APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The record reflects that the trial began on the morning of December 16, 2004, and testimony was heard through 9:00 p.m. that evening. Closing arguments and jury instructions followed.  Deliberations began at 11:20 p.m. The jury returned a verdict at 3:35 a.m. the next morning. Just before examination of the final witness, the trial court announced as follows:

In consultation with the attorneys, we have reached a conclusion that the earliest we could possibly be able to get . . . this case to you tonight would be midnight.  We don't think that is fair to you, to the defendant or to the state.  For that reason, our plan is to complete the proof tonight. We have one final witness to go. Then at the end of that, to break until 9:00 in the morning. Then in the morning you could get the arguments of counsel and the charge and the case would be turned over to you in the morning.  I think being realistic that is the best we can do to be fair to everybody. . . .

The petitioner, Thomas H. Pleasant, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to second degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and aggravated robbery, and he received a total effective sentence of eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the 1989 Sentencing Act is unconstitutional under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The habeas corpus court summarily denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The defendant, Brian Keith Stanley, was convicted of driving under the influence, first offense. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with ninety days to be served in confinement. After determining that the defendant had violated the implied consent law, the trial court revoked his driver's license for two years. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for driving under the influence. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Torian Dillard, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon and being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun, both Class E felonies. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive terms of forty years as a multiple offender for the attempted murder conviction and six years as a career offender for each of the Class E felony convictions, for an effective sentence of fifty-two years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the State excluded African-American venire members from his jury in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, the evidence was insufficient to sustain his attempted first degree murder conviction, and the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. Having reviewed the record and found no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Marlon Hayes, appeals the Tipton County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Hayes collaterally challenges his guilty pleas for first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery upon grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. After review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Appellant, Oscar C. Wells, proceeding pro se, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as being time barred. On appeal, Wells asserts that his petition was timely filed because he delivered the petition to the appropriate prison official within the requisite one-year limitation period as authorized by Supreme Court Rule 28. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as time barred because the petition was stamped “filed” by the Shelby County Criminal Court Clerk’s office outside the one-year period. Because these allegations present a factual dispute as to whether Wells’ petition was timely filed, we vacate the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for resolution of this issue.

The appellant, Charles Edward Wilkerson, was charged in a three count indictment with possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver, evading arrest, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Prior to trial, the appellant pled guilty to evading arrest and possession of drug paraphernalia. After a jury trial, the appellant was found guilty of criminal responsibility for the facilitation of the possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver, a Class C felony. The appellant received a total effective sentence of three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his facilitation conviction. After a review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a direct appeal as of right from a conviction on a jury verdict for aggravated robbery. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant raises four issues: (1) the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his car, (2) the trial court erred in allowing into evidence the preliminary hearing testimony of a police officer who was deceased at the time of trial, (3) the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty of aggravated robbery, and (4) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a search of his residence, Defendant, Raymond Griggs, was indicted on two counts.  Count one charged possession of a schedule II controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to deliver .5 grams or more, and count two charged Defendant with being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun. Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant. The trial court denied the motion. A jury trial was held and Defendant was convicted of count two, convicted felon in possession of a handgun. A mistrial was declared as to count one, presumably because the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict. Defendant filed a motion for new trial which the trial court subsequently denied. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the conviction of being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun, and (2) the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Isaac Jones, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief.  The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Joseph Granderson, was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. This Court affirmed the petitioner’s conviction and sentence on appeal. State v. Joseph Granderson, No. 02C01-9712-CR-00466, 1998 WL 506658 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Aug. 20, 1998), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Mar. 8, 1999). Subsequently, the supreme court denied permission to appeal. The petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on numerous grounds. Counsel was appointed and several amended petitions were filed. After hearing evidence on the petition over the course of several months, the post-conviction court entered an order granting post-conviction relief on the basis that trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to properly inform the petitioner of his potential sentence if convicted of first degree murder. The State appeals the post-conviction court’s decision. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner Derrick L. Brown appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to establish his entitlement to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

On May 15, 2004, the victim, Charles Lawuary, was shot and killed in Humboldt, Tennessee in an area known as “the crossing.” A bystander was grazed by a bullet. The defendant, James L. Miller, and a co-defendant, Charles Lewis, were later arrested for the shootings. The Gibson County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for criminal responsibility for first degree murder and criminal responsibility for aggravated assault. Following a jury trial held on March 21, 2005, the jury found the defendant guilty as charged. The defendant was sentenced to life in prison for the murder conviction and six years for the aggravated assault conviction, to be served concurrently with the life sentence. The defendant appeals, arguing that, the State failed to prove the venue of the crime, the trial judge failed to charge the natural and probable consequences rule to the jury, there was juror misconduct when one juror felt she was coerced into voting for a guilty verdict, and there was insufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction. We have reviewed the record in this case and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Frank Peake, III, was convicted of aggravated assault, and the trial court sentenced him to prison for six years as a Range II offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it allowed a witness to testify about a prior threat made by the Defendant; (2) the trial court erred by failing to provide a jury instruction on circumstantial evidence and failing to provide a limiting jury instruction as to the prior threat made by the Defendant; and (3) the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner of two counts of first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of attempted first degree murder. The Petitioner was sentenced to life plus an additional fifty years. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that, because his trial counsel was ineffective, the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Allan Joseph Robles, was convicted by a Henry County jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced as a 100% violent offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction and fined $10,000. On appeal, he argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in not granting his motion for acquittal; and (3) the trial court erred in not charging a lesser-included offense. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Courtney Catrell Goss, appeals t 1 he Fayette County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to rape and the resulting twelve-year sentence.  He contends that he did not plead guilty voluntarily and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Warren County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Michael Kenneth Sisco, of driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days with sixty days to serve in confinement and the balance on probation. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient, that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of a rebuttal witness, and that the trial court erred in sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Donnie W. Foulks, appeals the judgment of the Greene County Criminal Court denying post-conviction relief. On appeal, Foulks argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel and that his sentencing violated the constitutional mandate of Blakely v. Washington. After review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Solomon Galloway, of two counts of aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the appellant as a Range I, standard offender to eight years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentence in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), which resulted in his being improperly classified as a standard offender instead of an especially mitigated offender. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Edward Coleman, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, and he received a sentence of life imprisonment. Thereafter, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Clarence David Schreane, of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment for the murder and sixty years for the robbery, ordering the defendant to serve his sixty-year sentence as a career offender consecutively for an effective sentence of life plus sixty years. The defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred in failing to suppress his confession. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tony Samuel, was convicted by a Lauderdale County jury of burglary and Class E felony theft. He received an effective seven-year sentence for these convictions. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) his sentences are excessive. After a review of the record, the judgments of conviction and resulting sentences are affirmed.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Abbigail Morton, was convicted of one count of attempted premeditated first degree murder and one count of conspiracy to commit premeditated first degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to concurrent sentences of twenty years for each conviction. In her appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the testimony of the co-defendant, Robert Hunter, was insufficiently corroborated to support Defendant’s convictions; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions; (3) the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of solicitation of first degree murder; and (4) the trial court erred in not sentencing Defendant as an especially mitigated offender. After a thorough review of
the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

On May 31, 2002, following a jury trial, Defendant, Tony Allan Phipps, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. Defendant was sentenced to serve eleven (11) years in the Department of Correction and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of five thousand ($5000.00) dollars. Defendant filed a motion for new trial which the trial court granted on October 14, 2002. On August 11, 2004, following another jury trial, Defendant was convicted of reckless homicide, ordered to pay a five thousand ($5000.00) dollar fine and sentenced to ten (10) years in the Department of Correction. Defendant appeals his conviction for reckless homicide. In his appeal, Defendant argues (1) the evidence in the record is insufficient to sustain a conviction for reckless homicide; (2) the evidence in the record does not support the jury verdict; (3) the jury verdict is contrary to law and evidence; and (4) the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant did not act in self-defense as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-611(b) (2003). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.