APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a direct appeal from a conviction on a jury verdict of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), third offense, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the Defendant, Timothy Lloyd, to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with 120 days to be served in the county jail. The Defendant now appeals, contending that the evidence submitted at trial was insufficient to support his DUI conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

With respect to the defendant’s issue (2), whether the trial court erred in not charging lesser offenses, I join in the result, but for reasons other than those reached by the majority.

I join Judge Hayes in concurring in the result regarding the trial court’s failure to instruct on lesser included offenses. I believe that an analysis of various jury instructional errors suggests that the legislature was empowered to enact the 2001 amendment (effective 2002) to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-18-110.

A Cocke County jury found the defendant, Mitchell Presnell, guilty of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty (20) years as a Range II multiple offender. In this appeal the defendant claims that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial
court erred when it failed to instruct on the lesser-included offenses of  ssault and aggravated assault; (3) the trial court erred in applying enhancement factor (3), that the defendant was a leader in the offense; and (4) the defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Damion Carrick, appeals the trial court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for habeas corpus relief. In that petition, the petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus to release him from his sentences for two (2) counts of especially aggravated robbery based on the United States Supreme Court decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that
this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Appellant, Michael W. Smith, proceeding pro se, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Smith was convicted of rape in Shelby County and received an eight-year Department of Correction sentence, to be served consecutively to a three-year Department of Correction sentence in a separate case. On appeal, Smith argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition because his eight-year sentence has expired.  After review, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the petition on grounds that Smith has failed to establish that his sentence has expired.

Petitioner, Anthony Lamont Singleton, appeals from the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In his appeal, Petitioner argues that his Alford pleas in case No. S45,328 and case No. S47, 632 were involuntarily entered into, that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in connection with the negotiation and entry of his Alford pleas, and that the trial court improperly appointed trial counsel to represent him in case No. 47,632. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the probation of Defendant, Dana Lynn Armstrong, and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. In his appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding that he had violated the terms of his probation, and in revoking his probation and ordering that the sentence be served by incarceration. After a review of this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Roger Knoblock, was convicted, following a jury trial, of aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by allowing evidence of a prior conviction for aggravated sexual battery to be introduced during Defendant's testimony on cross-examination. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Hamilton County Criminal Court Jury convicted the defendant, David Gene Hooper, of rape, a Class B felony, and incest, a Class C felony, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of eight years for the rape and three years for the incest to be served on community corrections after serving eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county workhouse. The defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred (1) in failing to grant a mistrial based upon the state's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence until the middle of trial and in prohibiting him from cross-examining the victim concerning the exculpatory evidence; (2) in repeatedly admitting testimony which bolstered the victim's complaint through multiple witnesses; (3) in allowing testimony from various witnesses concerning the fact that victims of sexual abuse frequently delay reporting an attack; (4) in allowing the state to cross-examine the defendant concerning his possession of marijuana on the day he was arrested, approximately two years after the crime; and (5) in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of attempted rape, attempted sexual battery, and assault pursuant to State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. 1999). We conclude that although the trial court should have allowed the defendant to cross-examine the victim concerning the evidence the state failed to disclose until trial, the error was harmless. We affirm the trial court.

The Appellant, Harold Holloway, Jr., was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of second degree murder, attempted theft over $10,000, attempted aggravated robbery, and attempted carjacking. After a sentencing hearing, Holloway was sentenced to an effective forty-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Holloway raises seven issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to hear an ex parte motion for the appointment of a forensic psychiatrist and a neuropsychological examiner; (2) whether the convictions for attempted aggravated robbery and attempted theft over $10,000 violate double jeopardy principles; (3) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for attempted carjacking; (4) whether the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on any lesser included offenses of carjacking; (5) whether the court erred in allowing the State to question a defense expert in addiction medicine regarding prior bad acts committed by Holloway which were enumerated in reports relied upon by the expert; (6) whether the State improperly impeached a defense witness by questioning the witness regarding prior convictions which were not admissible under Tenn. R. Evid. 609; and (7) whether the trial court properly sentenced Holloway. After review of the record, we conclude that the convictions for attempted aggravated robbery and attempted theft over $10,000 violate principles of double jeopardy. The Appellant's remaining issues are without merit. Accordingly, the judgments of conviction and resulting sentences for second degree murder, attempted aggravated robbery, and attempted carjacking are affirmed. The judgment of conviction for attempted theft over $10,000 is merged with the Appellant's conviction for attempted aggravated robbery, and the sentence for attempted theft is vacated.

Petitioner, Patrick Deshun Paris, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was subsequently amended. Following an evidentiary hearing, the petition for post-conviction relief was dismissed. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in not stating its findings of fact and conclusions of law in its order denying Petitioner post-conviction relief. Petitioner also alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal because his counsel (1) failed to request the removal of juror, Daisy Foster; (2) questioned Marco Brooks about his family's criminal history to the detriment of Petitioner's case; (3) failed to adequately investigate Petitioner's case and prepare for trial; and (4) failed to object to the prosecutor's leading questions during Mr. Brooks' direct examination. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Eugene J. Kovalsky, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Bonzie Lavender, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Morris Lamonte Marsh, was convicted of four counts of first degree felony murder, two counts of second degree murder, two counts of attempted second degree murder, and one count of aggravated assault. After merging two of the first degree felony murder convictions and the two second degree murder convictions into the first two felony murder convictions and merging the aggravated assault conviction into one of the attempted second degree murder convictions, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve a total effective sentence of two life sentences plus forty years. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the law governing criminal responsibility; and (3) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Gary Randall Yarnell, the petitioner, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The lower court found his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and unknowing and involuntary guilty pleas unsupported by the evidence and denied relief. Because we are unpersuaded of error, we affirm.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by order pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner is appealing the lower court’s denial of habeas corpus relief.

I fully concur with Judge Hayes' notable and well-written opinion. Like Judge Hayes, I believe that the defendant was seized when the officer asked him to step out of his vehicle and that the seizure was not supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause. I also agree that the defendant's consent to search his person was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal seizure so as to be free from any taint. In consequence, the convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.

I respectfully dissent. Based upon my review of the record, the encounter leading up to Defendant’s consent to submit to a search was a brief police-citizen encounter requiring no objective justification. State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420, 424 (Tenn. 2000). Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Kevin White, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. In this appeal as of right, the petitioner presents one issue for review: whether the trial court erred in refusing to exclude his trial counsel from the courtroom during his testimony at the post-conviction hearing. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Following a bench trial, the Appellant, Antonio D. Jones, was convicted of one count of Class B felony possession of cocaine, one count of simple possession of marijuana, and one count of criminal trespass. The Appellant was sentenced to twelve years for felony possession of cocaine, eleven months and twenty-nine days for possession of marijuana, and thirty days for trespassing. All sentences were ordered to run concurrently for an effective sentence of twelve years. On appeal, the Appellant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish his guilt of possession of over .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell. He also argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search. After review, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Jones’ motion to suppress. Accordingly, the judgments of conviction for possession of marijuana and felony possession of cocaine are reversed and remanded for a new trial. Jones’ conviction for criminal trespass is affirmed.

I concur in all respects with the majority opinion save its view of the admissibility of the search warrant under Rule 41(c), Tenn. R. Crim. P. The defendant complains that his trial counsel failed to object to the state’s introduction of a copy of the search warrant into evidence. He asserts that the warrant states that “there is probable and reasonable cause to believe that Marvin O. Norton B/M is now in unlawful possession of the following . . . cocaine or derivatives of same . . . .” He argues that the content of the search warrant was objectionable because it contained hearsay, was irrelevant to the facts at issue, and made specific reference to the defendant as the individual in possession of the cocaine.

A Robertson County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Marvin Norton, of possessing twenty-six grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the appellant claims (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction and (2) that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Francis Sanschargrin, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. The trial court dismissed the petition, finding no grounds entitling Petitioner to habeas corpus relief. On appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the probation of Defendant, Kendrick D. Hutton, and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant requests this Court to remand the matter for a new probation revocation hearing because the trial court failed to follow the statutory procedure governing probation revocations. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.