APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Terry D. Brewer, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging his  forty-five-year sentence stemming from his 1989 convictions for aggravated rape with pregnancy  occurring, aggravated sexual battery, and incest. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition for writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner appeals the trial court’s dismissal and refusal to appoint counsel. The petitioner contends that his sentences are void because he was improperly sentenced under the 1982 Sentencing Reform Act instead of the 1989 Sentencing Reform Act. We conclude that the petition states no cognizable claim for relief, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Clifford Wayne Morris, pled guilty to attempted dissemination of a cordless telephone transmission, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days with a thirty day period of incarceration to be served prior to release on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jimmie Lee Hart, was convicted of possession of one-half gram or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment as a career offender. He appeals his conviction, contending (1) that the convicting evidence was insufficient and (2) that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the meaning of the use of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.  The Petitioner has appealed the habeas corpus court’s order dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the habeas corpus court was correct in dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance
pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.  Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

This matter is before the Court upon the motion of appointed counsel seeking permission to withdraw from further representation of the Appellant in the above-captioned appeal pursuant to Rule 22, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Counsel claims that there are no meritorious issues available for appellate review. Counsel has complied with the procedural requirements of Rule 22, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Mack T. Transou, has filed a responsive brief pursuant to Rule 22(E), Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. After careful review of the motion, the accompanying Anders brief, and the appellate record, we agree with counsel’s assertion that the appeal has no merit and is, accordingly, frivolous within the meaning of Rule 22, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Petitioner, Shinny Leverette, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon review of the record and the accompanying pleadings, this Court concludes that the trial court properly dismissed the petition for writ of error coram nobis. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the trial court’s dismissal is affirmed.

Both the petitioner and his co-defendant were convicted by a jury of two counts of first degree murder, one count of aggravated rape and one count of first degree burglary. The petitioner was unsuccessful in his direct appeal to this Court. He subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. The petitioner was also unsuccessful in his appeal of that judgment. The petitioner filed a motion to amend his post-conviction petition to request DNA testing of evidence. The second post-conviction court denied that motion. The petitioner appeals this decision. We affirm the decision of the second post-conviction court.

The defendant, Ashley Martin, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery: aggravated robbery by violence and aggravated robbery by fear. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the defendant to thirty years as a Range III, career offender. This appeal follows the denial of his motion for a new trial in which he alleged that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (2) the trial court erred in ruling his nine prior convictions for aggravated robbery were admissible for purposes of impeachment if he chose to testify. After careful review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The appellant, Thurman Randolph, was arrested in February of 2005 for rape. After a preliminary hearing in the Madison County Municipal Court the charge was dismissed. Subsequently, the State presented the matter to the Madison CountyGrand Jury, which returned an indictment on two counts of rape. The appellant was later re-indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury on two counts of rape and two counts of statutory rape. Upon learning that part of the audiotape of the preliminary hearing was not available due to a technical glitch in the recording, the appellant filed a motion seeking dismissal of the indictment and a remand of the matter to the Jackson Municipal Court for a new preliminary hearing pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.1(a). The trial court denied the motion and the appellant sought an interlocutory appeal. In this interlocutory appeal, the appellant asserts that the trial court improperly denied the motion to dismiss the indictment and remand the matter to the Jackson Municipal Court. Because the trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss the indictment, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Jacques Sherron, was convicted by a jury of criminal responsibility for introducing a controlled substance into a penal institution, conspiracy to introduce a controlled substance into a penal facility, possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver and possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver. The appellant received an effective sentence of ten years on March 18, 2005. The appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal on April 6, 2005. On July 1, 2005, trial counsel for the appellant filed a motion for new trial alleging that the evidence was insufficient, that the verdict was based on circumstantial evidence and that the appellant’s sentence was excessive.  The appellant subsequently filed a motion in this Court requesting dismissal of his appeal without prejudice due to the fact that the trial court had not yet ruled on the motion for new trial. This Court denied the motion. The appellant filed an amended pro se motion for new trial. The trial court held a hearing on the motion for new trial on September 14, 2005, at which time the appellant filed a third amended motion for new trial. The trial court denied relief, and the appellant filed a second notice of appeal on September 14, 2005. On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the conspiracy charge should have been dismissed for failure to state a crime; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict; and (3) whether the trial court committed plain error in failing to give an accomplice instruction to the jury. For the following reasons, we reverse and dismiss the conspiracy conviction, and affirm the conviction for introducing a controlled substance into a penal facility.

Pursuant to multiple indictments, Defendants Jevon Bryant, Keith Ezell and Torrez Talley were charged with fourteen counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and five counts of aggravated robbery.  Defendant Bryant was also charged with one count of felon in possession of a firearm.  Following a trial, the jury found Defendants Bryant and Ezell guilty on all counts. The jury found Defendant Talley guilty of ten counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and four counts of aggravated robbery. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Defendant Bryant to an effective sentence of 364 years, Defendant Ezell to an effective sentence of 198 years, and Defendant Talley to an effective sentence of 140 years. On appeal, the following issues are presented for review: (1) whether the trial court properly denied a motion to suppress physical evidence; (2) whether the trial court properly denied a motion for mistrial during jury selection; (3) whether the trial court properly found purposeful discrimination by the defendants in their exercise of peremptory challenges; (4) whether the trial court erred by failing to require the state prosecutor to elect facts supporting Defendant Bryant’s conviction for felonious possession of a handgun; (5) whether the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to rehabilitate the credibility of state witnesses; (6) whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial or provide curative instruction following an improper statement made by a state witness; (7) whether the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to bring in Defendant Ezell’s twin brother to rehabilitate a state witness’ pretrial misidentification; (8) whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial in response to the improper remarks made by the prosecutor during closing argument; (9) whether the trial court erred by refusing to permit counsel to review the jury instructions prior to charging the jury; (10) whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on reasonable doubt; (11) whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the defendant’s right not to testify; (12) whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on false imprisonment as a lesser-included offense of especially aggravated kidnapping; and (13) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the defendants. Because we conclude that no reversible error exists, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, the record reflects that the defendants’ especially aggravated kidnapping convictions were not properlymerged. Therefore, we remand for merger and entry of corrected judgments as to those convictions.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant, Candice Alene Peery, pled guilty to aggravated burglary and theft of property over $1,000. In return, she received an effective eight-year sentence as a Range II multiple offender with the manner of service of her sentence to be determined by the trial court. The court ordered the defendant to serve her sentence in confinement and she appealed, arguing that the court erred in denying an alternative sentence. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Derrick Walton, was convicted of one count of second degree murder. He was sentenced to twenty-three years in the Department of Correction. The Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I agree that principles of double jeopardy would be offended upon the defendant’s retrial for second degree murder because the record does not support the trial court’s finding of manifest necessity and because the defendant, ostensibly at least, did not consent to the order of mistrial. I write this concurring opinion because this latter issue – the defendant’s lack of consent – gave me great pause.

The appellant, Marcell Carter, pled guilty to a violation of the bad check law, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-121. The trial court sentenced the appellant to four years to be served on Community Corrections. Subsequently, a warrant was filed against the appellant alleging a failure to abide by several conditions of his Community Corrections sentence. After a series of hearings, the trial court removed the appellant from Community Corrections and re-sentenced him to four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion. Because we determine that the trial court properly revoked the appellant’s Community Corrections sentence and resentenced the appellant, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Johnie Jefferson, appeals as of right from the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree murder conviction, for which he is serving a life sentence. The petitioner claims he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his attorney failed to investigate two witnesses properly and failed to consult with him prior to trial. We conclude no error exists, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Carolette Stephens, was indicted on one count of second degree murder. During the jury trial in May of 2005, the trial court sua sponte declared a mistrial over objection of both the State and the appellant. The case was immediately rescheduled for trial. The appellant sought a dismissal of the indictment, arguing that the retrial placed the appellant in double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the indictment, but permitted the appellant to seek an interlocutory appeal. This Court granted the interlocutory appeal. On appeal, the appellant presents the following issues: (1) whether the State provoked the trial court into granting a mistrial by eliciting testimony regarding an unconstitutional search warrant that had been suppressed by the trial court; (2) whether the trial court erred in granting a mistrial based on manifest necessity; and (3)
whether the appellant’s rights to protection against double jeopardy will be violated by a retrial for second degree murder. Because the trial court improperly declared a mistrial without a manifest necessity for doing so, the double jeopardy provisions of the federal and state constitutions prohibit a retrial of the appellant on the charge that is the subject of this appeal. The judgment of the trial court denying the appellant’s motion to dismiss is therefore reversed and the indictment dismissed.

The appellant, Christopher Kyle, also known as “Snap,” was convicted by  jury of second degree murder and theft of property. As a result, the trial court sentenced the appellant to twenty-three years as a violent offender for second degree murder and eleven months and twenty-nine days for theft of property. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder, that the trial court erred in instructing the juryon the theory of criminal responsibility and that his sentence is excessive.  For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Clyde Lee Blackmon, appeals as of right the Shelby County Criminal Court’s  denying his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2004 conviction of second degree murder, a Class A felony, for which he is serving a twenty-five-year sentence as a Range I, violent offender. The petitioner claims he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which rendered his guilty plea involuntary. We conclude no error exists, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Michael Dewayne Mann, was convicted of second offense driving under the influence (DUI) and violation of the implied consent law. As a result, the appellant was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail, to be served on unsupervised probation after incarceration of ninety days. After the denial of a motion for new trial, this appeal ensued. The appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. Because the evidence was sufficient to sustain the appellant’s conviction for second offense driving under the influence and the appellant does not challenge his conviction for violation of the implied consent law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Faron Douglas Pierce, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Pierce was convicted of aggravated robbery by a Blount County jury and was sentenced to twenty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Pierce argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that trial counsel was deficient in: (1) failing to seek suppression of evidence at trial; (2) failing to adequately inform Pierce of his right to testify at trial; and (3) calling a witness which prejudiced the defense. After review, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The appellant, Ronald Eugene Mullins, was convicted by a jury of theft of property over one thousand dollars. The trial court ordered the appellant to serve a three-year sentence as a Range I standard offender. After the denial of a motion for new trial, the appellant filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. After a review of the record, we affirm.

Petitioner, Jimmy Ray Culberson, pled guilty to two counts of rape of a child and received concurrent fifteen-year sentences with 100% service on each count. In September 2003, petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that his plea was not knowing and voluntary and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition. In this appeal, petitioner maintains the trial court erred in denying his petition. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Terry M. Odom, was indicted on three counts of aggravated sexual battery. Pursuant to a plea agreement, petitioner pled guilty to one count and received an eight-year sentence at 100% while the two remaining counts were dismissed. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and after the appointment of counsel filed an amended petition. Following an evidentiary hearing on August 3, 2005, the trial court denied the petition. On appeal, petitioner claims the trial court erred in denying relief. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Kalvin Rush, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery and sentenced to eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Rush raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. After review of the record, we find the evidence sufficient to support the verdict and affirm the judgment of conviction.