APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Felix Lopez, pled guilty to manslaughter and received a negotiated out-of-range fifteen-year sentence, to be served at sixty percent. Subsequently, petitioner timely filed a post-conviction petition alleging he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. When the post-conviction court denied post-conviction relief, this appeal followed. After careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Faris Adb Al-Ali, was convicted by a Rutherford County jury of rape of a child and received a twenty-two year sentence. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Petitioner timely filed his pro se post-conviction petition. Following the appointment of counsel and filing of an amended petition, the post-conviction court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the petition. On December 1, 2005, the post-conviction court entered an order dismissing the petition. Petitioner appealed. We affirm the post-conviction court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, David Marsh, was convicted of two counts of forgery and sentenced to serve three years in the Department of Correction for each offense, to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of three years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for forgery. After a thorough review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Appellants, Steven Thomas Geyer and his wife, Tammy Syvilla Geyer, were convicted by a Hardeman County jury of multiple offenses arising during the drive home from their children’s school Christmas pageant. Appellant Steven Geyer was convicted of DUI, child endangerment, and driving on a suspended license. Appellant Tammy Geyer was convicted of reckless endangerment. On appeal, the Appellants raise three issues for review: (1) whether the trial court  erred by prohibiting the Appellant’s questioning of a witness regarding an obsolete law; (2)  whether the trial court erred in excluding a defense photograph due to the Appellants’ failure to comply with the reciprocal discovery requirements of Rule 16, Tenn. R. Crim. P.; and (3) whether the trial court erred by not filing a written order on a pre-trial Rule 16 discovery motion. After a review of the record, we affirm.

The appellant was convicted following a jury trial of aggravated rape and aggravated sexual battery and received concurrent fifteen and eight year sentences, respectively. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss these charges based on violation of his right to a speedy trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Marlon Thomas, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The petitioner, Stanley F. Blackwood, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of first degree murder, three counts of attempted first degree murder (Class A felony), five counts of aggravated assault (Class C felony), two counts of reckless endangerment (Class E felony), and one count of aggravated burglary (Class C felony ), for which he now serves a life sentence plus twenty-two years. The petitioner claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because his attorney: (1) acknowledged to the jury in opening statements that the petitioner shot the victim; (2) characterized the petitioner’s version of events as “bizarre,” undermining his credibility with the jury; (3) failed to fully investigate the possibility that the handgun discharged accidentally; and (4) failed to object to a prejudicial jury instruction. We find no basis to grant relief and affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

The Petitioner, Anthony H. Dean, appeals as of right from the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying post-conviction relief. In 2000, a jury convicted the Petitioner of aggravated rape, and he was sentenced to forty years as a violent offender. This Court affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and several amendments thereto. Following multiple hearings, the post-conviction court denied relief, and he now appeals to this Court. In this appeal, he raises nine issues which, in substance, relate to the following two claims: (1) violation of his constitutional rights when he was not taken timely before a magistrate and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying relief.

The petitioner, James Matthew Gray, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to a charge of reckless homicide. He was sentenced to twelve years in the Department of Correction as a career offender with a release eligibility of sixty percent. He was originally indicted on two counts: (1) felony murder, and (2) especially aggravated robbery. As part of his plea agreement, he agreed to plead out of range of his offender status. On appeal, he argues that his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowingly entered because he asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After careful review, we conclude that the petitioner has not met his burden of showing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel by clear and convincing evidence and, further, that he has not shown that his plea was involuntary and unknowing. No grounds for relief exist, and the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Appellant, James Anthony McCurry, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he asserts that his conviction for misdemeanor evading arrest is voidable because of an abridgement of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. After review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Donald Wade Goff, was convicted following a November 2001 jury trial on two counts of rape of a child, eleven counts of incest, nine counts of rape, seven counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and one count of attempted rape. The trial court imposed an eighty-year sentence. On direct appeal, the sentence was modified to fifty-six years based upon this Court’s dismissal of the nine rape counts due to lack of evidence of force or coercion. Petitioner subsequently filed a post-conviction petition on August 9, 2004. After the appointment of counsel and the filing of an amended petition, the post-conviction court conducted an evidentiary hearing. Following the hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. Petitioner filed this appeal claiming the post-conviction court erred in denying his post-conviction petition. Upon our review, we affirm the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Troy Brooks, who was formerly a licensed attorney in the State of Tennessee,was indicted by a grand jury in Wilson County for five counts of theft over $10,000, four counts of theft over $1000, six counts of fraudulent use of a credit card in the amount of $1000 to $10,000, and one count of fraudulent use of a credit card in the amount of over $500. The offenses arose from the Defendant’s misuse of nine clients’ trust monies and credit card accounts during the course of several months. The Defendant requested pretrial diversion, and the district attorney general denied the Defendant’s request. The Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Wilson County Criminal Court, alleging that the district attorney general abused his discretion by denying pretrial diversion. The trial court denied the Defendant’s petition. The Defendant filed a motion for  interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s decision, and this Court granted the Defendant’s motion. This Court now affirms the judgment of the trial court and concludes that the district attorney general did not abuse his discretion by denying pretrial diversion.

The Appellant, Ronald Crook, was convicted bya Shelby County jury of driving under the influence (DUI), first offense, and reckless driving. As a result of these convictions, Crook received concurrent sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days with service of four days for each conviction. On appeal, Crook argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that his sentences are excessive. After review, the judgments of conviction and resulting sentences are affirmed.
 

The defendant, Adam Sanders, was convicted by a Marion County Circuit Court jury of two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and two counts of incest, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced him to twenty years for each of the rape convictions, three years for each of the incest convictions, and eight years for the aggravated sexual battery conviction and ordered that the rape sentences be served consecutively to each other, for an effective sentence of forty years at 100% in the Department of Correction. Following the denial of his motion for a new trial, the defendant filed a timely appeal to this court in which he raises essentially four issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions for rape of a child and incest; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on new evidence in support of his motion to suppress; and (4) whether the trial court erred in sentencing him to twenty years for each rape conviction and in ordering that the rape sentences be served consecutively. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Mark Tomlin, pled guilty to one count of possession of under 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell. The Petitioner petitioned for post-conviction relief claiming that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the post-conviction petition, and we affirm that judgment.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Harold Hack, of three counts of vehicular homicide, one count of aggravated assault, one count of felony reckless endangerment, and one count of violating the open container law. For these convictions, the Defendant received an effective sentence of twenty-four years as a Range I, standard offender to be served in the Department of Correction.  In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and contends that his sentence is excessive. After a review of the record, ¹ we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. However, I disagree with the conclusion that the defendant’s homosexual status was admissible. The defendant moved in limine to exclude this evidence, and the trial court ruled as follows:

[I]f the discussion places into context the full [gist] of the statement . . . weighing these issues about drug usage or some on again, off again, homosexual experiences and how that explains or what did or did not happen with Mr. Wilson, I don’t think the prejudicial effect of that mentioned in the large scheme of this case is outweighed by . . . the probative value, I think is present in terms of the intent, in terms of the defendant’s defense, in terms of placing into context his explanation about his relationship with [the victim] and how that did occur and things of that nature, the probative value of that information is not outweighed by the prejudicial effect.

The defendant appeals his convictions of seven counts of aggravated sexual battery, alleging error in the following respects: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; 2) the trial court erred in the defendant’s motion for severance; and 3) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the videotaped statement of the defendant’s interview. Our review revealed no reversible error, and the convictions are hereby affirmed.

The petitioner, Maurice Pruitt, was convicted of the sale of one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to 18 years in prison. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court dismissed his petition.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a direct appeal as of right from convictions on a jury verdict of one count of child rape and two counts of rape. For these convictions, the Defendant, Charles L. Williams, received an effective twenty-two-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction with 100% service required.  On appeal, the Defendant raises six issues: (1) the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony of the victim; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the charges of child rape and rape; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State’s DNA expert witness to speculate about the significance of the ratio of DNA discovered under the Defendant’s fingernails; (4) prosecutorial misconduct requires a new trial; (5) the trial court gave erroneous jury instructions when it stated the elements of child rape could be satisfied by a showing of a mens rea of recklessness; and (6) the trial court erred in failing to merge the lesser rape convictions into the child rape conviction. We have concluded that the trial court erred by allowing certain speculative testimony by the State’s DNA expert witness. We also have concluded that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing argument. In addition, the two rape convictions should have been merged into the child rape conviction. We have determined that the cumulative effect of the trial errors deprived the Defendant of a fair trial. Judge Welles also concludes that the trial court erred by giving erroneous jury instructions for the requisite mens rea. We reverse the convictions and remand for a new trial.

The appellant, Anthony Alston, was indicted with possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver and felony possession of cocaine. The appellant pled guilty to the charges, but agreed to allow the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the two convictions and imposed a sentence of nine years for possession with intent to deliver more than .5 grams of cocaine. Further, the trial court ordered the nine-year sentence to run consecutively to a sentence for which the appellant was on Community Corrections at the time of the current offense. The appellant appeals, arguing that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The majority concludes that there was insufficient evidence that victim Crain was “put in fear.” The majority concludes that Mr. Crain disavowed being “in fear.” I simply disagree. Witness Kevin Young, Mr. Crain’s assistant who came from inside the store, testified that Mr. Crain told him he was being robbed and to call the police, which Mr. Young did. Mr. Crain described how a man jumped into his truck and ordered him to the front of the truck. Mr. Crain described that he was “angry” this was happening to him. He did not like being “backed into a corner at all.” Mr. Crain offered no resistance and somehow exited the truck. Still angry about what was happening, Mr. Crain attempted to close the door and lock the defendant inside. When the defendant saw Mr. Crain’s attempt or “caught him,” the defendant threatened to shoot Mr. Crain. Mr. Crain believed the defendant was armed and saw the defendant reach for his pocket or belt line. Mr. Crain testified “there was too much things going through my mind at the time to actually mentally get a good picture.” Mr. Crain could not identify the defendant.

The Defendant, Robert Lee Hammonds, pled guilty to possession of over 26 grams of cocaine. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, the Defendant reserved four certified questions of law relating to whether the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress because the traffic stop and subsequent search were unconstitutional. He contends that the officer exceeded the scope of the stop and that the mandatory blanket consent form that he signed as part of a previous community corrections sentence did not give the arresting officer consent to search his vehicle. Further, he contends that he revoked any consent given by the mandatory blanket consent. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Andre Dotson, appeals from his 2005 Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions on two counts of aggravated robbery and two counts of robbery. On appeal, the  defendant claims that the trial court erred (1) in joining four indictments for trial, (2) in severing, on the morning of trial, the charges against a co-defendant, (3) in excluding the co-defendant’s pretrial statement as evidence offered by the defendant, (4) in failing to hold that the evidence was insufficient to support three of the convictions, (5) in denying the defendant’s motion to allow him to sit with his attorney at the counsel table, (6) in failing to instruct the jury as to the shortcomings of eyewitness testimony, and (7) in sentencing the defendant as a multiple offender on two convictions and as a persistent offender on two convictions. We reverse one conviction of robberybut affirm the court’s judgments, as modified.

The defendant, Arthur R. Brooks, pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement in the Knox County Criminal Court to three counts of robbery, a Class C felony. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six years for each conviction, to be served concurrently, with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentences. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the defendant serve his sentences in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in denying him alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.