APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Latonya Taylor, was convicted by a jury of three counts of premeditated first degree murder and three counts of felony first degree murder. The latter three counts were merged with the premeditated first degree murders. The defendant was also convicted of especially aggravated robbery (Class A felony) and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping (Class A felony). An effective sentence of life without parole plus twenty years was imposed. She appeals the convictions. From our review of the record we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts, and there being no other reversible errors, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.

The defendant, Barry C. Melton, was convicted of facilitating the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class D felony, and possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, Class A misdemeanors. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to two years for the felony conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each of the misdemeanor convictions, for a total effective sentence of two years, with sixty days to be served in confinement and the balance on probation. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his facilitation conviction and that he should have been granted full probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent from the result reached by the majority, and would affirm the judgment of the trial court. In 1978, based upon the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S. Ct. 2141 (1978), and Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S. Ct. 2151 (1978), the Tennessee Supreme Court held in State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978), that the thirteenth juror rule in Tennessee must be abolished, because it violated principles of double jeopardy.

The Hardin County grand jury returned two indictments¹ against the Defendant, Gregory O. Cherry, charging him with thirteen drug offenses. In separate plea agreements, the Defendant pled guilty to five offenses: (1) possession with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell .5 grams or more of cocaine, (2) simple possession of marijuana, (3) possession of drug paraphernalia, (4) selling a Schedule IV controlled substance, and (5) delivering less than .5 grams of cocaine. The plea agreements provided that the Defendant would receive an effective sentence of ten years with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the Defendant’s ten-year sentence be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying an alternative sentence. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the Hardin County Circuit Court.

A Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Kevin Hunter Biggs, of one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eight years in the Department of Correction to be served at one hundred percent as a child rapist.¹  The defendant appeals, claiming (1) that the successor trial judge was not qualified to act as thirteenth juror; (2) that the trial court erred in failing to include attempted aggravated sexual battery as a lesser included offense; (3) that the state withheld exculpatory information from the defendant in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963) and Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure; (4) that the designated trial judge erred in concluding the defendant’s newly discovered evidence was not likely to change the result of the trial; and (5) that the trial court erred in admitting irrelevant and highly prejudicial character and hearsay testimony. Concluding that the successor trial judge could not act as the thirteenth juror, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the
case for a new trial.

Henry Zillon Felts, the defendant, was convicted of attempted first degree murder (Class A felony) and aggravated burglary (Class C felony). The defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-one years at 100% in the Department of Correction. He now appeals as of right his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of conviction.

The defendant, Antonio Arnold, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of felony murder, voluntary manslaughter, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and four evidentiary rulings of the trial court. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, James Timothy Taylor, was convicted in a Robertson County bench trial of one count of passing a forged check, a Class E felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a copy of the original check. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Andre Smith, appeals the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion. The defendant pled guilty to theft over $1000, a Class D felony. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s request for judicial diversion and ordered the defendant to serve his sentence on supervised probation. After careful review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion.

The petitioner, Octavian Demetrius Reeves, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder and resulting sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, the petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to cross-examine witnesses thoroughly and failed to file a motion for a change of venue. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner, Danny L. Fish, Jr., appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for sexual battery by an authority figure, a Class C felony, and his resulting sentence of five years in the Department of Correction. The petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, rendering his no contest plea unknowing and involuntary. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Tenica Dickerson, and her sister, Latamia Dickerson, were involved in an argument at a Waffle House in Jackson. She was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct. A jury convicted her for the charged offense. The trial court sentenced her to thirty days to be served at seventy-five percent. The defendant appeals the trial court’s judgment arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction. We have reviewed the record and find that there is sufficient evidence. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Jeffrey Owen Walters, was convicted by a Marshall County jury of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-three years and nine months in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he has raised two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; and (2) whether the State failed to furnish Walters all of his in-custody statements in violation of Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16. Following review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict, and, although we find that the State violated the discovery rule, we conclude that the error is harmless. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

The Defendant, Timothy R. Bouton, pled guilty to vehicular manslaughter and reckless endangerment and was sentenced to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred: (1) when it failed to have him execute an ex post factor waiver with regard to the 2005 Sentencing Act; (2) in its application of enhancement and mitigating factors; and (3) when it denied him probation or other alternative sentencing. After reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court erred when it failed to have the Defendant execute an ex post factor waiver with regard to the 2005 Sentencing Act. Therefore, we reverse the case and remand it for a new sentencing hearing.

The Appellant, Jackie Glenn Allen, appeals the sentencing decision of the Lincoln County Circuit Court. Allen pled guilty to the crimes of rape and incest and was subsequently sentenced to concurrent sentences of ten years and six months for the rape and five years for the incest. After review of the record, we affirm the sentences as imposed.

The defendants, Andrew L. Collins and Terrance D. Grizzard, were each convicted of one count of aggravated assault. In addition, the defendant Collins pled guilty to one count of domestic assault and the defendant Grizzard was convicted of one count of reckless endangerment. Collins received an effective sentence of six years and Grizzard received an effective sentence of eight years. In this appeal, the defendant Collins asserts (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault and (2) that the trial court erred by providing a jury instruction on criminal responsibility. The defendant Grizzard asserts (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and (2) that his sentence is illegal. Because the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant Collins's conviction for aggravated assault, that conviction must be reversed and dismissed. Further, because the record establishes that there are clerical errors on the judgment forms relating to the defendant Grizzard, the cause must be remanded to the trial court for entry of corrected judgments. Otherwise, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Defendant, Patty D. Layland Smith, pled guilty to two counts of failure to appear, each offense being a Class E felony. Defendant was sentenced as a career offender and ordered to serve six years for each offense, to be served concurrently, with a sixty (60) percent release eligibility date. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied probation and any other form of alternative sentencing. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that she was not eligible for probation or alternative sentencing. After a full review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Yvonne B. Ragland, was convicted on her guilty plea to Class D felony theft in the Knox County Criminal Court. The trial court denied her bid for judicial diversion and sentenced her to three years on probation. She appeals the denial of judicial diversion and the length of sentence imposed. Because the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion, we reverse and remand the case with instructions for the trial court to enter an order placing the defendant on judicial diversion with appropriate conditions.

The Defendant, Shrone M. Hill, pled guilty to five counts of aggravated burglary, and the trial court sentenced him, as a Range I offender, to an effective sentence of eighteen years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it sentenced him to the maximum of six years for each count; and (2) the trial court erred when it ordered two of the five sentences to run consecutively to each other and consecutively to the three concurrent sentences. Finding that there exists no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Charles Hall, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of aggravated robbery. For these offenses, the defendant was sentenced as a repeat violent offender to consecutive sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court erred in consolidating the indictments for trial; (2) the trial court erred in sentencing him under the Repeat Violent Offender Act; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (4) the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for two separate trials.

The appellant, Calvin Austin, was charged with violating probation. After a hearing in which the trial court revoked the appellant’s probation solely on the fact that the appellant received a new arrest, the appellant appealed. Because the trial court improperly revoked the appellant’s probation without a finding that the revocation was based on a preponderance of the evidence, we reverse the revocation of probation and remand the case for a hearing in which the trial court determines whether the preponderance of the evidence justifies a revocation.

The petitioner, Billy Jackson Coffelt, was convicted in 1983 of assault with intent to commit first degree murder and assault with intent to commit robbery with a deadly weapon. The trial court imposed a sentence of life for the conviction of assault with intent to commit first degree murder and a sentence of not less than ten and not more than twenty-one years for the conviction of assault with intent to commit robbery. There was no direct appeal. After seventeen years of protracted litigation, the post-conviction court granted the petitioner a delayed appeal of his convictions. At the same time, the post-conviction court denied the remaining claims in the petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner filed separate notices of appeal in each case. The cases were later consolidated by this court upon motion of the petitioner. The single issue presented in the petitioner's delayed appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions. In his appeal of the denial of his post-conviction petition, the petitioner asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Because the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, the judgments of conviction as to the delayed appeal are affirmed; however, because the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial, the judgment of the post-conviction court denying relief must be reversed, the convictions vacated, and the cause remanded for a new trial.

The defendants, Jose Rodriguez and Eladio Caballero Sanchez, were convicted of conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(j)(13) (2003). The trial court sentenced each defendant to twenty years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant Rodriguez asserts (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his alleged prior bad acts in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (3) that the trial court erred by permitting a state witness to give improper opinion testimony; and (4) that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a map created by a state witness. The defendant Sanchez asserts (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his alleged prior bad acts in violation of Rule 404(b); (3) that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a document that was not provided to the defense prior to trial; (4) that the trial court erred by permitting a state witness to give improper opinion testimony; and (5) that the trial court erred by admitting irrelevant evidence regarding his ownership of property in Mexico. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This is a direct appeal as of right upon a certified question of law. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2).  The Defendants, Ricky Shackles and Carrie Anderson, were both convicted of simple possession of a controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor, following their entry of a guilty plea. Defendant Shackles received eleven months and twenty-nine days on probation, and Defendant Anderson received eleven months and twenty-nine days on judicial diversion. On appeal, the Defendants claim, pursuant to their reserved certified question, that as occupants of a parked car in a privately owned parking lot, they had a reasonable expectation of privacy which rendered the warrantless search of their car unconstitutional. Because the certified question of law is not dispositive of the Defendants’ case, we dismiss this appeal.

The defendant, Donnie Joe Hensley, appeals from his Greene County Criminal Court jury conviction of first degree murder. He claims on appeal that the trial court erred (1) in failing to dismiss the indictment because the juvenile court had transferred his case to criminal court without appointing a guardian ad litem, (2) in refusing to remand to juvenile court because a prosecution witness had lied in the juvenile court transfer hearing, and (3) in refusing to extend the plea cut-off date until the defendant attained his 18th birthday. The defendant also claims that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction of premeditated first degree murder. We find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the criminal court.