APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Montea Wilson, aka Marcus Floyd, was convicted by a jury of felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery in 2000. The jury sentenced the petitioner to life in prison without the possibility of parole for the felony murder conviction, and the trial court merged the
attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction with the felony murder conviction. This Court affirmed the petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal. See State v. Montea Wilson, No. W2000-00748-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 925255 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 3, 2002), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Nov. 4, 2002). The petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, among other things. The petition was amended by counsel. At the evidentiary hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court refused to let the petitioner’s attorney question trial counsel about his requests for jury instructions on lesser-included offenses, determining that the issue was waived or previously determined. At the conclusion of the hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition for post-conviction relief. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that the post-conviction court improperly concluded that several of the petitioner’s issues were waived or previously determined, denying the petitioner a full and fair hearing on the petition for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, we remand the matter for a full and fair hearing on the issues presented in the post-conviction petition.

The defendant, James Rowe Hudson, was declared a Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender in Carroll County by default judgment. Several weeks later, he was charged in Henry County with driving while a Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-616(a).  The defendant then filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure in Carroll County to set aside the original order. The motion was denied. Ultimately, the defendant was convicted in Henry County and received a Range I, two-year sentence. In this appeal of right, the following issues have been presented for our review: (1) whether the trial court of Carroll County properly denied the motion to set aside the order declaring the defendant to be a Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction in Henry County for violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act; and (3) whether the trial court of Henry County imposed an excessive sentence. The judgment of the Carroll County Circuit Court denying the defendant's motion to set aside the order declaring him to be a Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender is reversed and the order is set aside. Because the conviction in Henry County is based upon the Carroll County order, the conviction must be reversed and the charge dismissed.

The Defendant, Denny Finney, pled guilty to misdemeanor simple possession of a schedule VI substance, and the State agreed to dismiss the other counts against him. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended, except for six months to serve in jail. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the Defendant's sentence.

The defendant, Edward M. Patterson, pled nolo contendere to possession of drug paraphernalia and criminal trespass and received respective sentences of sixty and thirty days, both suspended. As a condition of his plea, the defendant reserved a certified question of law as to whether there was adequate reasonable suspicion to support a seizure of his person. Because we find the certified question is not dispositive of the charges, we dismiss the appeal.

On appeal, the defendant challenges the length and consecutive nature of his sentences on three counts of sexual battery. Upon review, we conclude that: (1) the enhanced sentences were justified based upon the defendant's prior criminal behavior; (2) the mitigating factors, even if applied, would not have lessened the enhanced sentence; and (3) the defendant's consecutive sentence was proper based upon the predatory nature of his conduct and the residual psychological effects incurred by the minor victim. Therefore, we affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court.

I agree that if the allegations and assertions contained in the petition are correct, the Defendant’s sentences appear to be in direct contravention to Tennessee’s sentencing act and are therefore illegal and void. However, because the Defendant’s habeas corpus petition was summarily dismissed without a hearing, I would remand the case to the habeas court for a determination of whether the sentences are indeed void.

The petitioner appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that: (1) he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel, and (2) the post-conviction court and the district attorney general erred in failing to comply with the Post Conviction Procedure Act, which caused him prejudice. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Dickey L. Cotton, appeals the circuit court’s summary dismissal of his Pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we reverse the circuit court’s dismissal of the habeas corpus petition and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Donnie Glenn Thompson, was indicted for one count of stalking his former wife, Kimberly McClinsey. The Defendant subsequently submitted an application for pretrial diversion on this charge, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-15-105. The district attorney general denied the Defendant’s request for pretrial diversion. The Defendant sought review by the trial court, and the trial court found no abuse of discretion by the district attorney general. The Defendant now appeals from the trial court’s ruling. Finding that the district attorney general abused his discretion in analyzing the Defendant’s application for pretrial diversion, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter to the district attorney general for further consideration.

The defendant, Jeffery Scott Sherrill, pleaded guilty to second degree murder. After conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to serve a 25-year sentence as a Range I violent offender. Aggrieved of his sentence, the defendant brings the instant appeal challenging his sentence as excessive. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Petitioner, Xavier S. Todd, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief.  The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the Petitioner is statutorily prohibited from seeking state habeas corpus relief as he is in federal custody and is being restrained under an order of a federal court. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This matter is before the Court upon the State's motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has appealed the trial court's order summarily dismissing the petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In that petition, the petitioner alleges that the trial court erred by failing to appoint counsel and that the trial court erred by charging the jury with reckless endangerment as a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault. Upon a review of the record in this case we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Darnell Lavelle Welch, was indicted for premeditated first degree murder. A jury convicted the defendant as charged, and he was sentenced to life in prison. The defendant now appeals his conviction, alleging that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction in two
respects: (1) that self-defense was not rebutted beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) that premeditation was not proven. Upon review, we conclude that the jury was justified in rejecting self-defense and in finding that the defendant acted with premeditation in killing the victim. Therefore,
the defendant’s conviction is affirmed.

The petitioner, Aaron T. Burton, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Jerry Dale Tigner, Jr., was indicted for second degree murder, a Class A felony, and was convicted by a jury as charged and sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to seventeen years in confinement. The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence, claiming that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the sequential jury instructions on second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter are unconstitutional; (3) the trial court erred in sentencing by failing to consider all mitigating factors; and (4) the State committed Brady violations with regard to a witness.  Upon review, we find no reversible error and affirm the conviction and sentence.

The defendant, Eric Rice, pled guilty to one count of statutory rape, a Class E felony, and applied for judicial diversion pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313. The trial court denied the application for judicial diversion and sentenced the defendant as a standard offender. On
appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver, a Class B felony, and sentenced to a Department of Correction term of ten years as a Range I offender, the defendant, Bobby Shane Hurley, appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the severity of his sentence, and the failure of the trial court to grant a sentencing alternative to incarceration.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Darrell Toomes, was convicted of delivery of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine. He was sentenced to seven years in the Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion for new trial. On appeal, Defendant argues that
the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Capital Defendant, Robert Hood, appeals as of right his conviction of first degree murder and sentence of death resulting from the 2001 murder of Toni Banks. A Shelby County grand jury charged the defendant by indictment with one count of felony murder, one count of premeditated murder, two counts of misdemeanor theft of property, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. On May 6, 2004, a Shelby County jury found the defendant guilty of both counts of homicide and guilty as to both counts of misdemeanor theft. The jury acquitted the defendant on both counts of aggravated kidnapping. After a separate sentencing hearing, the jury unanimously found the presence of one statutory aggravating circumstance, that the defendant had previously been convicted of a violent felony offense. The jury further determined that this aggravating circumstance outweighed any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and imposed a sentence of death. The trial court approved the sentencing verdict. The defendant appeals presenting for our review the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s request to proceed pro se, (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing to permit defense counsel to withdraw, (3) whether the presence of uniformed detention response team members sitting on either side of the defendant throughout trial was prejudicial error, (4) whether the evidence is sufficient to support a verdict of premeditated murder, (5) whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence involving prior bad acts of the defendant, (6) whether the trial court’s instruction that the defendant’s prior offenses were offenses whose statutory elements involved the use of violence violated the United States Constitution, (7) whether the death penalty imposed in this case violated due process because the indictment failed to allege the aggravators relied upon by the state, and (8) whether Tennessee’s
death penalty scheme is unconstitutional. Finding no error requiring reversal, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence of death.

A Montgomery County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Christopher Lynn Hoosier, of possession with the intent to sell one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent terms of twenty years for the cocaine conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the misdemeanor convictions. The defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred in sentencing him by finding enhancement factors that were not submitted to a jury or proven beyond a reasonable doubt and by failing to apply a factor in mitigation. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, in which he asserted that trial counsel was ineffective in: (1) failing to secure an independent mental evaluation; and (2) failing to demand a speedy trial. Upon review, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the post-conviction court; therefore, we affirm.

The appellant, Jerry Bell, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated burglary. The appellant received a total effective sentence of twenty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the sentences imposed for those convictions. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Larry W. Timberlake, appeals his probation revocation and imposition of his original seven-year sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

An Obion County jury found the defendant, Shirley Annette Rudd, guilty of facilitating the manufacture of methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver, and conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-11-403, -12-103, -17-417 (2003). Pretrial, the defendant had moved to suppress methamphetamine seized from her person. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and concluded that the evidence had been legally seized. The defendant challenges that ruling on appeal. After reviewing the record, applicable authorities, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Anthony Leon Moore, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.