APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Appellant, Mozella Newson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. Following a transfer hearing, Newson, who was fourteen years old at the time of the crimes, was transferred from the juvenile court to the Shelby County Criminal Court to be tried as an adult. She subsequently pled guilty to carjacking, especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, for which she received an effective fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, Newson argues that she was denied her Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that the attorney representing her during the transfer hearing was ineffective by: (1) failing to advise the juvenile court of Newson’s age; (2) failing to challenge the transfer order which stated that Newson was sixteen years old or older; (3) failing to present any favorable evidence at the transfer hearing which might have prevented her transfer; (4) failing to object to the identification procedure employed at the transfer hearing; and (5) failing to advise Newson of her right to appeal the juvenile court’s decision to transfer the case. After review, we conclude: (1) Newson’s subsequent guilty pleas waived all issues regarding guilt; and (2) Newson’s failure to prepare a complete record precludes review of her allegations of  deficient performance which resulted in her transfer to the criminal court. Accordingly, the  judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The petitioner, William B. Thurlby, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of both pre-arrest and trial counsel, the State withheld evidence and failed to make an election of offenses, his due process rights were violated, and the cumulative effect of the various errors resulted in the denial of his right to a fair trial. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.

Following a jury trial, defendant, William Thomas Branch, was found guilty of the offense of rape of a child, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to fifteen years. In his appeal, defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, and that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Dennis Allen Rollison, was convicted by a Montgomery County Criminal Court jury of sexual battery, a Class E felony, and was sentenced to one year to be served on probation. He appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient because it fails to show he touched the victim inappropriately. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, James Fenton, was convicted of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty years. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the trial court erred by disallowing questions about the number of times the victim had previously been robbed; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction; (3) that the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; (4) that the trial court failed to appropriately exercise its role as thirteenth juror; and (5) that the trial court erred by failing to consider as a mitigating factor the defendant's lack of education. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Julius E. Gunn, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant was indicted for the first degree premeditated murder of Danquel R. Batey. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, to ten years confinement. In his appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the length of his sentence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Fred Johnson, was convicted by a Campbell County jury of five counts of sexual battery, a Class E felony, and five counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to one year for each sexual battery and eight years for each aggravated sexual battery. He received a total effective sentence of twenty-seven years, twenty-four years at 100% as a violent offender for the aggravated sexual battery counts and three years at 30% as a Range I, standard offender for the sexual battery counts. On appeal, he argues: (1) the trial court erred in failing to charge lesser-included offenses; (2) the jury did not understand or follow the charge of the trial court; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated sexual battery. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments to reflect that Counts 3 and 5 are consecutive to Counts 1 and 2.

The defendant, Louis Bernard Williams, was convicted by a Madison County jury of possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class E felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia and evading arrest, both Class A misdemeanors. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to four years in the Department of Correction for the felony conviction and to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail for each of the misdemeanor convictions and ordered that the evading arrest sentence be served consecutively to the sentence for possession of marijuana. The trial court also ordered that the defendant serve the sentences consecutively to his eight-year sentence for a felony for which he had been on probation at the time of the instant offenses and consecutively to a nine-year sentence he had received for additional offenses he committed while out on bond in the instant case. The defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in excluding the hearsay statement of a man who claimed ownership of the drugs; and (3) whether the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial when a law enforcement officer referred at trial to the defendant’s having been on probation at the time of the offenses. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court

Following a bench trial, the defendant, Derrick Lamouns Jones, was convicted of felony DUI, a Class E felony, and violation of the implied consent law and was sentenced to the Department of Correction for two years as a Range I, standard offender, and to the county jail for eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. The sentences were run concurrently with the exception of five days to be served in the county jail. In addition, the defendant’s driver’s license was suspended for five years and he was fined $6000. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and his motion to exclude a prior DUI conviction; the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and the trial court improperly sentenced him to an enhanced sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Thaddeus Johnson, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree murder. He received a sentence of life imprisonment for his murder conviction and a consecutive twenty-five year sentence for his attempted murder conviction. On appeal, the defendant presents the following issues for review: (1) the trial court committed plain error by admitting hearsay statements from non-testifying co-defendants; (2) the evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree murder; and (3) the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing. Upon review of the record, parties’ briefs and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Jerry Jerome Primm, of second degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and felony murder, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty years. Aggrieved that his convictions were unsupported by sufficient evidence and that his sentences were erroneous, he now brings the instant appeal. We affirm.

Millard E. Smith, the defendant, was indicted and stood trial on one count of aggravated rape. A jury convicted the defendant on the lesser included offense of rape (Class B felony). The defendant was sentenced as a repeat, violent offender to life without parole. He now appeals his conviction, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to convict. After review, we conclude the evidence was overwhelming and affirm the judgment of conviction.

The appellant, James Castile, was indicted with charges of manufacturing methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell, possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and criminal impersonation. Prior to trial, the trial court denied a motion to suppress the evidence which alleged that the evidence seized as a result of a search of his person and a search of his hotel room was unconstitutional. After a jury trial, the appellant was found guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver, simple possession of methamphetamine and criminal impersonation. At a sentencing hearing, the trial court disregarded the simple possession conviction as a lesser-included offense of the manufacturing and possession counts and sentenced the appellant as a Range II offender to an eight-year sentence for manufacturing methamphetamine, an eight-year sentence for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and a six-month probationary sentence for criminal impersonation. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently to each other, but consecutively to a previously imposed sentence for which the appellant was on probation from the State of Kentucky. After the denial of a motion for new trial, the appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, the appellant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict; (3) the trial court erred by sentencing the appellant as a Range II offender and; (4) the trial court erred by ordering the sentence to be served consecutively to the Kentucky sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Reese L. Smith Jr., was convicted of two counts of impersonating a licensed professional, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of two years for each count to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant seemingly contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Finding that there exists no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Robin Davis, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Donald Eugene Fowlkes, appeals from the order of the trial court revoking his probation and ordering that his eight-year sentence be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering that his sentence be served in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In December of 2004, the petitioner pled guilty to attempted especially aggravated robbery and aggravated robbery. On May 25, 2005, the petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. By order on June 13, 2005, the post-conviction court denied the petition without appointing counsel or holding an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner appeals arguing that the post-conviction court should have held a hearing. The State concedes that the petitioner is correct. We agree as well. We reverse the decision of the post-conviction court and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

The petitioner pled guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual battery. He later filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court held a hearing on May 8, 2003. The court then entered an order on May 9, 2003 denying the petition. The petitioner filed a pro se notice of appeal over a year and a month later on June 17, 2004. We now dismiss the petitioner’s appeal because the notice of appeal was filed outside of the thirty days required under Rule 4 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The defendant, Kenneth Lyle Davis, appeals from the trial court’s order revoking his probation and reinstating his original sentence of two years. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1985, the Petitioner, Sedley Alley, was convicted of aggravated rape, kidnapping, and first degree murder. For the capital crime of first degree murder, the jury imposed the sentence of death.  Petitioner Alley’s execution was scheduled for May 17, 2006; however, on May 16, 2006, the
Governor, upon recommendation of the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole, granted a fifteenday reprieve to allow the Petitioner the opportunity to petition the trial court for DNA testing of “those additional items that were not included in his 2004 petition.” On May 19, 2006, Petitioner Alley filed a petition to compel testing of evidence under the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The post-conviction court denied the petition on May 31, 2006. Our supreme court, on June 2, 2006, rescheduled Petitioner Alley’s execution for June 28, 2006. See State v. Sedley Alley, No. M1991-00019-SC-DPE-DD (Tenn., at Nashville, June 2, 2006) (order). The Petitioner sought and was granted expedited review by this Court. Upon review of the record and the responses by both parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, James B. Sanders, appeals from his conviction for third offense of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (D.U.I.) and from the resulting sentence. On appeal, the defendant claims that a prior facially valid judgment of conviction for a previous D.U.I. was insufficient to sustain enhanced punishment when the written waiver of counsel was not introduced and the defendant testified that he was not represented by counsel. We conclude the prior certified judgment of conviction is facially valid and is not subject to collateral attack in this proceeding. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Rita Lynn Neff, appeals from the order of the trial court revoking her probation and ordering that her effective eight-year sentence be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her probation and ordering that her sentences be served in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Charles Manning, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, attacking his two convictions for second degree murder. Following a hearing, the trial court denied any relief to Petitioner. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Kimberly Greene, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus on March 1, 2005, and counsel was subsequently appointed to assist Petitioner. A hearing was held on June 1, 2005, and, after consulting with her counsel, Petitioner voluntarily withdrew her petition. Thereafter Petitioner filed a pro se notice of appeal. Upon a review of the record in this case, we conclude that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.