APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Jerry Wayne Patterson, was convicted by jury of attempted first degree murder, a ClassA felony, and sentenced to forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant presents three issues for review: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress his confession; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support a guilty verdict for attempt to commit first degree murder. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The majority concludes that the defendant’s statement to Sheriff’s Investigator Lowe was voluntarily given. For the reasons expressed below, I am unable to join in this conclusion.

The petitioner, Mario Leggs, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Derwood Scott Kendrick, was on probation for several convictions of attempted misapplication of contract funds and one (1) conviction of illegal voting. While on probation, the defendant was arrested for theft, misapplication of contract funds and passing worthless checks. The trial court held a probation revocation hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation. The defendant appealed this revocation on the grounds that: (1) the trial court erred in refusing to divest the media privilege for a news reporter and (2) there was insufficient evidence for the trial court to revoke his probation. We have analyzed the issues and find that the trial court did not err in refusing to divest the media privilege. However, we also find that the evidence does not support the revocation of the defendant's probation. We affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the trial court, and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

The appellant, Earl D. Mills, pled guilty to vehicular homicide. As a result of the guilty plea, the remaining nine (9) counts of the indictment were either merged with the vehicular homicide conviction or nolle prossed by the State. The trial court sentenced the appellant to twelve (12) years as a multiple offender. At the sentencing hearing, the appellant sought pre-trial jail credit for the 197 days he spent in jail prior to his guilty plea. The trial court denied the request because the appellant was serving a sentence on an unrelated probation violation charge while awaiting trial on the charges arising out of the indictment for vehicular homicide. The appellant filed a motion to reconsider. The trial court granted the motion and awarded the appellant thirty-six (36) days of jail credit. However, the appellant insists he should receive credit for the entire 197 days. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Martin E. Walker, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from an allegedly void judgment, which the habeas corpus court dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing his petition because: (1) count one of the indictment charging him with murder is defective because it did not provide notice of the offense charged; (2) the indictment is invalid because the district attorney failed to sign it; and (3) the State failed to comply with the trial court's order for a bill of particulars. Finding no error in the judgment of the habeas corpus court, we affirm the dismissal of the Petitioner's petition for habeas corpus relief.

The Petitioner, William J. Carico, was convicted of aggravated rape, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004) announced a new rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively to his case and creates an exception to the one-year statute of limitations for filing a post-conviction petition. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Lamonn Lee Harris, entered an open guilty plea to fourteen counts of forgery, Class E felonies, and one count of theft less than $500.00, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of six years as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing and in imposing an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Ricky Estes, was convicted of burglary of an automobile, theft under $500.00, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a multiple offender to four years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his pre-trial motion for a continuance; (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions; and (3) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Ericonta Daman Flenoid, pled guilty in the Sumner County Criminal Court to aggravated burglary and robbery. He received a total effective sentence of ten years, with one year to be served in confinement and the remainder on probation. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the appellant's probation, finding that the appellant failed to comply with the terms of probation. The trial court ordered the appellant to serve his sentences in confinement. The appellant appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Beverly Dixon, pleaded guilty to one count of felony Class B theft of property over $60,000. The trial court imposed an incarcerative eight-year sentence and denied any form of alternative sentencing. On appeal, the defendant argues that the sentencing process was flawed by the introduction of prejudicial hearsay and that the trial court should have granted probation or placement into a community corrections program. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Ericonta Daman Flenoid, pled guilty in the Sumner County Criminal Court to aggravated burglary and robbery. He received a total effective sentence of ten years, with one year to be served in confinement and the remainder on probation. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the appellant's probation, finding that the appellant failed to comply with the terms of probation. The trial court ordered the appellant to serve his sentences in confinement. The appellant appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Mack T. Transou, stands convicted of rape and sexual battery, for which he received an effective sixteen-year sentence. Aggrieved of his convictions and sentence, the defendant brings the instant appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress DNA evidence and the imposition of his sentence in violation of his right to trial by jury. Following our review upon the record, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentence.

The appellant, Chris Ebbs, pled guilty in May of 1996 to attempted aggravated sexual battery and was sentenced to six (6) years in the Department of Correction. The trial court suspended the sentence to probation for six (6) years conditioned upon various requirements. In June of 2001, a probation violation warrant was filed. As a result, the trial court revoked the appellant's suspended sentence and ordered the appellant to serve the six-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's decision to revoke probation. After a review of the record and applicable legal authorities we conclude the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed.

The Appellant, William F. Cain, was convicted of misdemeanor stalking and sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail. On appeal, Cain raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and (2) whether he should have received a suspended sentence. After review, the judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.

A Madison County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Chester Floyd Cole, of incest, a Class C felony, and assault, a Class B misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to five years for the incest and six months for the assault1 to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the incest count pursuant to Rule 8, Tenn. R. Crim. P., and State v. Dominy, 67 S.W.3d 822 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001), and that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the trial court.

The petitioner, Wayford Demonbreun, Jr., appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Defendant, James Erskin McCullough, pled guilty to various offenses, and, while he was on probation for these convictions, a probation violation report was filed, stating that the Defendant failed to report to his probation officer and was arrested for theft. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation, and it ordered that the Defendant serve the remainder of his sentence in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to revoke the Defendant's probation, and, therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Defendant, Roland R. Smith, was convicted by a jury of nine counts of statutory rape and three counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years on each of the statutory rape convictions and eleven years on each of the sexual exploitation convictions. The sentences were ordered to be served in such fashion as to result in an effective term of seventeen years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues: 1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support certain of his convictions of statutory rape; 2) whether certain of the Defendant's convictions must be reversed under the doctrine of election of offenses; 3) whether certain of the Defendant's convictions violate principles of double jeopardy; 4) whether the trial court erred in refusing to sever some of the offenses; and 5) whether the Defendant's sentence is excessive. We reverse and remand for retrial the Defendant's convictions of statutory rape arising out of Counts Four, Five, Eight and Nine. We reverse and dismiss the Defendant's conviction of statutory rape arising out of Count Six. The Defendant's effective sentence is thereby modified to fifteen years. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal as of right from the denial of post-conviction relief. The Defendant, Jeffrey Lynn Myers, was convicted of one count of attempted rape upon entry of a best-interest guilty plea. He was sentenced to six years' imprisonment as a Range I, standard offender. The Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief and received an evidentiary hearing. The trial court subsequently denied the Defendant's petition, and he now appeals to this Court. He argues multiple issues, all of which we find to have been waived because the claims are either (1) not proper issues for a post-conviction proceeding, (2) not properly preserved for appeal, or (3) not reviewable due to an incomplete record. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Archie L. Miller, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his three 2002 convictions of selling cocaine. The post-conviction court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition, and the court conducted an evidentiary hearing. Following the hearing, the court found that the petitioner failed to establish the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and denied post-conviction relief. We affirm the action of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Augustine John Lopez, III, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of first degree felony murder and theft of property over $1000 and subsequently received concurrent sentences of life imprisonment and five years for the respective convictions. On appeal, Lopez raises four issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions: (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing testimony by a police officer concerning fingerprint evidence; (3) whether the trial court erred in excluding the hearsay statements of a witness which indicated her possible involvement in the murder; and (4) whether the trial court's sequential jury instruction was error. After review of the record, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.

The defendant, David Wayne Fountain, appeals from the Rhea County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation. Because the record supports the revocation of probation, we affirm the revocation; however, to avoid a length of confinement that exceeds the defendant’s release eligibility as a Range I offender, we modify the post-revocation terms of the manner of service of the defendant’s two-year sentence.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, challenging: (1) the jury instruction given on the mens rea term "knowingly," and (2) the trial court's failure to instruct on the lesser included offenses of aggravated assault and assault. Upon review, we conclude that the issues are waived for failure to provide a completed record on appeal. Furthermore, notwithstanding waiver, the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Kennath Henderson, appeals as of right from the May 21, 2003 judgment of the Fayette County Circuit Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner entered guilty pleas to first degree premeditated murder, two (2) counts of especially aggravated
kidnapping, aggravated robbery, attempted especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and felonious escape. The petitioner waived his right to jury sentencing. After a capital sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed the death sentence for the murder count and an effective sentence of twenty-three (23) years in prison for the noncapital offenses. The petitioner’s convictions and sentences, including the sentence of death, were affirmed on direct appeal by the Tennessee Supreme Court. See State v. Henderson, 24 S.W.3d 307 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 934 (2000). A pro se petition for post-conviction relief was filed on February 12, 2001, which was followed by an amended petition on November 30, 2001. An evidentiary hearing was held on April 28-29, 2003, and, on May 21, 2003, the trial court denied relief and dismissed the petition. The petitioner appeals, presenting for our review the following claims: (1) the trial judge erred in failing to recuse himself at both the trial and the post-conviction hearings; (2) the post-conviction court’s findings were clearly erroneous; (3) trial counsel was ineffective; (4) appellate counsel was ineffective; (5) the post-conviction court erred in prohibiting a witness from testifying; and (6) the imposition of the death penalty is unconstitutional. After a careful and laborious review of the record, this Court concludes that there is no error requiring reversal. Accordingly, the order of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed.