APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Latonya Yvonne Taylor, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of aggravated  robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of kidnapping. For these convictions, the Defendant received an effective twenty-three-year sentence in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress her statement given to the police; (2) whether the trial court improperly limited the scope of the Defendant’s mother’s testimony; (3) whether theevidence is sufficient to support her conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping; and (4) whether the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, RichardBarrom,was convicted of assault by causing extremely offensive or provocative physical contact, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court deferred sentencing, placed the defendant on diversion for eleven months, twenty-nine days, and ordered him to perform thirty hours of community service work and complete an anger management program.  On appeal, he argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in overruling his objection to hearsay testimony; (3) the trial court improperly removed a juror based on race; and (4) his conviction was barred by prior jeopardy. Additionally, the State argues that the trial court erred by granting judicial diversion. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In the latter half of 2001, the defendant, Bobby Ray Johnson, who was living in Coffee County, convinced his girlfriend to engage in fellatio on two occasions with the minor victim, while the defendant watched and videotaped the encounters. The defendant was indicted for two counts of rape of a child. The defendant was convicted on both counts by a Coffee County jury. The trial court sentenced the defendant to two consecutive sentences of twenty years each to be served at 100% as a child rapist. The defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in ordering his sentences to be served consecutively. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Bobby Gene Walker, Jr., appeals a certified question of law regarding a police officer’s stop of him which resulted in his arrest for driving under the influence and violating the implied consent law. Because we agree with the Circuit Court for Blount County that reasonable suspicion supported by specific and articulable facts existed for the stop, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Robert J. Wrigglesworth, Jr., previously convicted in Texas for the offense of indecency with a child by contact, was indicted for violating Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-211(c) because of his residing at an address where a minor child also resided. He offered to stipulate that he was a sex offender as covered by this statute. The trial court concluded that the State was required to accept this stipulation and thus barred from proving that the defendant was a convicted sex offender or why it was unlawful for him to live in the same residence as a minor. The State filed a Rule 9 appeal. Following our review, we reverse the order of the trial court.

The petitioner, Terry Jamar Norris, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.

Williamson County- The defendant, William Earl Cherry, was indicted for three counts of aggravated assault and three counts of reckless endangerment. He filed an application for pretrial diversion, and the State denied his request. He then filed a petition for writ of certiorari, and the trial court ordered that the State enter into a memorandum of understanding. The State filed a Rule 9 appeal. Following our review, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Jermaine Scruggs, pled guilty to driving under the influence, first offense, a Class A misdemeanor; reckless driving, a Class B misdemeanor; and driving without a license, a Class C misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10-401, -403, -205, 50-351 (2003). The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days and a $350.00 fine for driving under the influence, first offense; six months and a $100.00 fine for reckless driving; and thirty days and a $50.00 fine for driving without a license, each at a seventy-five percent service rate. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to an earlier five-year sentence for tampering with evidence. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by ordering his sentences for the three misdemeanor convictions to be served consecutively to his prior felony sentence. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The appellant, Markus K. Hartley, was indicted by the Williamson County Grand Jury for driving under the influence, fourth offense. The appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the police did not have probable cause to stop his vehicle. The trial court denied the motion to suppress the evidence. Subsequently, the appellant pled guilty to driving under the influence, second offense, but reserved a certified question of law to determine whether the trial court properly ruled on the motion to suppress. Because the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Because I conclude the defendant’s due process rights were violated by the introduction of unreliable pretrial identification evidence, I respectfully dissent.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Corey Biggs, was convicted of sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, and was sentenced as a multiple offender to eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by not suppressing his out-of-court identification by a police officer.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Christopher Busby, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Shaune Woolen, appeals from the circuit court’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review of the parties’ briefs and applicable law, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Willie L. Pegues, who is serving a sentence of life imprisonment for first degree felony murder, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

The Defendant, Frederick D. Deberry, appeals from an order of the trial court dismissing his “motion for new trial.” The trial court dismissed the pleading because it “was not timely filed, the issue has previously been adjudicated in this matter and the Motion for New Trial is not well-taken.” We affirm the order of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Defendant, Casey Watson, entered a plea of guilty to one count of possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony; one count of possession of dihydrocodeinone with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class D felony; one count of possession of more than one-half ounce but less than ten pounds of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class E felony; one count of unlawful possession of a weapon with intent to employ it in the commission of an offense, a Class E felony; and one count of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent sentences of eight years for his Class B felony conviction, two years for his Class D felony conviction and for each of his Class E felony convictions, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for his misdemeanor conviction, for an effective sentence of eight years. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences in split confinement, with probation after serving ninety days in confinement. As a condition of his plea agreement, Defendant reserved a certified question of law regarding the validity of a search warrant. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Raymon Haymon, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  On appeal, he raises thirteen issues regarding claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and the violation of certain constitutional rights. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, including the petitioner’s reply brief, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Jon Douglas Hall, appeals the dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. In this appeal, he alleges that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his petition without a hearing and that the judgment of conviction is void because the trial court lacked jurisdiction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Michael E. Bunting, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine for resale, and he subsequently pled guilty to felony failure to appear. Following a joint sentencing hearing for these two convictions, the trial court imposed an effective twenty-one-year sentence as a Range III, persistent offender to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his cocaine possession conviction, and (2) a sentence of community corrections was appropriate, and his sentences were improperly enhanced in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). After a review of the record, the judgments of conviction and resulting sentences are affirmed.

The defendant, Jermaine Hughey, was convicted of four counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and four counts of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to eleven years for each aggravated robbery conviction and five years for each attempted aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court ordered (1) that in Case No. 03-00283, the three attempted aggravated robbery sentences be served concurrently to each other and consecutively to the aggravated robbery sentence, for a total sentence of sixteen years; (2) that in Case No. 03-00284, the three aggravated robbery and one attempted robbery sentences be served concurrently to each other, for a total sentence of eleven years; and (3) that the sentences in Case No. 03-00284 be served consecutively to the sentences in Case No. 03-00283, for an effective sentence of twenty-seven years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals claiming: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, (2) that the trial court erred in allowing the interpreter to participate in the trial, (3) that the trial court erred in allowing a witness’s testimony and in not allowing the defendant to cross-examine witnesses about their immigrant status, (4) that the prosecutor made improper comments about the defendant’s right to testify, (5) that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury on lesser included offenses, and (6) that the trial court erred in sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Henry A. Edmondson, Jr., of carjacking, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to twenty years to be served in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, (2) that the trial court erred in not granting his motion to suppress, (3) that the trial court erred in its instruction to the jury on possession, and (4) that the trial court erred in sentencing him. We conclude that although the trial court erred in charging the jury on the definition of possession, the error was harmless. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Timothy Thomas, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to adequately investigate the case or explain the ramifications of the plea agreement and that his guilty pleas were consequently unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Rashad K. Sanders, pled guilty to one count of introduction of marijuana into a penal institution, a Class C felony. The Sullivan County Criminal Court sentenced him to a four-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred in denying him alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Michael White, was convicted of five counts of rape and sentenced to fifty-five years in the Department of Correction. The defendant now appeals asserting that: (1) insufficient evidence was presented to support his convictions; and (2) the sentence imposed was excessive and contrary to law. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Joel Keener, was convicted of facilitation of the manufacture of methamphetamine, and the trial court sentenced him, as a Range II offender, to eight years in prison. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. Finding that there exists no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.