APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a direct appeal as of right from a conviction on a jury verdict for aggravated robbery. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant raises four issues: (1) the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his car, (2) the trial court erred in allowing into evidence the preliminary hearing testimony of a police officer who was deceased at the time of trial, (3) the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty of aggravated robbery, and (4) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a search of his residence, Defendant, Raymond Griggs, was indicted on two counts.  Count one charged possession of a schedule II controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to deliver .5 grams or more, and count two charged Defendant with being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun. Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant. The trial court denied the motion. A jury trial was held and Defendant was convicted of count two, convicted felon in possession of a handgun. A mistrial was declared as to count one, presumably because the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict. Defendant filed a motion for new trial which the trial court subsequently denied. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the conviction of being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun, and (2) the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner Derrick L. Brown appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to establish his entitlement to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Petitioner, Isaac Jones, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief.  The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Joseph Granderson, was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. This Court affirmed the petitioner’s conviction and sentence on appeal. State v. Joseph Granderson, No. 02C01-9712-CR-00466, 1998 WL 506658 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Aug. 20, 1998), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Mar. 8, 1999). Subsequently, the supreme court denied permission to appeal. The petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on numerous grounds. Counsel was appointed and several amended petitions were filed. After hearing evidence on the petition over the course of several months, the post-conviction court entered an order granting post-conviction relief on the basis that trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to properly inform the petitioner of his potential sentence if convicted of first degree murder. The State appeals the post-conviction court’s decision. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

On May 15, 2004, the victim, Charles Lawuary, was shot and killed in Humboldt, Tennessee in an area known as “the crossing.” A bystander was grazed by a bullet. The defendant, James L. Miller, and a co-defendant, Charles Lewis, were later arrested for the shootings. The Gibson County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for criminal responsibility for first degree murder and criminal responsibility for aggravated assault. Following a jury trial held on March 21, 2005, the jury found the defendant guilty as charged. The defendant was sentenced to life in prison for the murder conviction and six years for the aggravated assault conviction, to be served concurrently with the life sentence. The defendant appeals, arguing that, the State failed to prove the venue of the crime, the trial judge failed to charge the natural and probable consequences rule to the jury, there was juror misconduct when one juror felt she was coerced into voting for a guilty verdict, and there was insufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction. We have reviewed the record in this case and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Frank Peake, III, was convicted of aggravated assault, and the trial court sentenced him to prison for six years as a Range II offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it allowed a witness to testify about a prior threat made by the Defendant; (2) the trial court erred by failing to provide a jury instruction on circumstantial evidence and failing to provide a limiting jury instruction as to the prior threat made by the Defendant; and (3) the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner of two counts of first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of attempted first degree murder. The Petitioner was sentenced to life plus an additional fifty years. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that, because his trial counsel was ineffective, the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Courtney Catrell Goss, appeals t 1 he Fayette County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to rape and the resulting twelve-year sentence.  He contends that he did not plead guilty voluntarily and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Allan Joseph Robles, was convicted by a Henry County jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced as a 100% violent offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction and fined $10,000. On appeal, he argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in not granting his motion for acquittal; and (3) the trial court erred in not charging a lesser-included offense. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Warren County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Michael Kenneth Sisco, of driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days with sixty days to serve in confinement and the balance on probation. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient, that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of a rebuttal witness, and that the trial court erred in sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Donnie W. Foulks, appeals the judgment of the Greene County Criminal Court denying post-conviction relief. On appeal, Foulks argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel and that his sentencing violated the constitutional mandate of Blakely v. Washington. After review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Solomon Galloway, of two counts of aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the appellant as a Range I, standard offender to eight years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentence in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), which resulted in his being improperly classified as a standard offender instead of an especially mitigated offender. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Edward Coleman, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, and he received a sentence of life imprisonment. Thereafter, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Clarence David Schreane, of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment for the murder and sixty years for the robbery, ordering the defendant to serve his sixty-year sentence as a career offender consecutively for an effective sentence of life plus sixty years. The defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred in failing to suppress his confession. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tony Samuel, was convicted by a Lauderdale County jury of burglary and Class E felony theft. He received an effective seven-year sentence for these convictions. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) his sentences are excessive. After a review of the record, the judgments of conviction and resulting sentences are affirmed.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Abbigail Morton, was convicted of one count of attempted premeditated first degree murder and one count of conspiracy to commit premeditated first degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to concurrent sentences of twenty years for each conviction. In her appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the testimony of the co-defendant, Robert Hunter, was insufficiently corroborated to support Defendant’s convictions; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions; (3) the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of solicitation of first degree murder; and (4) the trial court erred in not sentencing Defendant as an especially mitigated offender. After a thorough review of
the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

On May 31, 2002, following a jury trial, Defendant, Tony Allan Phipps, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. Defendant was sentenced to serve eleven (11) years in the Department of Correction and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of five thousand ($5000.00) dollars. Defendant filed a motion for new trial which the trial court granted on October 14, 2002. On August 11, 2004, following another jury trial, Defendant was convicted of reckless homicide, ordered to pay a five thousand ($5000.00) dollar fine and sentenced to ten (10) years in the Department of Correction. Defendant appeals his conviction for reckless homicide. In his appeal, Defendant argues (1) the evidence in the record is insufficient to sustain a conviction for reckless homicide; (2) the evidence in the record does not support the jury verdict; (3) the jury verdict is contrary to law and evidence; and (4) the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant did not act in self-defense as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-611(b) (2003). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Benton County Grand Jury indicted the defendants, Jerry and Roseanne K. Ward, for crimes against revenue officers and tampering with governmental records. The defendants and the District Attorney General agreed to pretrial diversion. When the trial court refused to approve the agreement for pretrial diversion, the defendants filed an application for an appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We have reviewed the record and conclude that the trial court erred in withholding its approval of the pretrial diversion agreement. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner, Welister L. White, pled guilty to one count of felony murder in 1979 in exchange for a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. In August of 2005, the petitioner sought habeas corpus relief on the basis that his sentence was illegal given the holding in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). The trial court dismissed the petition, and this appeal followed. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The appellant, Carey Haynes, Jr., was indicted by the Dyer County Grand Jury for one count of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine and one count of selling more than .5 grams of cocaine. After a jury trial, the appellant was convicted on both counts. The trial court sentenced the appellant to six years for the conviction for the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine and twelve years for the conviction for the sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently to each other, but consecutively to several sentences for which the appellant was on probation at the time he committed the present offenses. After the denial of a motion for new trial, the appellant sought an appeal, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Clifford Leon Farra, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he asserts that the post-conviction court erred by proceeding with an evidentiary hearing even though the state had failed to file an answer to his original pro se petition. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The petitioner pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to one count of rape of a child on May 1, 2002. On October 7, 2002, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief asserting that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel at his guilty plea. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition on May 19, 2005. The petitioner appeals to this Court.  After a review of the record, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Marcus Nixon, was convicted in Lauderdale County of rape of a child and sentenced to serve twenty-one years in the Department of Correction. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. The petitioner filed a petition seeking a DNA analysis. The trial court initially granted an order requiring the petitioner to submit a blood sample to be compared to DNA collected at the scene. After a response from the State, the trial court entered a second order requiring the petitioner to provide a biological specimen for inclusion in the DNA database compiled by the State, but denying the petitioner’s request for DNA analysis because no “exculpatory results” would come from the analysis. The petitioner then sought a writ of mandamus requiring the State to comply with the trial court’s second order, and also filed a motion seeking permission to file an interlocutory appeal to appeal the trial court’s denial of his petition requesting DNA analysis. The petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, James Riels, appeals his sentences of death imposed by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury. On September 18, 2003, a Shelby County Grand Jury charged the appellant with one count of first degree felony murder for the death of Mary Jane Cruchon, one count of first degree premeditated murder for the death of Mary Jane Cruchon, one count of first degree felony murder for the death of Franchion Pollack, one count of first degree premeditated murder for the death of Franchion Pollack, one count of especially aggravated robbery of Franchion Pollack, one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery of Mary Jane Cruchon, and one count of aggravated burglary of the habitation of Mary Jane Cruchon. On August 9, 2004, the appellant entered guilty pleas to all seven counts. The trial court merged the felony murder convictions with the premeditated murder convictions, resulting in two convictions for first degree murder. A jury was impaneled for the sentencing phase, and on August 13, 2004, the jury imposed the death penalty for the murder of each victim. In the death of Mary Jane Cruchon, the jury unanimously found the presence of three statutory aggravating circumstances. In the death of Franchion Pollack, the jury unanimously found the presence of four statutory aggravating circumstances. The jury further determined that the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances. The trial court approved the sentencing verdict. In a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective thirty-five-year sentence for the remaining noncapital convictions. The appellant appeals, presenting for our review the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by overruling his motion to suppress, (2) whether the trial court erred by permitting the State to cross-examine him regarding the circumstances of the offenses, (3) whether the trial court erred by permitting the introduction of a post-mortem photograph of one of the victims, (4) whether the trial court’s instruction that the appellant’s prior offenses were offenses whose statutory elements involved the use of violence violated the United States Constitution, (5) whether the trial court’s instruction on victim impact evidence constituted a coercive jury instruction, and (6) whether Tennessee’s death penalty scheme is unconstitutional. Finding no errors requiring reversal, we affirm the appellant’s sentences of death.