APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Kelvin Jermaine Dowell, was convicted by jury of first degree murder and abuse of a corpse, see Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202(a)(1), -17-312 (2003), for which he received a life sentence. Aggrieved of his convictions, the defendant brings the instant appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s denial of his request for a continuance. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the lower court.

The appellant, Dorris Lee Markum, was indicted on two counts of aggravated burglary, two counts of arson and two counts of theft of property under five hundred dollars. After a jury trial, the appellant was convicted of all charges. As a result, he was sentenced as a Range II multiple offender to an effective sentence of twenty years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, the appellant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his arson convictions and that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on arson. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Kamal Muhammed, was indicted with second offense driving under the influence. After a jury trial, the appellant was convicted of the indicted offense. As a result, he was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days. All but seventy-five days of the sentence were suspended. The appellant challenges his conviction on appeal, arguing that the State failed to prove venue and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Jason Curtis Johnson, was convicted of one count of first degree premeditated murder and one count of second degree murder for the killing of Christy Waller and her unborn child, respectively. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for his first degree murder conviction and twenty-five years for his second degree murder conviction, with the sentence for second degree murder conviction to be served consecutively to his life sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence autopsy photographs of the victim’s fetus; (3) that the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions; and (4) that the trial court erred in its sentencing determinations. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Richard D. Wiggins, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Davidson County Criminal Court. Wiggins pled guilty to attempted especially aggravated robbery and, as provided by the plea agreement, received an eight-year split confinement sentence requiring service of one year in the county jail followed by seven years probation. On appeal, Wiggins contends that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to trial counsel's ineffectiveness in: (1) failing to have Wiggins evaluated for mental competency; (2) failing to fully investigate the case; (3) advising Wiggins how to answer the trial court's questions during the plea colloquy; and (4) failing to fully explain the nature and consequences of his guilty plea. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus in Marshall County, the county in which he was convicted. He is incarcerated in Wayne County. The trial court dismissed his petition for writ of habeas corpus because it was not filed in the county in which he is located and because the petition did not state sufficient grounds. We affirm the decision of the habeas corpus court.

The Appellant, Simon Avalos Villagomez, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Villagomez argues that his guilty plea for felony possession of seventy pounds or more of marijuana for resale was not knowing and voluntary due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The defendant, James Wesley Martens, was convicted by a Humphreys County jury of aggravated robbery and evading arrest. The defendant was sentenced to concurrent sentences of fourteen years and three years, respectively, in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range II multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his request for a continuance and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the probation of defendant, Jerry Eldridge, and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. In his appeal, defendant argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the revocation hearing, and that the trial court erred in finding that he had violated the terms of his probation. After a review of this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Tyler Stout Smith, was convicted of vehicular homicide by recklessness. Defendant was ordered to pay a fine of ten thousand ($10,000) dollars and was sentenced to four (4) years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence presented was insufficient to establish the element of recklessness beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) Defendant's due process rights were violated when the trial court did not allow him to present evidence that the victim was influenced by an intoxicant which may have influenced her ability to avoid the collision; and (3) the trial court improperly increased the Defendant's sentence from three years to four years. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Dorothy Pryor, appeals the sentencing decision of the Sumner County Criminal Court. The defendant pled guilty to five counts of burglary and three counts of Class D felony theft. Pursuant to the plea agreement, she received an effective eight-year sentence for the burglary convictions and an effective eight-year sentence for the theft convictions. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the burglary and theft sentences to be served consecutively to one another and consecutively to a prior eight-year sentence, for a total sentence of twenty-four years in the Department of Correction as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal, the defendant argues that consecutive sentencing was improper. After a review of the record, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Willie Wilson, was found guilty of two counts of aggravated robbery. He received concurrent sentences of nine years for each conviction. In his appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the aggravated robbery convictions should be merged into a single conviction and the case remanded for entry of corrected judgments consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Appellant, Jason Earl Hill, proceeding pro se, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 1995, Hill pled guilty to aggravated burglary and received a three-year suspended sentence. In February 2005, Hill filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief collaterally attacking the 1995 conviction. While acknowledging that the petition was filed outside the statute of limitations, Hill asserts that due process requires that the statute be tolled and that his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea be addressed. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as time-barred without addressing the merits of Hill's substantive claims. On appeal, Hill asserts that the court erred in: (1) dismissing the petition as untimely; (2) dismissing the petition without addressing the whole subject matter as to all causes of action involved; and (3) dismissing the petition because due process requires vacating the conviction due to his innocence. After review, we conclude that the facts of this case do not warrant tolling the post-conviction statute of limitations. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court's summary dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Johnny E. Porter, was convicted of possession of over .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. He received concurrent sentences of nine years and eleven months, twenty-nine days on the charges, respectively. On appeal, the defendant contests the sufficiency of the evidence and contends that the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence on Count One from eight years to nine years based solely upon his prior criminal record. Upon review, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

The petitioner, Chuncy L. Hollis, originally pled guilty to possession of cocaine greater than .5 grams with intent to sell, a Class B felony, in exchange for a sentence of eight years. Thereafter, he filed and was denied post-conviction relief. The petitioner now appeals the post-conviction court’s order, claiming that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel which resulted in an unknowing and involuntary plea.

The defendant, Tammy Marie Wilburn, pled guilty to one count of attempted aggravated arson, a Class B felony. The Blount County Circuit Court sentenced her to an eight-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender to be served in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred in denying her alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After a bench trial, the Defendant was convicted of burglary, a Class D felony, and theft of property under the value of five hundred dollars, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§39-14-402, -103, -105(1). After conducting a sentencing hearing, the Defendant was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to serve ten years in the Department of Correction for his burglary conviction.  He received a concurrent sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail for his theft conviction. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve a mid-range sentence for the burglary conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Paul O. Dickens, Sr., was convicted by a Rutherford County jury of attempted voluntary manslaughter (a Class D felony), reckless endangerment (a Class E felony), and two counts of coercion of a witness (a Class D felony). On direct appeal to this court, the defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict; and (2) his convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter and reckless endangerment violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Upon review of the record, briefs of the parties, and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Shirley A. Rudd, was convicted by an Obion County jury of sale of a controlled substance. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred when it did not declare a mistrial because two witnesses made improper and prejudicial statements about the Defendant’s prior bad acts; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction; and (3) the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant’s counsel the right to question a witness about her motive for testifying. Finding that there exists no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jonathan Ellis, appeals pro se from the Johnson County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his convictions for thirteen counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and resulting sentences of twenty-five years on each conviction to be served concurrently as a Range I, standard offender in the Department of Correction. He claims his judgments of conviction are void because they classify his release eligibility status at thirty percent in violation of statute. We conclude that four of the sentences are illegal. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgment in part, reverse the judgment in part, and remand the case.

The State appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's dismissal of a presentment charging the defendant, Bradley Noble, with the rape of a five-year-old child at a day care center. The presentment charged the defendant, a former employee of the center, with digitally penetrating the victim's anus on an unspecified day in March 1999. In a subsequent bill of particulars, the State narrowed the time of the offense to between 3:20 and 5:29 p.m. on March 10, 1999. During the defendant's first trial, which ended in a mistrial, defense counsel revealed in opening arguments that he intended to prove that the defendant had not been alone with the victim during the time alleged in the bill of particulars. Following the mistrial, the State filed a "Superceding Bill of Particulars," which reverted back to the general time frame of the presentment. The defendant moved to dismiss the presentment, and the trial court granted the motion. We reverse the order of the trial court, reinstate the presentment, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant pled guilty to driving while under court order not to operate a motor vehicle because he had been declared an habitual motor offender. The trial court sentenced the defendant to six years as a Career Offender. The defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in not granting him probation and in sentencing him as a career offender. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Leonard Masonet, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the length of his sentence contravened the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 and was therefore void. The trial court summarily denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing, and Petitioner now appeals. After a review of the record, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus.

A Roane County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Dennis D. Plemons, Sr., of driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days with all but five days suspended. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence is insufficient. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

An Anderson County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Adam F. Wester, of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. The appellant appeals, claiming (1) that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear about prior injuries to the victim; (2) that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence photographs of the victim's body; (3) that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the mens rea element of the crime; (4) that the trial court erred by refusing to give a special jury instruction on "accident"; (5) that the trial court erred by giving sequential jury instructions; and (6) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.