APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This court granted Defendant’s petition to rehear to consider the impact of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) on Defendant’s sentence. Since that time, the Tennessee Supreme Court has considered the impact of Blakely on Tennessee’s sentencing scheme and concluded that the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989and its procedures do not violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by a jury as described in Blakely. See State v. Edwin Gomez, ____ S.W.3d _____, No. M2002-01209-SC-R11-CD, 2005 WL 856848, at *22 (Tenn. Apr. 15. 2005). In light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gomez, this court determines that Defendant’s argument that his sentence is improper under Blakely has no merit. This court’s previous opinion is affirmed in all respects. Costs are assessed against the State.

The defendant was indicted by the Carter County Grand Jury for two (2) counts of third offense DUI and one (1) count driving on a revoked license. The defendant filed a motion to suppress which was denied by the trial court. The defendant later agreed to a guilty plea subject to a certified question of law. The certified question, which is presented on appeal to this Court, is: whether the trial court erred by failing to hold that the defendant was unlawfully arrested without a warrant, for a misdemeanor (driving under the influence 2nd offense, and driving on a revoked license first offense), not committed in the presence of an officer, and not subject to an exception allowing warrantless arrests under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-7-103, thereby rendering any evidence gained from such unlawful arrest inadmissible, which would result in the dismissal of the indictment. We conclude that the certified question is not dispositive of the case, and we do not have jurisdiction. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The petitioner, Avis N. Neal, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He seeks relief from his jury conviction for rape of a child and resulting sentence of twenty years in confinement. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Christopher Lance Shockley, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to four counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to eight years at 100% on each count and ordered that two of the sentences be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of sixteen years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue the defendant raises on appeal is whether the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences. Following our review, we conclude that the record supports the imposition of consecutive sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his habeas corpus petition, contending that: (1) the trial court did not have jurisdiction to allow him to withdraw his guilty pleas; and (2) the judgments and sentences violated his right to due process. Upon review, we conclude that the petitioner's classification as a multiple rapist is an operation of law and does not require any notice to the petitioner or any further proceedings post-trial. As such, the convictions and sentences are not void, and we affirm the denial of habeas relief.

The appellant, Stephen Anthony Scott, has filed a petition for rehearing, pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to have this Court reconsider its opinion previously filed in this case on June 7, 2005. Specifically, the appellant urges this Court to revisit its ruling that
the trial court properly applied sentence enhancement to count seven of his convictions. In his petition, the appellant contends that this Court misconstrued or “overlooked” his argument, though he admits that his argument was inartfully drawn in his appellate brief, stating, “the issue is not as precisely stated as it should have been.”

The defendant, Julio Cesar Hernandez Salinas, was convicted of conspiracy to deliver more than 70 but less than 300 pounds of a Schedule VI controlled substance, marijuana, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eleven years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion to suppress on the basis that he lacked standing; (2) not allowing defense counsel, during voir dire, to ask prospective jurors about their involvement in religious and social organizations; (3) permitting the State to question a trial witness as to the defendant's prior bad acts; and (4) imposing a sentence of eleven years. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner challenges the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, contending that trial counsel was ineffective in: (1) failing to call requested witnesses; and (2) failing to adequately communicate with him. Upon review, we conclude that the evidence presented does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s findings; therefore, we affirm.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Edward Johnson, was convicted of Class E felony theft, and was sentenced to serve six years imprisonment as a Range III career offender. In this appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by requiring him to go to trial in this case
after he had requested a continuance. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. However, under the particular facts of this case as set forth in the record, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error by denying Defendant's request for a continuance. We therefore reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial.

Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty in case No. 03-01711 of three counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felony, involving victims Henry Skelton,MarkMears, and John Norris, and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, involving victim Myron Raymond. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender, to thirty years for each aggravated robbery conviction and fifteen years for the aggravated assault conviction. Defendant was found guilty in case No. 03-01718 of one count of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, of Dr. Charles White, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to sixty years as a Range III, persistent offender, for this offense. The trial court ordered Defendant’s sentences in case No. 03-01711 to be served consecutively to each other and consecutively to his sentence in case No. 03-01718, for an effective sentence of one hundred and sixty-five years. On appeal, Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Defendant argues, however, that the trial court’s application of enhancement factors in determining the length of his sentences violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court, and the imposition of consecutive sentencing.

Petitioner, Miqwon Deon Leach, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he was denied his constitutional right to testify and that his rights under the Interstate Compact on Detainers were violated. Petitioner also contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance (1) by failing to follow the procedures set forth in State v. Momon; (2) by failing to object to the State’s failure to comply with the provisions of the Interstate Compact on Detainers, and (3) by failing to file a motion for a speedy trial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Roland Bennett, is currently serving a life sentence imposed in 1984. In 2001, the petitioner's counsel filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis on the basis of newly discovered evidence. After holding an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the coram nobis court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner now brings this appeal challenging that action. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The appellant, Raschad Donnell Simpson, pled guilty to possession of cocaine for resale. As a result of the plea agreement, the appellant was sentenced to serve eight (8) years in incarceration. During his incarceration, the appellant was accepted to and participated in a bootcamp program and on August 29, 2001 was released to probation. Subsequently, a probation violation warrant was issued against the appellant alleging a violation of probation based on a new arrest and conviction. At a probation revocation hearing, the appellant pled guilty to the violation. As a result, the trial court revoked the appellant's probation and ordered him to serve the eight (8) year sentence in confinement. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the appellant's probation, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Dustin Dwayne Davis, was convicted by a jury in 1998 of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, misdemeanor theft and two (2) counts of aggravated rape. As a result, the petitioner was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 100 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the petitioner's convictions and sentence. See State v. Dustin Dwayne Davis, No. 03C01-9712-CR-00543, 1999 WL 135054 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Mar. 15, 1999), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 11, 1999). The petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief in which he alleged, inter alia, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a hearing, the petition for post-conviction relief was denied. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief. Because we determine that the petitioner was afforded the effective assistance of counsel, we affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Michael L. Smith, appeals from the trial court's order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The pro se petitioner, James R. Blevins, appeals from the dismissal of his motion to reopen his post-conviction petition. The states moves the court to affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of this court’s rules. The motion was properly dismissed for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Elton Bowers, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief.  The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State's motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Cornelius Richmond, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for seven counts of aggravated robbery. He claims that Tennessee’s Post-Conviction Procedure Act as applied to his case violates the due process clause and that the trial court erred in sentencing. We affirm the trial court.

The petitioner, Kenneth Ray Haynes, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, Anthony Allen, was convicted by a Shelby County jury and received an effective sentence of 124 years for numerous aggravated rape and aggravated robbery charges consolidated into a single trial. In this appeal, he argues: (1) the trial court erred in consolidating the indictments; (2) the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a post-arrest statement; (4) the evidence is insufficient to support three of his convictions; and (5) the State failed to elect the offense for which conviction was sought in two case numbers. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse one of the defendant’s aggravated rape convictions and remand it for a new trial, affirm the remaining judgments of conviction, and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing to determine whether consecutive sentencing is appropriate.

The Appellant, Roy Allen Burch, appeals the Hawkins County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In his petition, Burch seeks relief from his 1989 life sentence for aggravated rape. He contends that the sentence violates the recent Supreme Court decision in Blakely v. Washington, 524 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), because the trial court applied enhancement factors not found by the jury in increasing his sentence. On appeal, Burch argues that the Blakely holding announces a new rule of law and is, thus, entitled to retroactive application in a post-conviction proceeding. After review, we conclude that the issue has been rendered moot by the recent Tennessee Supreme Court opinion, State v. Edwin Gomez and Jonathan S. Londono, No. M2002-01209-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. Apr. 15, 2004), reh'g denied, (May 18, 2005), holding that the Tennessee Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 is not violative of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Accordingly, the summary dismissal is affirmed.

The majority concludes that the defendant’s statement to Sheriff’s Investigator Lowe was voluntarily given. For the reasons expressed below, I am unable to join in this conclusion.

The petitioner, Mario Leggs, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Appellant, Tiffany Yvonne Marshall, appeals the revocation of her probation by the Cumberland County Criminal Court. On April 5, 2004, Marshall pled guilty to theft over $1,000 and theft under $500 and received an effective four-year sentence. These sentences were suspended, and Marshall was placed on probation to be supervised by community corrections. On May 25, 2004, a probation violation warrant issued alleging Marshall had committed the offenses of identity theft, possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance, and possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance. Following a revocation hearing, Marshall was found to be in violation of her probation, and her original sentence to the Department of Correction was reinstated. On appeal, Marshall argues: (1) that the trial court violated Blakely v. Washington; (2) that the evidence fails to establish that she violated probation; and (3) that the trial court acted "too harshly" by revoking her probation. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jerry Wayne Patterson, was convicted by jury of attempted first degree murder, a ClassA felony, and sentenced to forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant presents three issues for review: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress his confession; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support a guilty verdict for attempt to commit first degree murder. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.