APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Robert L. Moore, filed in the Hardeman County Circuit Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his 1994 conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to sell, his three 1991 convictions for sale of cocaine, and his three 1991 convictions for concealing stolen property are void. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition without the appointment of counsel or an evidentiary hearing, and the petitioner appeals that dismissal. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Jerry L. Cowan, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to second degree murder, and he received a sentence of thirty-five years as a Range II offender. Subsequently, he filed in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his sentence was void. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition without the appointment of counsel or an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner appeals that dismissal. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Cumecus R. Cates, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition based on its determination that the underlying conviction was on appeal to this Court. It is from the order of dismissal that the Petitioner appeals. The State concedes that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the petition. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings.

The Appellant, Arthur Lee Harrison, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of the attempted voluntary manslaughter of his estranged wife. On appeal, Harrison argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. After review, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Roderick Harris, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 2004, he pled guilty to aggravated robbery and received a sentence of ten years. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a pretrial mental evaluation. After a review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition.

The majority affirms consecutive sentences based upon a finding that the appellant’s criminal history is extensive. T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b)(2). The pre-sentence report reflects no documentation of a prior conviction of any type. The appellant’s statements to the pre-sentence officer indicate excessive alcohol and drug abuse and that he completed a drug and alcohol treatment program in 1983. Based upon the appellant’s self-reporting of drug use, the majority concludes that consecutive sentences are warranted. I am unable to join with the majority in concluding that a defendant’s self-reporting of uncharged alcohol or drug abuse will warrant consecutive sentences. This information is sought in the pre-sentence report for the purpose of fashioning an individualized sentence under sentencing guidelines, not for purposes of gathering incriminating evidence. To utilize the offender’s statements within the report for increased penal sanctions is counterproductive in that it discourages truthfulness and is inconsistent with the purposes of the pre-sentence report. If the State wishes to introduce evidence of uncharged criminal activity, then it may do so; however, the defendant should not be penalized for candor.

The appellant, Paul Neil Laurent, was indicted in 2003 for twelve counts of various crimes allegedly committed against his step-daughter and daughter. After a bench trial, the appellant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, attempted aggravated sexual battery, aggravated sexual battery, two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, and one count of attempted child neglect. The appellant received a total effective sentence of seventeen years. The appellant appeals, arguing that: (1) the trial court erred by denying the motion for judgment of acquittal and motion to dismiss regarding the charge of aggravated kidnapping; (2) the trial court erred in determining that the appellant was guilty of attempted aggravated sexual battery and aggravated sexual battery because the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing the appellant. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Carlito D. Adams, was convicted in 1995 of two counts of felony murder and two counts of attempted felony murder, with the latter being reversed and dismissed. See State v. Carlito D. Adams, No. 02C01-9608-CR-00267, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1247 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 11, 1997), perm. to appeal denied concurring in results only (Tenn. Nov. 9, 1998). In November 1999, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which, according to the petitioner, was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Additionally, he alleges that this court denied, on January 25, 2002, his motion to reconsider the dismissal. On January 19, 2005, he filed a motion to reopen his post-conviction petition, claiming that a new right, which he sought to assert, had been recognized in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and that there was new scientific evidence establishing his actual innocence. The post-conviction court denied the motion to reopen, and the petitioner appealed. Following our review, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Carlos L. Rice, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

Petitioner, Grover L. Dunigan, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his conviction for second degree murder. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition without a hearing on the grounds that the petition was time-barred. In this appeal, Petitioner argues that due process requires tolling the statute of limitations because his trial attorney never told him that the supreme court had denied his Rule 11 application. After a thorough review of the record, we find that the lower court properly dismissed the petition. Therefore, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The defendant, Edna Phelps, was found guilty by a Madison County jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years, all suspended except for eleven months and twenty-nine days with the balance to be served on intensive probation. On appeal, she argues the trial court erred in overruling her objections to certain questions asked by the State. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Steven Murphy, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and two counts of theft of property over $1000, a Class D felony. The trial court merged the first degree felony murder conviction into the premeditated murder conviction, for which the defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, merged the two theft convictions, and sentenced the defendant to two years for the theft conviction, to be served concurrently with the life sentence without parole. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to allow hearsay statements of the victim into evidence, in denying his motion to suppress his statements to police, and in not instructing the jury on the adverse inference that could be drawn from the State’s failure to preserve the tape recording of the defendant’s statements. Having reviewed the record and found no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment in Case No. 01-02751 to reflect the defendant’s conviction offense which was omitted.

Following a jury trial, Petitioner, Marty Dale Williams and his co-defendant, Daryl Lee Madden, were convicted of felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and second degree murder. The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction with the felony murder conviction. Madden received an effective sentence of life plus 25 years; Petitioner received an effective sentence of life. On direct appeal, a panel of this court affirmed the judgments of the trial court. See State v. Madden, 99 S.W.3d 127 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002). Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief which the trial court subsequently denied after a hearing. Petitioner now appeals from the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. In this appeal, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in finding that Petitioner failed to establish that his trial counsel was per se ineffective and that trial counsel was ineffective under the totality of the circumstances. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

A Coffee County jury convicted the Defendant, Willie R. Harris, Jr., of driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI"). On appeal, he contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) the trial court erred when it admitted the results his blood alcohol content test into evidence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Kelvin Jermaine Dowell, was convicted by jury of first degree murder and abuse of a corpse, see Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202(a)(1), -17-312 (2003), for which he received a life sentence. Aggrieved of his convictions, the defendant brings the instant appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s denial of his request for a continuance. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the lower court.

The appellant, Dorris Lee Markum, was indicted on two counts of aggravated burglary, two counts of arson and two counts of theft of property under five hundred dollars. After a jury trial, the appellant was convicted of all charges. As a result, he was sentenced as a Range II multiple offender to an effective sentence of twenty years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, the appellant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his arson convictions and that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on arson. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Kamal Muhammed, was indicted with second offense driving under the influence. After a jury trial, the appellant was convicted of the indicted offense. As a result, he was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days. All but seventy-five days of the sentence were suspended. The appellant challenges his conviction on appeal, arguing that the State failed to prove venue and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Jason Curtis Johnson, was convicted of one count of first degree premeditated murder and one count of second degree murder for the killing of Christy Waller and her unborn child, respectively. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for his first degree murder conviction and twenty-five years for his second degree murder conviction, with the sentence for second degree murder conviction to be served consecutively to his life sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence autopsy photographs of the victim’s fetus; (3) that the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions; and (4) that the trial court erred in its sentencing determinations. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Richard D. Wiggins, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Davidson County Criminal Court. Wiggins pled guilty to attempted especially aggravated robbery and, as provided by the plea agreement, received an eight-year split confinement sentence requiring service of one year in the county jail followed by seven years probation. On appeal, Wiggins contends that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to trial counsel's ineffectiveness in: (1) failing to have Wiggins evaluated for mental competency; (2) failing to fully investigate the case; (3) advising Wiggins how to answer the trial court's questions during the plea colloquy; and (4) failing to fully explain the nature and consequences of his guilty plea. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus in Marshall County, the county in which he was convicted. He is incarcerated in Wayne County. The trial court dismissed his petition for writ of habeas corpus because it was not filed in the county in which he is located and because the petition did not state sufficient grounds. We affirm the decision of the habeas corpus court.

The Appellant, Simon Avalos Villagomez, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Villagomez argues that his guilty plea for felony possession of seventy pounds or more of marijuana for resale was not knowing and voluntary due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The defendant, James Wesley Martens, was convicted by a Humphreys County jury of aggravated robbery and evading arrest. The defendant was sentenced to concurrent sentences of fourteen years and three years, respectively, in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range II multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his request for a continuance and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the probation of defendant, Jerry Eldridge, and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. In his appeal, defendant argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the revocation hearing, and that the trial court erred in finding that he had violated the terms of his probation. After a review of this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Tyler Stout Smith, was convicted of vehicular homicide by recklessness. Defendant was ordered to pay a fine of ten thousand ($10,000) dollars and was sentenced to four (4) years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence presented was insufficient to establish the element of recklessness beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) Defendant's due process rights were violated when the trial court did not allow him to present evidence that the victim was influenced by an intoxicant which may have influenced her ability to avoid the collision; and (3) the trial court improperly increased the Defendant's sentence from three years to four years. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Dorothy Pryor, appeals the sentencing decision of the Sumner County Criminal Court. The defendant pled guilty to five counts of burglary and three counts of Class D felony theft. Pursuant to the plea agreement, she received an effective eight-year sentence for the burglary convictions and an effective eight-year sentence for the theft convictions. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the burglary and theft sentences to be served consecutively to one another and consecutively to a prior eight-year sentence, for a total sentence of twenty-four years in the Department of Correction as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal, the defendant argues that consecutive sentencing was improper. After a review of the record, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.