APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant was convicted of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a career offender to thirty years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to his current sentence. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred: (1) in denying his motion to suppress the evidence; (2) by allowing a law enforcement officer to testify as an expert witness and disallowing defense counsel to fully cross-examine the witness; (3) by not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of facilitation; (4) by not instructing the jury that evidence of mere association with others involved in criminal activity is insufficient to establish guilt; (5) in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and (6) in sentencing him as a career offender. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I join with the majority in affirming the defendant’s conviction but write separately for the reasons expressed below.

The Petitioner, Rafael Antonio Bush, was convicted of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault and received an effective twenty-two year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had not received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing, and this appeal ensued. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the jury be instructed about accomplice testimony. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a direct appeal from a conviction on a jury verdict of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), fourth or subsequent offense. The Defendant, William LarryLittles, filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a warrantless seizure, alleging the police did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct the investigatory stop that led to the seizure. The Defendant’s motion to suppress was denied. Following his conviction he was sentenced to eighteen months in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). This sentence was suspended, and he was ordered to serve 180 days in jail followed by supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant raises a single issue: that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, James C. Osborne, was convicted by a jury of rape, a Class B felony. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I offender to twelve years at 100%. He now appeals his conviction and sentence. After thorough review, we conclude that no reversible error is present. The judgment of conviction is hereby affirmed.

The defendant, Mark Edward Ellis, pled guilty to felony escape, a Class E felony. In exchange for his guilty plea, the defendant was sentenced to one year as a standard offender, which was to run consecutive to his prior sentences. On appeal, the defendant argues that the circuit court erred by denying his request for suspension of this sentence. Following our review of the parties’ briefs and applicable law, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

I concur in the reasoning and result reached in the majority opinion save in one area. I respectfully disagree with its conclusion that the defendant’s right to confrontation was forfeited by virtue of his wrongfully killing the victim. The majority opinion essentially holds that wrongfully causing the victim’s unavailability to testify at the defendant’s trial for murdering the victim forfeits the defendant’s right to confrontation, which allows all relevant statements by the victim to be admitted into evidence. I believe the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine should require that the defendant procure the absence of the declarant with the intent that the declarant not be a witness.

The defendant, Leslie A. Pryor, was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, one count of theft over $10,000, one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter, one count of felony evading arrest, one count of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, three counts of reckless endangerment, and one count of criminal impersonation. The trial court merged the reckless endangerment and attempted voluntary manslaughter convictions with the greater charge of aggravated assault, and the defendant was given an effective sentence of forty-two years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated assault. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Judge Brooks, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. In this appeal, the appellant claims (1) that the trial court improperly admitted the victim’s prior statements into evidence under the hearsay rule’s forfeiture by wrongdoing exception, Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), and in violation of the Confrontation Clause; (2) that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the appellant’s prior assault on the victim pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); and (3) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. While we conclude that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay into evidence, we conclude that the error was harmless and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Antonio Young, appeals from the order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Earnest Banks, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated burglary and sentenced to nine years in the Department of Correction as a Range II multiple offender. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Latonya Taylor, was convicted by a jury of three counts of premeditated first degree murder and three counts of felony first degree murder. The latter three counts were merged with the premeditated first degree murders. The defendant was also convicted of especially aggravated robbery (Class A felony) and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping (Class A felony). An effective sentence of life without parole plus twenty years was imposed. She appeals the convictions. From our review of the record we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts, and there being no other reversible errors, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.

The defendant, Barry C. Melton, was convicted of facilitating the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class D felony, and possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, Class A misdemeanors. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to two years for the felony conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each of the misdemeanor convictions, for a total effective sentence of two years, with sixty days to be served in confinement and the balance on probation. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his facilitation conviction and that he should have been granted full probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent from the result reached by the majority, and would affirm the judgment of the trial court. In 1978, based upon the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S. Ct. 2141 (1978), and Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S. Ct. 2151 (1978), the Tennessee Supreme Court held in State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978), that the thirteenth juror rule in Tennessee must be abolished, because it violated principles of double jeopardy.

The Hardin County grand jury returned two indictments¹ against the Defendant, Gregory O. Cherry, charging him with thirteen drug offenses. In separate plea agreements, the Defendant pled guilty to five offenses: (1) possession with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell .5 grams or more of cocaine, (2) simple possession of marijuana, (3) possession of drug paraphernalia, (4) selling a Schedule IV controlled substance, and (5) delivering less than .5 grams of cocaine. The plea agreements provided that the Defendant would receive an effective sentence of ten years with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the Defendant’s ten-year sentence be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying an alternative sentence. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the Hardin County Circuit Court.

A Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Kevin Hunter Biggs, of one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eight years in the Department of Correction to be served at one hundred percent as a child rapist.¹  The defendant appeals, claiming (1) that the successor trial judge was not qualified to act as thirteenth juror; (2) that the trial court erred in failing to include attempted aggravated sexual battery as a lesser included offense; (3) that the state withheld exculpatory information from the defendant in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963) and Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure; (4) that the designated trial judge erred in concluding the defendant’s newly discovered evidence was not likely to change the result of the trial; and (5) that the trial court erred in admitting irrelevant and highly prejudicial character and hearsay testimony. Concluding that the successor trial judge could not act as the thirteenth juror, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the
case for a new trial.

Henry Zillon Felts, the defendant, was convicted of attempted first degree murder (Class A felony) and aggravated burglary (Class C felony). The defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-one years at 100% in the Department of Correction. He now appeals as of right his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of conviction.

The defendant, Antonio Arnold, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of felony murder, voluntary manslaughter, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and four evidentiary rulings of the trial court. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, James Timothy Taylor, was convicted in a Robertson County bench trial of one count of passing a forged check, a Class E felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a copy of the original check. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Andre Smith, appeals the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion. The defendant pled guilty to theft over $1000, a Class D felony. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s request for judicial diversion and ordered the defendant to serve his sentence on supervised probation. After careful review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion.

The petitioner, Octavian Demetrius Reeves, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder and resulting sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, the petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to cross-examine witnesses thoroughly and failed to file a motion for a change of venue. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner, Danny L. Fish, Jr., appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for sexual battery by an authority figure, a Class C felony, and his resulting sentence of five years in the Department of Correction. The petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, rendering his no contest plea unknowing and involuntary. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Tenica Dickerson, and her sister, Latamia Dickerson, were involved in an argument at a Waffle House in Jackson. She was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct. A jury convicted her for the charged offense. The trial court sentenced her to thirty days to be served at seventy-five percent. The defendant appeals the trial court’s judgment arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction. We have reviewed the record and find that there is sufficient evidence. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Jeffrey Owen Walters, was convicted by a Marshall County jury of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-three years and nine months in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he has raised two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; and (2) whether the State failed to furnish Walters all of his in-custody statements in violation of Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16. Following review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict, and, although we find that the State violated the discovery rule, we conclude that the error is harmless. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

The Defendant, Timothy R. Bouton, pled guilty to vehicular manslaughter and reckless endangerment and was sentenced to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred: (1) when it failed to have him execute an ex post factor waiver with regard to the 2005 Sentencing Act; (2) in its application of enhancement and mitigating factors; and (3) when it denied him probation or other alternative sentencing. After reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court erred when it failed to have the Defendant execute an ex post factor waiver with regard to the 2005 Sentencing Act. Therefore, we reverse the case and remand it for a new sentencing hearing.