B felony). Following a jury trial, he was convicted of the lesser included offense of robbery (a Class C felony) and was sentenced as a career offender to fifteen years in the Department of Correction. Upon the grant of a delayed appeal, the defendant challenges: (1) the sufficiency of the identification evidence; and (2) whether his confession was sufficiently corroborated so as to establish the corpus delicti. After careful review of the record, the briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael D. McDade, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary and he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

A Maury County Circuit Court jury found the appellant, LeShaun Norwood, guilty of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction (DOC). In this appeal, the appellant claims (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, (2) that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress his confession to police, and (3) that the trial court erred by admitting prejudicial photographs into evidence. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Wesley Earl Brown, was convicted of two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and three counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to twenty-five years for each rape conviction, to be served consecutively, and ten years for each sexual battery conviction, to be served concurrently but consecutively to the rape convictions, for a total effective sentence of sixty years. On appeal, he argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior bad acts; and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Tyrone D. Conley, pled guilty in the Washington County Criminal Court to second degree murder, and he was sentenced to twenty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a "Constitutional Challenge to Vacate Invalid Sentence." The trial court dismissed the petition, finding that if the document was a petition for post-conviction relief, it was time-barred. Further, the trial court determined that if the document was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner did not allege that his judgment was void. On appeal, the petitioner contests the trial court's dismissal of his petition. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant was indicted for evading arrest, a Class E felony, in count one; for carjacking, a Class B felony, in count two; for reckless endangerment of Officer Billy Moyer, a Class E felony, in count three; for reckless endangerment of Officer Joe MacLeod, a Class E felony, in count four; for driving on a canceled, suspended or revoked license, subsequent offense, a Class A misdemeanor, in count five; and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor, in count six. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of Class E felony evading arrest, carjacking, reckless endangerment of Officer Moyer, and driving on a revoked license in counts one, two, three and five. Defendant was found not guilty of reckless endangerment of Officer MacLeod and resisting arrest in counts four and six. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, to two years for the felony evading arrest conviction, twelve years for the carjacking conviction, two years for the reckless endangerment conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the driving on a revoked license conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences concurrently for an effective sentence of twelve years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for carjacking and reckless endangerment, and that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on robbery and theft of property as lesser included offenses of carjacking. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Gregory Christopher Fleenor, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of life and fifteen years respectively. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging (1) that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and (2) that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I agree with the result reached by the majority. It is my view, however, that the petitioner is not attacking the revocation of his probation, which, as the majority correctly points out, is not permitted. It is my understanding that the petitioner claims that he would not have entered guilty pleas to the two misdemeanor charges if he had known that he was not eligible for boot camp. He also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to determine in advance of his plea that it was the policy of the Department of Correction to arbitrarily exclude from boot camp those offenders who had originally been charged with aggravated robbery by the use of a deadly weapon.

Petitioner, Cedrick Konard Mitchell, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In his appeal, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation and entry of Petitioner's best interest guilty plea to the charges of assault and driving on a suspended license, and that his guilty plea was not knowingly or voluntarily entered into. After a careful review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Mario Antoine Leggs, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. In addition, he asserts that the ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), renders his sentences invalid. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Defendant, William E. Pewitt, pled guilty to one count of theft over $1000.00, one count of burglary, and one count of theft over $500.00. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of two years, and the Defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it denied him alternative sentencing. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Mark Ray Delashmit, entered pleas of guilt to manufacturing methamphetamine, a Schedule II drug, and to possessing methamphetamine with the intent to deliver. The trial court imposed concurrent, four-year sentences in a community corrections program. As part of the plea agreement, the defendant reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(i) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The question that has been certified for review by the trial court is "[w]hether the search warrant executed upon Defendant’s residence was supported by probable cause. Specifically, whether there is an adequate showing of the reliability and credibility of the informant." The judgments are affirmed.

The appellant, Scott McClain, pled guilty in the Washington County Criminal Court to driving under the influence (DUI) with a blood alcohol content greater than .20. He received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration in the Washington County Jail. As a condition of his plea, the appellant reserved certified questions of law concerning the suppression of the results of his blood alcohol test. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Harold Lindell Scharkley, filed a petition for post-conviction relief contending that his guilty pleas were involuntary and unknowing because he received ineffective assistance of counsel and because the trial court failed to follow the requirements of Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the Petitioner’s request for post-conviction relief. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, contending that trial counsel was ineffective in: (1) declining a curative instruction following a witness' characterization of the petitioner as "a robber;" (2) failing to object to the untimely disclosure of audiotapes containing statements made by the petitioner to a key prosecution witness; (3) failing to argue that the term "recklessly" was statutorily inapplicable to the petitioner, and because the term was included in the indictment, failing to get a jury instruction on reckless homicide. Upon review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Defendant, Johnny Quent Crudup, was indicted on two counts of theft of property of more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and two counts of theft of property of more than $10,000 and less than $60,000, a Class C felony. Defendant filed an application for pretrial diversion which was subsequently denied by the district attorney general. The trial court denied the writ of certiorari and affirmed the district attorney general's decision. Defendant was granted permission to take an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Defendant contends that the district attorney general abused his discretion in denying Defendant's application, and that the denial was improperly made by an assistant district attorney instead of the district attorney. We affirm the trial court's order denying pretrial diversion.

The Defendant, Derek Bates, was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated robbery, which the trial court subsequently merged into a single conviction. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to nine years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the constitutionality of his sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Carlos Eddings, was tried and convicted for aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to ten years in prison. The Defendant appealed, and a majority of this Court concluded that his sentence must be modified to eight years pursuant to the United States Supreme Court case Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). State v. Carlos Eddings, No. W2003-02255-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2266794, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 8, 2004). The State filed an application for permission to appeal with the Tennessee Supreme Court pursuant to
Rule 11(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. On May 23, 2005, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted the State’s application for the purpose of remanding the case to this Court for reconsideration in light of State v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 632 (Tenn. 2005). On remand, we affirm
the Defendant’s ten-year sentence.