APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Jamie Brown, was convicted by a Knox County Jury of simple possession of marijuana. As a result, the trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be served on probation. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress. Because the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Darrell Carter, pled guilty to five counts of aggravated sexual battery. As a result, he was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction to be served at one hundred percent. The petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel and an alleged unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. The post-conviction court denied the petition. For the following reasons, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

The appellant, Curtis Emmanuel Lane, pled guilty to simple possession of marijuana and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended upon payment of court costs and fines. Pursuant to Rule 37 (b)(2)(i) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, the appellant attempted to reserve a certified question of law to this Court on the issue of whether the evidence should have been suppressed as the result of an illegal arrest. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the appellant failed to properly reserve a certified question of law. Therefore, the appellant's issue is not properly before this Court, and this appeal is dismissed.

I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion. However, I do so on the merits, as opposed to the petitioner’s failure to follow procedural requirements for habeas corpus petitions.

The petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder on November 14, 1997. The trial court sentenced the petitioner on the same day to twenty years to be served as a Range I, standard offender with a release eligibility of thirty percent. On July 27, 1999, the trial court amended the judgment stating that the petitioner’s release eligibility would be one hundred percent with credit given for time served up to fifteen percent of his sentence. The petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief on October 12, 2004. On November 15, 2004, the habeas court summarily dismissed the petitioner’s petition. The petitioner appealed this decision. We affirm the decision of the habeas court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, James D. Black, was found guilty of aggravated perjury, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to two years, all suspended but sixty days, and placed Defendant on supervised probation for four years. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Stanley Phillip Chapman, was convicted by a jury in the Tipton County Circuit Court of second degree murder. He received a sentence of twenty-two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises several issues for our review, including the trial court’s evidentiary rulings and sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Homer Alson Maddin, III, was convicted by a jury of four counts of aggravated rape in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-502. As a result, the appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-five years at one hundred percent. The appellant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the mental state of reckless, and that the trial court erred in applying certain enhancement factors to determine his sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Jackie J. Porter, pled guilty to one count of possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, manufacture or distribute, a Class B felony, and one count of simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. The length and manner of service of his sentences were left to the decision of the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to eight years, six months for his Class B felony conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for his Class A misdemeanor conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences concurrently, for an effective sentence of eight years, six months.  The trial court denied Defendant’s request that he be placed on community corrections. Defendant does not challenge the validity of his guilty pleas or his sentence for his misdemeanor conviction.  In his appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in determining the length of his felony sentence and in denying Defendant’s request for alternative sentencing. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to state on the record its reasons for denying a sentence of community corrections. Accordingly, we affirm Defendant’s convictions and the length of the sentence, but reverse the judgment as to the manner of service of the sentence, and remand for a new sentencing hearing regarding the manner of service of the sentence.

The Appellant, Jason D. Norris, appeals the sentencing decision of the Davidson County Criminal Court. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Norris pled guilty to five counts of aggravated robbery, stemming from two separate indictments, with the manner and service of the sentences to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, Norris was sentenced to eight years for each conviction, with two of the sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of sixteen years. On appeal, he argues that his sentences are excessive and that the trial court erred by ordering total confinement as opposed to sentences of community corrections. Additionally, Norris argues that the imposition of consecutive sentences violates Blakely v. Washington. After review, we affirm.

The Defendants, Lyle T. Van Ulzen and Billy J. Coffelt, were each convicted of one count of felony escape, two counts of aggravated assault, and three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and were each sentenced to an effective sentence of ninety years in prison. Coffelt now appeals, contending that: (1) the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant when it found that no mitigating factors applied; and (2) the trial court erred when it ordered that his sentences run consecutively. Van Ulzen also appeals, contending that the sentence imposed was not justly deserved in relation to the seriousness of the offense and is greater than that deserved under the circumstances. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Christopher David Parsley, appeals his sentence of three years for aggravated burglary and one year for sexual battery, to be served concurrently. A split confinement sentence was imposed of seven months to serve followed by three years of supervised probation. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant judicial diversion or, alternatively, full probation. After review, we affirm the sentence of the trial court.

The Appellant, Devon Crawford, appeals the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying post-conviction relief. On appeal, Crawford argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. After review, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Eli J. Landry, Jr., pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent sentences of thirteen years. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and intelligently entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Cumberland County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Dane Lee Duckett, of attempting to manufacture methamphetamine, simple possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving on a suspended license, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of six years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and that his sentence is excessive. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant appeals his conviction for premeditated first degree murder and presents nine issues for review: (1) Sufficiency of the evidence; (2) Failure to dismiss the indictment due to prosecutorial delay; (3) Failure to suppress the defendant's statements; (4) Failure to suppress a crime scene photograph; (5) Admission of hearsay under the state of mind exception; (6) Admission of hearsay under the co-conspirator exception; (7) Admission of conduct and activities by Chuck Dixon with Cashbox magazine; (8) Admission of a tape recording and transcript of the defendant's conversations; and (9) Error in instructing the jury on aiding and abetting. After careful review, we find no reversible error and affirm the defendant's conviction.

The Defendant, James Yates, filed a pro se pleading seeking to have a conviction and sentence set aside as unconstitutional. The trial court treated the pleading as seeking a writ of habeas corpus and summarily denied the Defendant’s claim for relief. The Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Charles Goode, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.  In this appeal, Petitioner argues that his counsel’s representation at trial was deficient because he failed to adequately investigate Petitioner’s case and failed to effectively cross-examine the victim.  After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Respectfully, I find I cannot fully concur in the opinion because, based upon the absence of a contemporaneous objection, it treats as waived the issue of the trial court’s “reading the aggravated kidnapping as a lesser-included offense out of order during the charge to the jury.”   The instructional problem alleged is one of instructional error, not instructional omission. In the case of the former, no contemporaneous objection is required, unlike when an instruction is omitted. See, e.g., State v. Johnny Wade Meeks, No. 03C01-9811-CR-00411, slip op. at 8-9 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Dec. 3, 1999).

The defendant, Terry Boyd Collins, stands convicted by a Sullivan County jury of arson and presenting a fraudulent insurance claim, for which he received an effective nine-year sentence. Aggrieved of his sentence and convictions, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and claims that prosecutorial comments during closing arguments constitute reversible error, that the trial court's sentencing determination conflicted with the mandates of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and that the trial court erred when denying all forms of alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the lower court.

The appellant, Donald Luke Seiber, was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and two counts of sexual battery, and he received a total effective sentence of sixteen years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, the trial court’s jury instructions, and sentencing. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the appellant’s convictions but remand for a new sentencing hearing.

The petitioner, Jesse Teasley, appeals from the trial court's order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted following a jury trial in Knox County for arson and aggravated burglary, as charged. The trial court sentenced the defendant six (6) months confinement and five (5) years and (6) months on probation to be followed by a second six (6) year sentence to be served entirely on probation. The defendant argues three (3) issues on appeal: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions; (2) the trial court erred in allowing testimony at trial contrary to the defendant's motion in limine which was granted by the trial court; and (3) the defendant's sentence was imposed contrary to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ----, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004) and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). After a careful review of the record, we affirm the defendant's convictions and remand for resentencing.

This appeal is before us following the reopening of Petitioner's post-conviction petition for the limited purpose of determining whether Petitioner is mentally retarded and thus ineligible for the death penalty pursuant to our supreme court's decision in Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790 (Tenn. 2001) and the United States Supreme Court's decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002). The post-conviction court ultimately determined that Petitioner had failed to prove that he was mentally retarded and that the weight of the proof was that he was not mentally retarded. Accordingly, the court denied Petitioner's request for a new trial and denied and dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal as of right, this court must determine the following issues: (1) whether Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he is mentally retarded; (2) whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203, as interpreted by the supreme court in Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d 450 (Tenn. 2004), is constitutional in light of the principles outlined in Atkins v. Virginia; and (3) whether the absence of mental retardation is an element of capital murder requiring the State to bear the burden of proof and requiring submission of the issue to a jury. After review of the record and the applicable law, we find no errors of law requiring reversal. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, James Ray Bartlett, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In this appeal as of right, the petitioner asserts that the judgments of conviction for aggravated assault and four counts of theft are void because the sentences are illegal. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.