APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Jerry Phillip Haley, was convicted of aggravated burglary, theft over $1000, and assault. The trial court imposed Range II sentences of six years for the aggravated burglary, four years for the theft, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the assault. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of six years. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evidence and (2) that the trial court erred by failing to provide a jury instruction on facilitation of a felony. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant, Marcus D. Hayes, was indicted for premeditated first degree murder. He was convicted by a jury of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder. He was sentenced to twenty-three years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the admissibility of his statements to police and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Paul Wilson, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that prior judgments used to enhance his 2005 aggravated robbery sentence were illegal and void. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The petitioner, Eddie Wayne Gordon, appeals the Gibson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to first degree murder and resulting life sentence. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment that the petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel. However, because the post-conviction court failed to address the issue of whether the petitioner pled guilty voluntarily, the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The State appeals the suppression of evidence by the Hardin County Circuit Court. Following his arrest for driving while intoxicated, the Defendant, Randy C. White, stated to the arresting officer that he was the driver of the vehicle. The trial court found that the statement was obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona. After review we conclude that, although the statement was made while White was in custody, it was not made in response to police interrogation. Thus, Miranda warnings were not required. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s suppression of the statement and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Leroy Brimmer, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. In this appeal, the appellant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, James Westbrook, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence and for failing to call his codefendant as a witness at trial. Following our review, we conclude that the petitioner has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating either a deficiency in counsel’s performance or resulting prejudice to his case. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition.

My colleagues conclude that, under the facts of this case, the appellant’s act of urinating in the patrol car constitutes vandalism. I respectfully disagree.

The appellant, Shane M. McAnally, was convicted by a Bedford County jury of misdemeanor vandalism and was sentenced to a term of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with sixty days to be served in confinement. On appeal, McAnally raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; and (2) whether the sixty-day period of confinement is excessive. Following review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support McAnally’s conviction for vandalism, and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, John W. Casey, pled guilty in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court to possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell and possession of drug paraphernalia. He received a total effective sentence of eight years. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and his pleas were not knowing and voluntary. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, James C. Johnson, was convicted of rape of a child, and he received a twenty-year sentence. Subsequently, he filed for habeas corpus relief, alleging that the Tennessee Department of Correction impermissibly changed his release eligibility from thirty percent to one hundred percent, his sentence is void because of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and his sentence is void because the State failed to file a notice of enhancement prior to trial.  The habeas corpus court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Rickie Boyd, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

The community corrections sentence of the defendant, Kathy E. Cooper, was revoked after a new law violation of driving under the influence, and the trial court resentenced her to serve twelve years, the maximum in the range, in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court inappropriately enhanced her sentence and revoked her community corrections sentence. Upon review, we conclude that facts which develop between the time a defendant is sentenced to community corrections and the time the sentence is revoked may be considered in applying enhancement factors and increasing a sentence.

The defendant in this case was indicted on a single count of felony murder committed during the perpetration of arson. Under the felony murder rule, criminal liability for the murder is imposed based on the culpability required for the underlying felony without separate proof of any culpability with regard to the death. As our supreme court stated in Farmer v. State, 296 S.W.2d 879, 883 (Tenn. 1956), “it is not necessary that the State prove an intention to kill, or that it was committed willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly and with malice aforethought.”

The defendant, Thomas Richardson, Jr., appeals his conviction for first degree felony murder. In support of his appeal, the defendant presents three issues: (a) The evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; (b) Two photographs of the victim were improperly admitted; and (c) Hearsay statements were improperly admitted.

The Appellant, David Jones Milton, was convicted by a Carroll County jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to a term of fifteen years in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, Milton raises the single issue of whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. After review of the record, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

The Appellant, Donald Franks, appeals the Hardin County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Franks argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. After review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Kevin Young, was convicted of one count of possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to sell and one count of possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to deliver. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a) (2003). The trial court merged the two counts into a single conviction and sentenced the defendant, a career offender, to six years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and (2) that the trial court provided an incorrect supplemental instruction to the jury. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Coy Pierce, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, a Class E felony, and driving on a revoked license, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court imposed sentences of two years for the DUI and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the driving on a revoked license. The trial court ordered that the sentences be served concurrently and that the defendant serve seven months in confinement with the remainder to be served on community corrections. On appeal, the defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial (1) as a result of prosecutorial misconduct and (2) as a result of the trial court’s ruling that the defendant could not enter a photograph into evidence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in part but remand the driving on a revoked license case for entry of a corrected judgment.

The Appellant, Joe Mac Pearson, was convicted by a Marshall County jury of the sale and delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance and the sale and delivery of a Schedule III controlled substance. As a result of these convictions, Pearson received an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Pearson argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient. We remand, however, for merger of offenses and for entry of corrected judgments of conviction.

The Petitioner, Ronald McCray, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner failed to file a timely notice of appeal and this Court cannot conclude that justice requires waiver of this jurisdictional requirement.  Accordingly, the above-captioned appeal is dismissed.

A Madison County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Charles Ivory Smith, of burglary and evading arrest. The trial court imposed a twelve-year sentence for burglaryand an eleven-month and twenty-nine-day sentence for evading arrest and ordered the defendant to serve the sentences consecutively as a career offender in the Department of Correction. The defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Kenneth W. Thompson, Sr., pled nolo contendere to one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to five years, to be served at thirty percent. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his request for alternative sentencing. Finding that there exists no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, LaQuenton Monger, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the Petitioner has failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking habeas corpus relief, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the petition. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

The record reflects that the trial began on the morning of December 16, 2004, and testimony was heard through 9:00 p.m. that evening. Closing arguments and jury instructions followed.  Deliberations began at 11:20 p.m. The jury returned a verdict at 3:35 a.m. the next morning. Just before examination of the final witness, the trial court announced as follows:

In consultation with the attorneys, we have reached a conclusion that the earliest we could possibly be able to get . . . this case to you tonight would be midnight.  We don't think that is fair to you, to the defendant or to the state.  For that reason, our plan is to complete the proof tonight. We have one final witness to go. Then at the end of that, to break until 9:00 in the morning. Then in the morning you could get the arguments of counsel and the charge and the case would be turned over to you in the morning.  I think being realistic that is the best we can do to be fair to everybody. . . .