APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Andre L. Mayfield, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, for this Court to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion. We grant the motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This matter is before this court following the Petitioner Heck Van Tran’s motion to reopen his postconviction petition for the limited purpose of determining whether the Petitioner is mentally retarded and thus ineligible for the death penalty. The lower court entered an order denying relief. The Petitioner appeals asserting that the proof established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Petitioner is mentally retarded renders his sentence of death unconstitutional. After a review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the lower court’s denial of relief.

The appellant, William Arthur Shelton aka John Shelton, was convicted by a jury in the Bradley County Criminal Court of three counts of false imprisonment, two counts of vandalism, and one count of premeditated first degree murder. He received a total effective sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of a motion for severance of the murder counts from the remaining counts, the trial court’s exclusion of a witness’s complete statement to police, and the sufficiency of the evidence. From our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jorge Herrera, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Jason Goolsby, was convicted of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and burglary and two counts of theft over $1000, Class D felonies. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of four years and six months for the aggravated burglary conviction and three years and six months for each of the Class D felonies, with nine months to be served in confinement and the balance on probation. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Keusi Yamba Donald, was convicted of possession with intent to sell or deliver 26 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and possession with intent to sell or deliver more not less than one-half (½) ounce nor more than ten (10) pounds of marijuana, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve sixteen years in the Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender for his conviction of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine, and six years in the Department of Correction as a Range III, career offender for his conviction of possession with intent to sell or deliver marijuana, with the sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress evidence, (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and (3) his sentence of sixteen years was excessive. After a thorough review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Lisa Marie Butler, of first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse, see T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202, -15-402 (2003), in connection with the June 17, 2003 death of her eight-month-old child, Dewayne Butler. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Violent Offender to life imprisonment at 100 percent for the felony murder conviction and to 20 years and six months at 100 percent for the aggravated child abuse conviction, with concurrent service of the sentences. On appeal, the defendant contests the legal sufficiency of the convicting evidence at trial and argues that her sentence for the aggravated child abuse conviction is excessive. After our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the defendant’s convictions.

The petitioner, Diallo J. Lauderdale, was convicted by a Henry County Circuit Court jury of first degree felony murder, and the trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to life in the Department of Correction. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the petitioner’s conviction and sentence. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.  After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, James Henry Walker, was convicted of one count of burglary, a Class D felony; one count of theft of property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor; and one count of vandalism of property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of six years as a Range II, multiple offender, for his felony conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor conviction, for an effective sentence of six years. Defendant does not appeal the length of his sentences. In his appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements and testimony of his identification. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

On July 21, 2005, the appellant, Joseph Kevan Clark, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of violating Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-616, a section of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender Act. On September 27, 2005, the appellant was sentenced to five years’ incarceration as a Range III offender. He appeals the judgment,  contending that his conviction is invalid because the underlying order declaring him to be a motor vehicle habitual offender was not properly entered pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58. Because we have previously held that an individual must utilize the provisions of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 to challenge an order declaring the individual to be a motor vehicle habitual offender, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. The appellant also contends that the five-year sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. Because the trial court appropriately considered both mitigating and enhancement factors, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

The Appellant, Brandon Wallace, appeals the sentencing decision of the Lauderdale County Circuit Court. Following a jury trial, Wallace was convicted of two counts of attempted first degree murder, attempted second degree murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, and felony reckless endangerment. Wallace’s conviction for attempted especially aggravated robbery was merged with his conviction for especially aggravated burglary. Following a direct appeal of his convictions and sentences, a panel of this court affirmed the convictions but remanded for resentencing in accordance with Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2005). After a resentencing hearing was conducted, Wallace was sentenced to twenty years for each attempted first degree murder conviction, eight years for attempted second degree murder, eight years for attempted especially aggravated robbery, eight years for especially aggravated burglary, and one year for felony reckless endangerment. Based upon the imposition of partial consecutive sentencing, Wallace received an effective sentence of forty-years confinement. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s application of enhancement factors, failure to apply mitigating factors, and imposition of consecutive sentencing. After review, the sentences are affirmed. However, we remand for entry of corrected judgment of conviction forms to properly reflect merger of the offenses and imposition of the aggregate forty-year sentence.

The defendant, Marchello Simpson, pled guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and nolo contendere to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to six years for each of the convictions and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences based upon a finding that he was a dangerous offender. We hold that no error occurred, and we affirm the trial court.

Following a jury trial, a Shelby County trial court convicted the defendant, Frank Smith, of two counts of rape (Class B felonies). The trial court sentenced the defendant to terms of incarceration of eight years on each offense, to be served concurrently. The defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred by failing to sentence him to a form of alternative sentencing and specifically argues that the trial court failed to state on the record its reasons for denying an alternative sentence. The defendant failed to provide a record of his sentencing hearing and, therefore, we must presume the trial court was correct. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Defendant, Cory Campbell, was indicted and charged with aggravated assault. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of felony reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve one year in the Shelby County Correctional Facility, with ninety days to be served on weekends and the remainder suspended. Defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of felony reckless endangerment and that the trial court lessened the State’s burden of proof in response to the jury’s questions during deliberations. After a thorough review of the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, David Earl Palmer, was convicted by a jury of aggravated burglary and aggravated rape. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to five years for the aggravated burglary conviction and 25 years for the aggravated rape conviction with consecutive service for an effective sentence of 30 years. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the petitioner’s convictions and sentences. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because he received ineffective assistance of counsel and because he was illegally sentenced. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Timothy Hutson, the defendant, appeals his jury conviction for premeditated first degree murder.  He was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal the defendant presents a single issue, that the evidence does not support the jury’s finding of premeditation. Our review reveals that sufficient evidence was presented, and we affirm the defendant’s judgment of conviction.

Robert Smith, the defendant, appeals from a Shelby County jury conviction for second degree murder (Class A felony). The defendant was sentenced to sixty years as a career violent offender.  In his sole issue the defendant maintains that the evidence does not support his conviction in that it was insufficient to prove a knowing killing. After review, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

A Shelby County jury found the defendant, Franklin Fitch, guilty of the first degree premeditated murder of Angela Carroll. Following a separate penalty phase, the jury found the presence of two statutory aggravating circumstances and that the aggravators outweighed any mitigating factors. The jury subsequently imposed a sentence of death. The defendant seeks review by this court of both his conviction for first degree murder and his sentence of death. He challenges:  (1) the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, (2) the sufficiency of the convicting evidence of first degree murder, (3) the trial court’s admission of post-mortem photographs of the victim, (4) the trial court’s instruction on premeditation, (5) the prosecutor’s closing argument, (6) the sufficiency of the (i)(2) aggravating circumstance, (7) the trial court’s instruction that reckless endangerment is an offense of violence, (8) the sufficiency of the (i)(3) aggravating circumstance, (9) the trial court’s admission of victim impact testimony, (10) the trial court’s jury instruction regarding victim impact evidence, (11) the failure to charge aggravating circumstances in the indictment, and (12) the constitutionality of Tennessee’s death penalty statutes. Following our extensive review, we affirm the defendant’s conviction of first degree murder. However, we conclude that the evidence does not support application of the (i)(2) statutory aggravating circumstance. As we are unable to conclude that this error is harmless, this matter is remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

The appellant, X-Cell Bonding Company, appeals the order of final forfeiture declared upon the minutes of the Sullivan County Circuit Court. Because the record fails to contain a Rule 58 final judgment, the appeal is dismissed.

Following a jury trial, the Petitioner, Trent Starks, was convicted of first degree murder. The State sought to impose the death penalty, but the jury sentenced the Petitioner to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Petitioner’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. In this appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, the Petitioner argues that (1) his trial co-counsel was inadequate under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, (2) his lead trial counsel failed to meet and communicate with him adequately in violation of the Sixth Amendment, (3) his lead trial counsel did not adequately advise him on whether to testify in violation of the Sixth Amendment, and (4) his lead trial counsel did not adequately investigate his alibi witness in violation of the Sixth Amendment. ¹ We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Bernard M. Wallace, was convicted of possession of cocaine over point five (0.5) grams with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. Defendant was sentenced to serve twenty-five years in the Department of Correction for the Class B felony, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the Class A misdemeanor, to be served concurrently. In this appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search of a motel room; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (3) the trial court improperly applied the enhancement factors in determining the length of Defendant’s sentence. After a thorough review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

John Green, the defendant, appeals his jury convictions of first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery (Class A felony). The defendant was sentenced to life in prison for first degree felony murder with a ten-year concurrent sentence for aggravated robbery. The defendant presents two issues: insufficient evidence to support the convictions, and error by the trial court in failing to suppress the defendant’s statements. We conclude from our review that the evidence was sufficient and that the defendant’s statements were properly admitted. The judgments of conviction are affirmed.

The Petitioner, Joseph W. Wilson, was convicted of one count of attempted second degree murder, three counts of aggravated rape, especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, and misdemeanor vandalism. He was sentenced to seventy-one years confinement. On appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. The Petitioner petitioned for post-conviction relief claiming that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the post-conviction petition as untimely, and we affirm that judgment.

The appellant, John Wallace, was convicted of four counts of assault. As a result, the trial court sentenced him to four, concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days. The trial court then placed the appellant on probation for the length of the sentence and imposed a fine of $500 for each conviction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s imposition of the $500 fine for each conviction. Because the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in that regard. However, because the trial court improperly fined the appellant $500 for each conviction when the jury was not instructed to impose a fine and the appellant did not waive his right to a jury-imposed fine, we remand the matter to the trial court for the proper assessment of a fine.

Maurice Shaw, the defendant, appeals his jury convictions for delivery and possession with intent to deliver over .5 grams of a Schedule II drug (cocaine), both offenses being Class B felonies. The defendant was sentenced as a standard offender to eleven years on each offense. The defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. Specifically, he contends that no drugs were found on him; that the only eyewitness lacked credibility; and that no foundation was made for identification of the defendant’s voice during the drug transaction. Our review indicates that sufficient evidence existed that the defendant did have cocaine in his possession and that the other issues were matters of credibility determination which were resolved by the jury. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions.