APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Arthur Yancy, Jr., appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petition for postconviction relief is time-barred by the statute of limitations, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Petitioner, Ernest Lee Hill, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgments of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

Capital Petitioner, Farris Genner Morris, Jr., appeals as of right the judgment of the Madison County Circuit Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. In January 1997, the Petitioner was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of premeditated first-degree murder and one count of aggravated rape. The Petitioner was sentenced to death for the first degree murder of Erica Hurd.  For the remaining convictions, the Petitioner received consecutive sentences of life without the possibility of parole for the murder of Charles Ragland and twenty-five years incarceration for the aggravated rape of Angela Ragland. The Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal by the Tennessee Supreme Court. See State v. Morris, 24 S.W.3d 788 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1082 (2001). On February 6, 2001, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court appointed the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender to represent the Petitioner in the proceedings. An amended petition was filed on December 17, 2001.  An evidentiary hearing was conducted in April 2004. On January 18, 2005, the trial court entered an order denying the Petitioner post-conviction relief. On appeal to this Court, the Petitioner presents a number of claims that can be characterized in the following four broad categories for this Court’s review: (1) the denial of a fair post-conviction evidentiary hearing, (2) the denial of a fair sentencing hearing, (3) the ineffective assistance of counsel, and (4) the constitutionality of the imposition of a sentence of death. Following a thorough and exhaustive review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Jerry Anderson, appeals from the order of the trial court dismissing his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, John Liddell, was convicted of two counts of theft of property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor; one count of the aggravated assault of Robert Bolinger, a Class C felony; and one count of the aggravated assault of Cheffie Hurt, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of thirteen years as a Range III, persistent offender for each felony conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor conviction, for an effective sentence of thirteen years. Defendant does not appeal the length of his sentences or the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his theft convictions. In his appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his two convictions of aggravated assault. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Jerry Bell, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of possession of a deadly weapon with the intent to employ it in the commission of aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the State failed to prove his identity beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions but that the convictions for both aggravated robbery and possession of a deadly weapon violate double jeopardy protections. The Defendant’s conviction for possession of a deadly weapon is dismissed. The Defendant’s remaining convictions and sentences are affirmed.  We remand solely for the entry of an appropriate judgment consistent with this opinion.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Ronald Clinton, was convicted of one count of the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, a Class A misdemeanor; one count of evading arrest, a Class E felony;  and one count of simple assault, a Class A misdemeanor. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor conviction, and six years as a Range III, career offender, for his felony conviction, and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively. Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his assault conviction, or the length or manner of service of his sentences. In his appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and felony evading arrest. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Decarlos Rodgers, pled guilty to possession of cocaine in an amount greater than 0.5 grams with intent to sell and convicted felon in possession of a handgun. He was sentenced to twelve and two years, respectively, to be served concurrently as a Range II offender. As a condition of his guilty plea, the defendant reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding whether the indictments against him should have been dismissed under a theory of promissory estoppel. After review, we conclude that the questions are properly certified and that the trial court ruled correctly in denying the motion to dismiss.

The petitioner, Earl Ray Trotter, pled guilty in the Bedford County Circuit Court to attempted second degree murder, especially aggravated burglary, and especially aggravated robbery. He received a total effective sentence of twenty-five years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Billy James Matthews, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.  Matthews’ convictions stem from his guilty pleas to rape and robbery, for which he was sentenced to ten years and six years respectively. In this appeal, Matthews raises the following issue for our review: whether the evidence preponderates against the post-conviction court’s findings that he received the effective assistance of counsel. The State asserts that the post-conviction petition should be dismissed because it was filed outside the one-year post-conviction statute of limitations.  We agree and conclude that Matthews’ petition is barred by the statute of limitations. Dismissal of the post-conviction petition is affirmed.

The Appellant, Christopher S. Love, appeals his conviction by a Hickman County jury for sexual battery, a Class E felony. Love was indicted for the offenses of aggravated rape, reckless endangerment, and aggravated assault. Following a jury trial, he was acquitted of reckless endangerment and found guilty of the lesser included offenses of sexual battery and misdemeanor assault. He was subsequently sentenced to concurrent sentences of two years and eleven months and twenty-nine days. On appeal, he raises the single issue of whether it was proper for the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of sexual battery. After review, we conclude that the Appellant waived the issue by his failure to object to the inclusion of the instruction at trial. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction for sexual battery is affirmed.

The defendant, Robert L. Myers, pled guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six years on each count, to be served concurrently. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying probation or alternative sentencing. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court properly sentenced the defendant and affirm the judgments of conviction.

The defendant, James Howard Theus, III, entered a best interest plea to facilitation of rape of a child. He was sentenced to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, suspended after service of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with the remainder on intensive probation. Thereafter, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and placed his sentence into effect. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s revocation of his probation. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Rick Hanebutt, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree premeditated murder. He received a sentence of life imprisonment for his murder conviction and a concurrent twenty year sentence for his attempted first degree murder conviction. On appeal, the defendant raises three issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; (2) whether the state failed to comply with discovery pursuant to Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure; and (3) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to change venue. Following our review of the parties’ briefs and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Ricky Lee Trentham, Jr., was convicted of simple possession of marijuana, Tenn Code Ann. 39-17-418(a), a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days at 75%. On appeal, he raises three issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether a copy of High Times magazine was erroneously admitted into evidence; and (3) whether he was properly sentenced. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Frank Ramsey, appeals the sentencing decision of the Sullivan County Criminal Court following his guilty plea to the crime of initiating a false report in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-502(a)(1)(c). Pursuant to the plea agreement, he was sentenced as a Range II multiple offender to a sentence of four years with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. On appeal, the Appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing. After review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Thomas Studdard, was indicted by the Dyer County Grand Jury on three counts of rape of a child in 2002. The petitioner subsequently pled guilty to one count of incest and was sentenced to eight years as a Range II multiple offender. The petitioner sought a reduction of his sentence in the trial court. The trial court denied the relief sought and the petitioner appealed. On direct appeal, this Court, without reaching the merits of the petitioner’s sentencing issues, vacated the judgment of conviction on the grounds that incest was not a lesser-included offense of rape.  Thomas Poston Studdard v. State, No. W2003-01210-CCA-R3-PC, 2004 WL 370259 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Feb. 27, 2004), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Sept. 7, 2004). Having granted the petitioner’s application for permission to appeal, our supreme court concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction to accept the petitioner’s guilty plea and remanded the case to this Court for consideration of the sentencing issues. Studdard v. State, 182 S.W.3d 283 (Tenn. 2005). On remand, this Court determined that the trial court did not err in denying the petitioner’s motion to reduce his sentence and that the certification requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-503(c) did not violate the petitioner’s equal protection rights.¹ Thomas Poston Studdard v. State, No. W2005-02707-CCA-RM-PC, 2006 WL 287427 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Feb. 6, 2006), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. May 30, 2006). While the petitioner’s direct appeal was still pending, the petitioner sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel². The postconviction court denied the petition and the petitioner sought relief in this Court. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant appeals from the trial court’s denial of a motion for nunc pro tunc order. Because such an order is not subject to an appeal as of right under Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appellant’s appeal.

The Defendant, Billie Joe Welch, was convicted of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, contending that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) the trial court improperly charged the jury on second degree murder; (4) the trial court erred when it answered a jury question off the record; and (5) the trial court improperly sentenced him. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Michael Anthony Lewis, was convicted of attempted first degree murder. He was sentenced as a career offender to sixty years in the Department of Correction (DOC). On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, (3) the trial court improperly sentenced the Defendant as a career offender, and (4) the trial court committed plain error by admitting a photograph that the State did not produce in response to a defense discovery request. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Janalee Wilson, appeals as of right from the judgment of theMadison County Circuit Court denying her petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Defendant argues that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that her constitutional rights were violated by the involvement of the federal prosecutor in the state proceedings. After review of the record, as to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Petitioner’s brief fails to set forth any specific contentions in support of the issue and, therefore, the issue is waived. As to her challenge to the federal prosecutor’s involvement, this issue is waived due to the Petitioner’s failure to raise it in her direct appeal and, additionally, the argument is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court denying post-conviction relief.

The defendant, David Earl Nixon, pled guilty to two counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor (Class B felony) and one count each of marijuana possession and possession of drug paraphernalia (Class A misdemeanors). He was sentenced to consecutive ten-year sentences for the two felony convictions, with the first ten years to be served in confinement and the second ten years on supervised probation. He received concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days in confinement for the misdemeanor convictions. The defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in requiring him to serve his sentence in confinement rather than on probation and argues that the sentence of confinement constitutes an excessive sentence. We note that the laws concerning sentencing changed on June 7, 2005, and that this defendant did not execute any written waiver to be allowed to be sentenced under the new law. A ten-year sentence on probation under the old law is unauthorized, making the second ten-year sentence on supervised probation illegal. Because the trial judge is required to consider the aggregate sentence imposed, we reverse the sentences imposed and remand for new sentencing. We found no other reversible error.

The appellant, David Michael Anderson, Jr., pleaded guilty to driving under the influence, first offense, and reserved, under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i), a certified question of law dispositive of the case. The certified question of law is whether the officer in this case lacked reasonable suspicion to effect a seizure in stopping appellant and as a result the evidence seized should have been suppressed. Following our review, we agree with appellant, reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the charge.

The defendant, Harold D. Noel, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. See Tenn Code Ann. § 39-13-211 (2003). The trial court imposed a sentence of six years to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Petitioner Robert Dallis Payne was convicted by a Davidson County jury of first degree murder and received a sentence of life in prison. On December 2, 2005, petitioner filed a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Criminal Court of Davidson County. On December 8, 2005 the trial court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, petitioner contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his petition for habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.