APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, David Anthony Avery, acting pro se, appeals from the summary dismissal of his third motion pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure seeking correction of his sentence. As grounds, the Petitioner asserts his sentence is illegal because attempted murder, a crime which he was convicted of, does not exist in Tennessee. Because the Petitioner’s motion failed to state a colorable claim for relief, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated rape, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and arguing that the trial court should have dismissed the indictment based on either pre-indictment delay or the failure to follow the mandates of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 5, that post-indictment delay deprived him of the right to a speedy trial, that the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial following the victim’s in-court outburst, that the trial court violated his right to counsel, and that the trial judge should have recused himself. Upon review, we discern no error, and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, William C. Sutton, received and signed a written trespass notice from Walmart informing him that he was banned from entering its retail locations for life. Less than a year later, the Defendant entered one of Walmart’s retail locations and left without paying for clothing items he concealed in a plastic bag. Before trial, the Defendant made an oral motion in limine to exclude the trespass notice as inadmissible hearsay, which the trial court denied. The jury subsequently convicted the Defendant of burglary, for which he received a twelve-year sentence of imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine and that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Fredrick Devell Rice Jr., entered guilty pleas to being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, tampering with evidence, and felony drug possession with intent to sell. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of ten years and placed the Defendant on probation after service of twelve months incarceration. The Defendant subsequently tested positive for fentanyl and norfentanyl four times. At the Defendant’s probation violation hearing, the Defendant objected to an assessment report the State offered through a witness who did not prepare it as inadmissible hearsay, which was overruled by the trial court. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence. In this appeal, the sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in admitting the testimony from the assessment report. After review, we affirm.

Reginal Jenkins, Defendant, appeals from his convictions for two counts of attempted first degree murder and two counts of employing a firearm during a dangerous felony, claiming there was insufficient evidence regarding identity and premeditation. We disagree with Defendant’s claims and affirm the judgments.

Defendant, Sentrell Pittman, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count each of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and rape. A jury convicted Defendant as charged, and following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective thirty-year sentence. Defendant appeals, arguing that: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; 2) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to compel the victim to submit to a mental evaluation; 3) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to allow the jury to visit the scenes of the incidents; 4) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment based on the State’s violation of State v. Ferguson; and 5) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412 seeking to allow cross-examination of the victim regarding her prior sexual history. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Green a/k/a Michael Cheairs, appeals his Madison County Circuit Court jury conviction of violating the sex offender registry requirements, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-208, arguing that the admission of and testimony about the violation report by someone other than the officer who prepared it violated the Confrontation Clause and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the report was the only evidence supporting his conviction. The State argues that the Defendant waived plenary review of the issue, and that he is not entitled to relief via plain error review. Upon review, we conclude that the Defendant properly preserved the issue below and agree that the admission of the violation report via a substitute witness violated the Confrontation Clause. The error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the inadmissible statements in the report were the primary evidence of the Defendant’s guilt. Accordingly, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Defendant properly preserved his Confrontation Clause issue and that he is entitled to relief. I would conclude that Defendant’s issue is waived, and Defendant is not entitled to plain error relief.

Clarence Hayes, Petitioner, appeals the dismissal of his habeas petition in which he argued his judgment was void because the person for whose actions he was held criminally responsible was never convicted of murder. After the dismissal of the Petition, Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider and a motion for clarification and reconsideration. The habeas corpus court denied both motions and Petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal. Because the interest of justice does not warrant the timely filing of the notice of appeal, Petitioner’s appeal is dismissed.

The Defendant, Devonta Ivy, was convicted by a Fayette County jury of aggravated robbery, unlawful possession of a weapon, theft of property, and evading arrest. The trial court entered judgments ordering the Defendant to serve an effective eleven-year sentence consecutively to a previously unserved sentence from Mississippi. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support each conviction and that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a prior conviction. Following our review and pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36, we remand for entry of corrected judgments for Counts Three and Four due to clerical errors. Otherwise, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Robert Jason Burdick, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order denying his three post-conviction petitions, seeking relief from his convictions of one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated rape, one count of attempted aggravated rape, and one count of aggravated burglary and his effective sentence of forty-six years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, that the cumulative effect of counsel’s deficient performance warrants new trials and sentencing hearings, and that the consecutive sentencing statute is void for vagueness. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Victor Valle, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief, arguing that he was entitled to and did not receive juvenile proceedings before the trial court admitted evidence of prior bad acts committed while Petitioner was a minor; the trial court erred by admitting evidence of prior bad acts; he received ineffective assistance of counsel; his indictment was insufficient to provide the trial court with subject matter jurisdiction; the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; the trial court improperly instructed the jury; and the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of his right to a fair trial. After review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Pro se Petitioner, Asata Lowe, filed a “Petition for Delayed Appeal,” which was treated as a motion for a delayed appeal and summarily dismissed by the Blount County Circuit Court. In this appeal, Lowe argues that the post-conviction court erred when it “failed to consider whether [he] was denied ‘the right to an appeal from the original conviction’ and that the court made ‘erroneous findings of fact and legal conclusions.’” After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Tameka Hamilton, entered guilty pleas to various offenses including reckless endangerment, evading arrest, theft, identity theft, fraudulent use of a credit card, and forgery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight years and placed the Defendant in a community corrections program. The Defendant subsequently violated her probation based on failure to complete the special conditions of the drug court program. In this appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred in ordering her to serve the remainder of her sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm.

Petitioner, Fred Beal, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, attempted first degree murder, two counts of attempted especially aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty-two years. This court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court denied the petition after a hearing. In this appeal, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly investigate a witness and to properly communicate with Petitioner, and that cumulative error prejudiced Petitioner. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Currently before the Court is the Petitioner’s pro se application for an extraordinary appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 10. It is not entirely clear what the Petitioner is seeking to appeal, but he failed to attach to his application a copy of any trial court order appealable under Rule 10. An extraordinary appeal may be granted from an interlocutory order of a trial court if the appellate court determines the trial court has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to require immediate review or if necessary for complete determination of the action on appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 10(a). Thus, Rule 10 is utilized to gain interlocutory appellate review of a trial court order. Again, the Petitioner failed to attach a copy of any trial court order which demonstrates how the trial court has acted in an “arbitrary fashion” necessary to warrant an extraordinary appeal at this juncture of the trial court proceedings. Tenn. R. App. P. 10, Advisory Commission Comment (“[t]he circumstances in which review is available . . . are very narrowly circumscribed to those situations in which the trial court . . . has acted in an arbitrary fashion, or as may be necessary to permit complete appellate review on a later appeal”). 

Accordingly, the Petitioner’s application is hereby denied. Because it appears the incarcerated Petitioner remains indigent, costs are taxed to the State. However, the State has the authority to recoup the costs associated with this appeal from the Petitioner’s trust fund account, if appropriate. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-25-143.

The Defendant has filed an application for interlocutory appeal, see Tenn. R. App. P. 9, seeking review of the trial court’s September 23, 2024 order and November 6, 2024 amended order denying the Defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment and granting the State’s motion to have the Defendant involuntarily judicially committed pursuant to the Tennessee Disability and Aging Act of 2024 (“the Act”). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 52-5- 404 (specifically regarding involuntary commitment for intellectually disabled defendants). The Defendant argues that interlocutory review of the trial court’s orders is required to prevent irreparable injury, to prevent needless and protracted litigation, and to develop a uniform body of law. Tenn. R. App. P. 9(a)(1), (2), and (3). The State has filed an answer in opposition to the Defendant’s application, arguing that three of the issues certified by the trial court ask for advisory opinions and that the three remaining issues do not satisfy the criteria for interlocutory appeal. Following our review, we grant the Defendant’s application for interlocutory appeal, in part, and deny the application, in part.

The Petitioner, Robert Wayne Garner, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. Specifically, the Petitioner argues that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because the trial court failed to explicitly order he serve his life sentence for felony murder in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) and failed to indicate the same on his felony murder judgment form. Additionally, the Petitioner alleges two procedural errors occurred in these proceedings: (1) the State was without authority to attach a proposed dismissal order to its motion to dismiss the habeas corpus petition, and (2) the habeas corpus court erred by simply signing the State’s dismissal order without providing extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law for its decision. After review, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Robert Wayne Garner, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. Specifically, the Petitioner argues that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because the trial court failed to explicitly order he serve his life sentence for felony murder in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) and failed to indicate the same on his felony murder judgment form. Additionally, the Petitioner alleges two procedural errors occurred in these proceedings: (1) the State was without authority to attach a proposed dismissal order to its motion to dismiss the habeas corpus petition, and (2) the habeas corpus court erred by simply signing the State’s dismissal order without providing extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law for its decision. After review, we affirm.

After the Defendant, Brandon Tylor Mulac, was arrested in Smith County with 396 grams of methamphetamine in his vehicle, law enforcement executed a search warrant on his home in DeKalb County and found another 425 grams of methamphetamine. The Defendant subsequently filed a motion to suppress the evidence from the DeKalb County search and a motion to exclude evidence from his Smith County arrest based on Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, both of which were denied by the trial court. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to sell or deliver over three hundred grams of methamphetamine and received a sentence of sixty years’ imprisonment. In this appeal, the Defendant argues the trial court erred based on the following three grounds: (1) in denying his motions to suppress because the search warrant and affidavit did not establish probable cause and because the affidavit contained false information in violation of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978); (2) in admitting evidence from the Smith County traffic stop in violation of Rule 404(b); and (3) in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction.1 Upon review, we affirm.

Lamar Fletcher, Defendant, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After a bench trial, the Defendant, Alphonso Elexander, was convicted in the Rutherford County Circuit Court of aggravated burglary, misdemeanor vandalism, and possession of drug paraphernalia and received an effective six-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, he claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated burglary conviction. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Paul Springer, was charged with two counts of forgery in an amount $60,000 or more but less than $250,000 and one count of theft in an amount $60,000 or more but less than $250,000.1 Defendant’s jury trial ended in a mistrial after Defendant “violat[ed] a court order” by referencing an alleged victim’s prior criminal record. During the trial, Defendant was twice held in contempt of court, once for arriving late to court and again for violating the court’s order. Nearly three years after judgments were entered against Defendant for two counts of direct contempt of court, Defendant filed a “Motion to Dismiss Contempt of Court,” which the trial court denied.2 Defendant appeals, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of contempt. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal.

Christopher Terrell Shipp, Petitioner, was convicted of one count of criminally negligent homicide, one count of felony murder, two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of attempted second degree murder after a jury trial. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of life in prison. On direct appeal, Petitioner challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission of the preliminary hearing testimony of one of the victims in the home invasion. State v. Shipp, No. M2016-01397-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 4457595, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 14, 2018). Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief seeking post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. An amended petition filed after counsel was appointed raised additional claims, including a Brady claim based on the State’s withholding of a witness statement before the preliminary hearing. After an evidentiary hearing, Petitioner sought removal of his appointed counsel. This Court denied Petitioner’s application for an extraordinary appeal and the post-conviction court denied the petition for post-conviction relief. Eventually, Petitioner was allowed to proceed pro se on appeal. Because Petitioner has either waived his issues or failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Movant, Antonio K. Champion, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence related to his guilty-pleaded convictions in Madison County Circuit Court case numbers 22-488 and 22-489. 1 On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion because he was improperly sentenced as a Range II offender based upon several prior convictions, which he asserts also involved “illegal” sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.