APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Pursuant to multiple indictments, Defendants Jevon Bryant, Keith Ezell and Torrez Talley were charged with fourteen counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and five counts of aggravated robbery.  Defendant Bryant was also charged with one count of felon in possession of a firearm.  Following a trial, the jury found Defendants Bryant and Ezell guilty on all counts. The jury found Defendant Talley guilty of ten counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and four counts of aggravated robbery. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Defendant Bryant to an effective sentence of 364 years, Defendant Ezell to an effective sentence of 198 years, and Defendant Talley to an effective sentence of 140 years. On appeal, the following issues are presented for review: (1) whether the trial court properly denied a motion to suppress physical evidence; (2) whether the trial court properly denied a motion for mistrial during jury selection; (3) whether the trial court properly found purposeful discrimination by the defendants in their exercise of peremptory challenges; (4) whether the trial court erred by failing to require the state prosecutor to elect facts supporting Defendant Bryant’s conviction for felonious possession of a handgun; (5) whether the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to rehabilitate the credibility of state witnesses; (6) whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial or provide curative instruction following an improper statement made by a state witness; (7) whether the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to bring in Defendant Ezell’s twin brother to rehabilitate a state witness’ pretrial misidentification; (8) whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial in response to the improper remarks made by the prosecutor during closing argument; (9) whether the trial court erred by refusing to permit counsel to review the jury instructions prior to charging the jury; (10) whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on reasonable doubt; (11) whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the defendant’s right not to testify; (12) whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on false imprisonment as a lesser-included offense of especially aggravated kidnapping; and (13) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the defendants. Because we conclude that no reversible error exists, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, the record reflects that the defendants’ especially aggravated kidnapping convictions were not properlymerged. Therefore, we remand for merger and entry of corrected judgments as to those convictions.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant, Candice Alene Peery, pled guilty to aggravated burglary and theft of property over $1,000. In return, she received an effective eight-year sentence as a Range II multiple offender with the manner of service of her sentence to be determined by the trial court. The court ordered the defendant to serve her sentence in confinement and she appealed, arguing that the court erred in denying an alternative sentence. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Michael Dewayne Mann, was convicted of second offense driving under the influence (DUI) and violation of the implied consent law. As a result, the appellant was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail, to be served on unsupervised probation after incarceration of ninety days. After the denial of a motion for new trial, this appeal ensued. The appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. Because the evidence was sufficient to sustain the appellant’s conviction for second offense driving under the influence and the appellant does not challenge his conviction for violation of the implied consent law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Faron Douglas Pierce, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Pierce was convicted of aggravated robbery by a Blount County jury and was sentenced to twenty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Pierce argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that trial counsel was deficient in: (1) failing to seek suppression of evidence at trial; (2) failing to adequately inform Pierce of his right to testify at trial; and (3) calling a witness which prejudiced the defense. After review, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

I agree that principles of double jeopardy would be offended upon the defendant’s retrial for second degree murder because the record does not support the trial court’s finding of manifest necessity and because the defendant, ostensibly at least, did not consent to the order of mistrial. I write this concurring opinion because this latter issue – the defendant’s lack of consent – gave me great pause.

The appellant, Marcell Carter, pled guilty to a violation of the bad check law, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-121. The trial court sentenced the appellant to four years to be served on Community Corrections. Subsequently, a warrant was filed against the appellant alleging a failure to abide by several conditions of his Community Corrections sentence. After a series of hearings, the trial court removed the appellant from Community Corrections and re-sentenced him to four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion. Because we determine that the trial court properly revoked the appellant’s Community Corrections sentence and resentenced the appellant, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Johnie Jefferson, appeals as of right from the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree murder conviction, for which he is serving a life sentence. The petitioner claims he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his attorney failed to investigate two witnesses properly and failed to consult with him prior to trial. We conclude no error exists, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Carolette Stephens, was indicted on one count of second degree murder. During the jury trial in May of 2005, the trial court sua sponte declared a mistrial over objection of both the State and the appellant. The case was immediately rescheduled for trial. The appellant sought a dismissal of the indictment, arguing that the retrial placed the appellant in double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the indictment, but permitted the appellant to seek an interlocutory appeal. This Court granted the interlocutory appeal. On appeal, the appellant presents the following issues: (1) whether the State provoked the trial court into granting a mistrial by eliciting testimony regarding an unconstitutional search warrant that had been suppressed by the trial court; (2) whether the trial court erred in granting a mistrial based on manifest necessity; and (3)
whether the appellant’s rights to protection against double jeopardy will be violated by a retrial for second degree murder. Because the trial court improperly declared a mistrial without a manifest necessity for doing so, the double jeopardy provisions of the federal and state constitutions prohibit a retrial of the appellant on the charge that is the subject of this appeal. The judgment of the trial court denying the appellant’s motion to dismiss is therefore reversed and the indictment dismissed.

The appellant, Christopher Kyle, also known as “Snap,” was convicted by  jury of second degree murder and theft of property. As a result, the trial court sentenced the appellant to twenty-three years as a violent offender for second degree murder and eleven months and twenty-nine days for theft of property. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder, that the trial court erred in instructing the juryon the theory of criminal responsibility and that his sentence is excessive.  For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Clyde Lee Blackmon, appeals as of right the Shelby County Criminal Court’s  denying his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2004 conviction of second degree murder, a Class A felony, for which he is serving a twenty-five-year sentence as a Range I, violent offender. The petitioner claims he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which rendered his guilty plea involuntary. We conclude no error exists, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Jimmy Ray Culberson, pled guilty to two counts of rape of a child and received concurrent fifteen-year sentences with 100% service on each count. In September 2003, petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that his plea was not knowing and voluntary and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition. In this appeal, petitioner maintains the trial court erred in denying his petition. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Terry M. Odom, was indicted on three counts of aggravated sexual battery. Pursuant to a plea agreement, petitioner pled guilty to one count and received an eight-year sentence at 100% while the two remaining counts were dismissed. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and after the appointment of counsel filed an amended petition. Following an evidentiary hearing on August 3, 2005, the trial court denied the petition. On appeal, petitioner claims the trial court erred in denying relief. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Ronald Eugene Mullins, was convicted by a jury of theft of property over one thousand dollars. The trial court ordered the appellant to serve a three-year sentence as a Range I standard offender. After the denial of a motion for new trial, the appellant filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. After a review of the record, we affirm.

The Appellant, Kalvin Rush, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery and sentenced to eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Rush raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. After review of the record, we find the evidence sufficient to support the verdict and affirm the judgment of conviction.

The Petitioner, Arthur Yancy, Jr., appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petition for postconviction relief is time-barred by the statute of limitations, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Petitioner, Ernest Lee Hill, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgments of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

Capital Petitioner, Farris Genner Morris, Jr., appeals as of right the judgment of the Madison County Circuit Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. In January 1997, the Petitioner was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of premeditated first-degree murder and one count of aggravated rape. The Petitioner was sentenced to death for the first degree murder of Erica Hurd.  For the remaining convictions, the Petitioner received consecutive sentences of life without the possibility of parole for the murder of Charles Ragland and twenty-five years incarceration for the aggravated rape of Angela Ragland. The Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal by the Tennessee Supreme Court. See State v. Morris, 24 S.W.3d 788 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1082 (2001). On February 6, 2001, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court appointed the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender to represent the Petitioner in the proceedings. An amended petition was filed on December 17, 2001.  An evidentiary hearing was conducted in April 2004. On January 18, 2005, the trial court entered an order denying the Petitioner post-conviction relief. On appeal to this Court, the Petitioner presents a number of claims that can be characterized in the following four broad categories for this Court’s review: (1) the denial of a fair post-conviction evidentiary hearing, (2) the denial of a fair sentencing hearing, (3) the ineffective assistance of counsel, and (4) the constitutionality of the imposition of a sentence of death. Following a thorough and exhaustive review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Jerry Anderson, appeals from the order of the trial court dismissing his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Ronald Clinton, was convicted of one count of the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, a Class A misdemeanor; one count of evading arrest, a Class E felony;  and one count of simple assault, a Class A misdemeanor. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor conviction, and six years as a Range III, career offender, for his felony conviction, and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively. Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his assault conviction, or the length or manner of service of his sentences. In his appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and felony evading arrest. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, John Liddell, was convicted of two counts of theft of property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor; one count of the aggravated assault of Robert Bolinger, a Class C felony; and one count of the aggravated assault of Cheffie Hurt, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of thirteen years as a Range III, persistent offender for each felony conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor conviction, for an effective sentence of thirteen years. Defendant does not appeal the length of his sentences or the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his theft convictions. In his appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his two convictions of aggravated assault. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Jerry Bell, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of possession of a deadly weapon with the intent to employ it in the commission of aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the State failed to prove his identity beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions but that the convictions for both aggravated robbery and possession of a deadly weapon violate double jeopardy protections. The Defendant’s conviction for possession of a deadly weapon is dismissed. The Defendant’s remaining convictions and sentences are affirmed.  We remand solely for the entry of an appropriate judgment consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Decarlos Rodgers, pled guilty to possession of cocaine in an amount greater than 0.5 grams with intent to sell and convicted felon in possession of a handgun. He was sentenced to twelve and two years, respectively, to be served concurrently as a Range II offender. As a condition of his guilty plea, the defendant reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding whether the indictments against him should have been dismissed under a theory of promissory estoppel. After review, we conclude that the questions are properly certified and that the trial court ruled correctly in denying the motion to dismiss.

The petitioner, Earl Ray Trotter, pled guilty in the Bedford County Circuit Court to attempted second degree murder, especially aggravated burglary, and especially aggravated robbery. He received a total effective sentence of twenty-five years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Billy James Matthews, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.  Matthews’ convictions stem from his guilty pleas to rape and robbery, for which he was sentenced to ten years and six years respectively. In this appeal, Matthews raises the following issue for our review: whether the evidence preponderates against the post-conviction court’s findings that he received the effective assistance of counsel. The State asserts that the post-conviction petition should be dismissed because it was filed outside the one-year post-conviction statute of limitations.  We agree and conclude that Matthews’ petition is barred by the statute of limitations. Dismissal of the post-conviction petition is affirmed.

The Appellant, Christopher S. Love, appeals his conviction by a Hickman County jury for sexual battery, a Class E felony. Love was indicted for the offenses of aggravated rape, reckless endangerment, and aggravated assault. Following a jury trial, he was acquitted of reckless endangerment and found guilty of the lesser included offenses of sexual battery and misdemeanor assault. He was subsequently sentenced to concurrent sentences of two years and eleven months and twenty-nine days. On appeal, he raises the single issue of whether it was proper for the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of sexual battery. After review, we conclude that the Appellant waived the issue by his failure to object to the inclusion of the instruction at trial. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction for sexual battery is affirmed.