APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner appeals the denial of his habeas petition, contending that the judgments reflect thirty percent release eligibility rather than the statutorily mandated one hundred percent service required of multiple rapists. Because the petitioner was convicted by a jury, as opposed to pleading guilty, we conclude that the trial court was required to impose the one hundred percent service requirement.  Therefore, the trial court’s failure to properly mark the judgments does not render the judgments void but should be amended as a clerical error, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.  We affirm the denial of habeas relief.

The petitioner, Joseph A. Maine, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his guilty pleas were not knowing or voluntary and that his trial counsel was ineffective for, among other things, erroneously advising him that he would be eligible for release after serving only twenty-five years of his life sentence.1 Because the record reflects that the petitioner was similarly misinformed by the trial court as to the release eligibility date for his life sentence, we conclude that his pleas were not knowing or voluntary. Accordingly, we reverse the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition and remand the case for the petitioner to withdraw his pleas of guilty.

A Greene County jury convicted the Petitioner, Bronzo Gosnell, Jr., of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison. This Court affirmed the Petitioner's conviction on direct appeal, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court summarily dismissed as time-barred. Because we agree that the petition is time-barred, we affirm.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the defendant, Antonio Sanders, of two counts of  first degree felony murder; two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; one count of  aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; and five counts of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. The trial court merged the two counts of first degree murder together and the two counts of aggravated robbery together and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment for the felony murder, eight years for the aggravated robbery, three years for the aggravated burglary, and three years for each count of attempted robbery, all to be served concurrently. The defendant appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient, that the trial court improperly approved the use of an interpreter at trial, and that the trial court erred in ordering the sequestration of the jury. We affirm the trial court.

The defendant, Martez Towen Fitts, pled guilty to sale of cocaine over .5 grams and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eight years, all suspended except for forty-eight hours and the balance to be served on probation, with the first six months on intensive probation. Additionally, he was ordered to comply with alcohol and drug assessment programs, obtain his GED, and pay a $2000 fine. The trial court subsequently revoked the defendant's probation, and he appealed. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Calvin O. Tankesly, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that the trial court should have granted him relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence allegedly showing that extraneous prejudicial information was imparted to the jury at his trial. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court denying the petition.

The Appellant, Yolando Odom, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Under the terms of a plea agreement, Odom pled guilty to one count of robbery and accepted an eight-year sentence as a Range II offender, despite only meeting the statutory criteria for a Range I offender. On appeal, Odom contends that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to trial counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to inform him of possible defenses at trial and in failing to review the proof with respect to the elements of the indicted offense of aggravated robbery. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The appellant, Brian Eric McGowen, a.k.a. Brad Lee O'Ryan, was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and attempted especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction for his murder conviction, to forty years incarceration for his especially aggravated robbery conviction, and to twenty years incarceration for his attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the appellant raises numerous issues for our review, including the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, evidentiary issues, jury instructions, and sentencing. Upon our review of the record, we merge the appellant's conviction for attempted especially aggravated robbery into his conviction for especially aggravated robbery. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

The defendant, Arthur Buford, who was indicted for aggravated perjury, was convicted of perjury.  The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; (2) that the state failed to make a proper election of offenses; and (3) that the trial court erred by permitting the defendant's former attorney to testify as a witness for the state. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.

The defendant, Morgan Roa, pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement in the Davidson County Criminal Court to aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six years with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the defendant serve his sentence in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in denying him alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Tony Willis, appeals from the trial court's denial of habeas corpus relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred by summarily dismissing the petition. The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant, Felix Tyrone Smith, pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault and one count of possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell. Defendant was sentenced to an effective eight-year sentence on supervised probation. In 2002, Defendant was found to be in violation of the conditions of his probation but the trial court reinstated Defendant's probation. Approximately two years later, after the filing of another probation violation warrant, the trial court revoked Defendant's probation and ordered Defendant to serve the original eight-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by relying on evidence not included in the record when revoking Defendant's probation. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Malcolm Whiteside, entered pleas of guilty to forgery, assault, resisting arrest, aggravated burglary, two counts of evading arrest, and four counts of theft under $500. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of seven years to be served in the community corrections program. A violation warrant was filed less than one month after the defendant was placed on community corrections. A second violation warrant was filed three years later. At a hearing held six years after the filing of the second warrant, the trial court revoked the community corrections sentence and ordered service of the balance of the sentence in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by revoking community corrections and ordering service of the sentence. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Jason Dwight King, pled guilty to DUI, driving on a suspended license, felony evading arrest, reckless endangerment, and reckless driving. The petitioner pled nolo contendere to theft over $1,000 and theft under $500. As a result, he received an effective sentence of two-and-a-half (2 1/2) years. The petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. We affirm the dismissal of the petition.

This is a direct appeal from a conviction on a jury verdict of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), third offense, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the Defendant, Timothy Lloyd, to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with 120 days to be served in the county jail. The Defendant now appeals, contending that the evidence submitted at trial was insufficient to support his DUI conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

With respect to the defendant’s issue (2), whether the trial court erred in not charging lesser offenses, I join in the result, but for reasons other than those reached by the majority.

I join Judge Hayes in concurring in the result regarding the trial court’s failure to instruct on lesser included offenses. I believe that an analysis of various jury instructional errors suggests that the legislature was empowered to enact the 2001 amendment (effective 2002) to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-18-110.

A Cocke County jury found the defendant, Mitchell Presnell, guilty of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty (20) years as a Range II multiple offender. In this appeal the defendant claims that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial
court erred when it failed to instruct on the lesser-included offenses of  ssault and aggravated assault; (3) the trial court erred in applying enhancement factor (3), that the defendant was a leader in the offense; and (4) the defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Damion Carrick, appeals the trial court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for habeas corpus relief. In that petition, the petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus to release him from his sentences for two (2) counts of especially aggravated robbery based on the United States Supreme Court decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that
this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Appellant, Michael W. Smith, proceeding pro se, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Smith was convicted of rape in Shelby County and received an eight-year Department of Correction sentence, to be served consecutively to a three-year Department of Correction sentence in a separate case. On appeal, Smith argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition because his eight-year sentence has expired.  After review, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the petition on grounds that Smith has failed to establish that his sentence has expired.

Petitioner, Anthony Lamont Singleton, appeals from the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In his appeal, Petitioner argues that his Alford pleas in case No. S45,328 and case No. S47, 632 were involuntarily entered into, that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in connection with the negotiation and entry of his Alford pleas, and that the trial court improperly appointed trial counsel to represent him in case No. 47,632. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the probation of Defendant, Dana Lynn Armstrong, and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. In his appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding that he had violated the terms of his probation, and in revoking his probation and ordering that the sentence be served by incarceration. After a review of this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Roger Knoblock, was convicted, following a jury trial, of aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by allowing evidence of a prior conviction for aggravated sexual battery to be introduced during Defendant's testimony on cross-examination. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Hamilton County Criminal Court Jury convicted the defendant, David Gene Hooper, of rape, a Class B felony, and incest, a Class C felony, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of eight years for the rape and three years for the incest to be served on community corrections after serving eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county workhouse. The defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred (1) in failing to grant a mistrial based upon the state's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence until the middle of trial and in prohibiting him from cross-examining the victim concerning the exculpatory evidence; (2) in repeatedly admitting testimony which bolstered the victim's complaint through multiple witnesses; (3) in allowing testimony from various witnesses concerning the fact that victims of sexual abuse frequently delay reporting an attack; (4) in allowing the state to cross-examine the defendant concerning his possession of marijuana on the day he was arrested, approximately two years after the crime; and (5) in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of attempted rape, attempted sexual battery, and assault pursuant to State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. 1999). We conclude that although the trial court should have allowed the defendant to cross-examine the victim concerning the evidence the state failed to disclose until trial, the error was harmless. We affirm the trial court.

The Appellant, Harold Holloway, Jr., was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of second degree murder, attempted theft over $10,000, attempted aggravated robbery, and attempted carjacking. After a sentencing hearing, Holloway was sentenced to an effective forty-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Holloway raises seven issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to hear an ex parte motion for the appointment of a forensic psychiatrist and a neuropsychological examiner; (2) whether the convictions for attempted aggravated robbery and attempted theft over $10,000 violate double jeopardy principles; (3) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for attempted carjacking; (4) whether the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on any lesser included offenses of carjacking; (5) whether the court erred in allowing the State to question a defense expert in addiction medicine regarding prior bad acts committed by Holloway which were enumerated in reports relied upon by the expert; (6) whether the State improperly impeached a defense witness by questioning the witness regarding prior convictions which were not admissible under Tenn. R. Evid. 609; and (7) whether the trial court properly sentenced Holloway. After review of the record, we conclude that the convictions for attempted aggravated robbery and attempted theft over $10,000 violate principles of double jeopardy. The Appellant's remaining issues are without merit. Accordingly, the judgments of conviction and resulting sentences for second degree murder, attempted aggravated robbery, and attempted carjacking are affirmed. The judgment of conviction for attempted theft over $10,000 is merged with the Appellant's conviction for attempted aggravated robbery, and the sentence for attempted theft is vacated.