APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Jackie F. Curry, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claims the trial court erred in finding his petition barred by the Post-Conviction Procedure Act's one-year statute of limitations. He asserts that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), announced a new rule of constitutional law requiring retroactive application. We affirm the trial court's summary dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, James C. McWhorter, was convicted of two counts of forgery, misdemeanor evading arrest, and felony reckless endangerment. The trial court imposed a four-year sentence for each of the forgery convictions, an eleven month and twenty-nine day sentence for the misdemeanor evading arrest conviction, and a four-year sentence for the felony reckless endangerment conviction. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, for a Range II, effective sentence of four years.  In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his residence; (2) that the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress the defendant's statement to police; (3) that the trial court erred by denying the motion to sever the offenses; (4) that there was a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof at trial; (5) that Count 3 of the indictment did not charge an offense; (6) that the offenses alleged were legally impossible under the facts of the case; (7) that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for evading arrest and reckless endangerment; (8) that the trial court erred by referring to his statement as a "confession;" (9) that the trial court should have given a curative instruction during a co-defendant's testimony; (10) that the sentence is excessive; and (11) that the trial court erred by denying probation. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner, Quentin L. Hall, pled guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. Approximately eight years later he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. On appeal, the petitioner claims the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition as untimely. Because the facts of this case do not warrant tolling the post-conviction statute of limitations, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Larry Joe Jones, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, Gabrial Ayuel, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of attempted first-degree murder and sentenced to twenty years as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, the defendant raises five issues: (1) juror misconduct; (2) prosecutorial misconduct; (3) erroneous evidentiary rulings; (4) improper disclosure of unrelated, outstanding warrants; and (5) sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was indicted on two counts of driving under the influence (DUI). After a bench trial, the defendant was found guilty of both counts, but the trial court merged the counts into one conviction for DUI. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail, to be suspended after serving forty-eight hours in jail. The trial court also revoked the defendant's license for one year and imposed a three hundred fifty dollar fine. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle; (2) the test results from the breath-alcohol test were inadmissible because the officer failed to observe him for the requisite twenty minutes prior to the administration of the test; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jeffery Lynn Anderson was convicted by a jury of one count of burglary of a motor vehicle. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Laranda Conner, pled guilty to DUI, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail with all but forty-eight hours suspended. As a
condition of her guilty plea, she sought to reserve as a certified question of law whether the trial
court erred in overruling her motion to suppress the results of a blood-alcohol test taken without her consent but pursuant to medical treatment, which allegedly constituted an illegal search and seizure. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the defendant failed to properly reserve a question of law. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner, Melissa Barnett, appeals the trial court's order denying post-conviction relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition is barred by the statute of limitations and was properly dismissed. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Charles Edward Greer, was convicted of three counts of sale of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine and three counts of delivery of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine, all Class B felonies. The trial court merged the three convictions for delivery of cocaine into the accompanying convictions for the sale of cocaine and imposed concurrent, Range I sentences of eight years on each. In this appeal as of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. The judgments are affirmed.

The Appellant, Romelus Caraway, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated perjury.  On appeal, Caraway argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we conclude that the proof fails to establish that Caraway’s perjurious testimony was material to the proceeding at which the testimony was presented. Because materiality is an essential element of the offense of aggravated perjury, we reduce Caraway’s conviction to reflect a conviction for the lesser included offense of simple perjury.

The petitioner, Terry Penny, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his motion for a corrected judgment and his petition for post-conviction relief arguing his 1976 judgment should be corrected pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 and his post-conviction petition was not time- barred by the statute of limitations. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court.

The defendant, David M. Olvera, was convicted of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to concurrent terms of life and twenty years, respectively. On appeal, he argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police; (3) the trial court erred in allowing an intern from the district attorney general's office to participate in reading the defendant's statement to the jury; and (4) the trial court erred in charging the jury on flight. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Kenneth Ray Brasher, was convicted of theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served consecutively to a prior sentence. His sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Joseph Hough, appeals from the post-conviction court's summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief because the petition did not include a proper verification under oath. After a thorough review, we conclude that the circumstances in this case warrant allowing Petitioner the opportunity to amend his petition pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-106(d). The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

The defendant, Claude Francis Garrett, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury conviction of first degree felony murder, which resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, he claims that (1) the convicting evidence was insufficient; (2) three prosecution witnesses presented false testimony; (3) the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony; (4) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on various points of law; (5) the trial court erred in failing to require a witness to answer defense counsel's questions on cross-examination; (6) the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for the payment of travel expenses for a non-resident witness; (7) the state withheld exculpatory evidence; and (8) he was denied due process of law. Following our review, we affirm the conviction.

Aggrieved of the Davidson County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief, the petitioner, Danny Ray Meeks, appeals. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition because the petitioner did not make a partial payment of the filing fee as required by Code section 41-21-807. Although we believe that the court acted precipitantly, we affirm the order of dismissal on the basis that the petition fails to establish a claim for habeas corpus relief.

The Petitioner, Vanory Askew, pled guilty to intent to sell or deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine, and one count of possession of a deadly weapon with intent to employ it in the commission of an offense, and he was sentenced to eighteen years. Subsequently, the Petitioner pled guilty to possession of cocaine in an amount under .5 grams and was sentenced to four years in the Department of Correction to be served concurrently with his previous sentence. The Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that: (1) the trial court erred by summarily dismissing the his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus and denying his request for the appointment of counsel; and (2) the concurrent sentence he received for his 2003 conviction was illegal, because he was on parole at the time of the offense. The trial court dismissed the petition, and we reverse the judgment of the trial court, and remand the case for the appointment of counsel, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Petitioner, Charles Damien Darden, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

The Petitioner, Marvin Anthony Matthews, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

The defendant, Ronnie Misher, was convicted of three counts of burglary of a vehicle and three counts of theft under $500. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-402(a)(4), - 103, -105(1) (2003). The trial court imposed a sentence of six years for each burglary conviction and a sentence of eleven months
and twenty-nine days for each theft conviction. The trial court ordered that two of the burglary sentences be served consecutively and the remainder of the sentences be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of twelve years. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient and that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner, James T. Spurling, appeals the post-conviction court's summary dismissal of his pro se petition as untimely. Because the petitioner's claims, when taken as true, allege attorney misrepresentation concerning the filing of a post-conviction petition, we conclude that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine: (1) whether due process tolled the limitations period because counsel did, in fact, assure the petitioner that he would continue his representation through the filing of a post-conviction petition; and if so, (2) whether the petitioner was within the reasonable opportunity afforded him by due process. Therefore, we reverse the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition and remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing.

Aggrieved of his Davidson County Criminal Court conviction of driving under the influence (DUI), a class A misdemeanor, the defendant, Robert G. Laney, appeals and claims only that the evidence of his physical control of the motor vehicle was insufficient to support his conviction. We disagree and affirm the conviction.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, James D. Cooks, Jr., of assault and theft of property valued less than five hundred dollars, and the trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days for each offense. The appellant appeals,
claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Karlis Williams, pleaded guilty on January 14, 2003, to three counts of robbery and six counts of misdemeanor theft of an amount less than $500. By plea agreement with the state, the petitioner received an effective seven-year sentence, as a Range II multiple offender. The petitioner subsequently filed with the Shelby County Criminal Court a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that as a result, his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made. He also raised a challenge to his sentence based on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner brings the instant appeal challenging that denial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.