APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Wayne County Jury convicted the defendant of four hunting related offenses. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of seventy days, to serve forty-two days in incarceration with the remainder suspended. The defendant argues on appeal that he should have been granted probation with regard to his entire sentence. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Milburn L. Edwards, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of twenty-one counts of rape, two counts of first degree burglary, two counts of aggravated burglary, one count of second degree burglary, one count of aggravated rape, one count of assault with intent to commit rape and one count of robbery. He received an effective sentence of life plus 415 years, which was later modified to life plus 195 years on appeal. State v. Edwards, 868 S.W.2d 682 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). A petition for post-conviction relief was denied by the trial court and the denial was affirmed on appeal. Milburn L. Edwards v. State, No. M2002-02124-CCA-R3-PC, 2003 WL 23014683 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Dec. 15, 2003). On March 13, 2006, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his convictions for the failure of the district attorney general to endorse the indictments. The trial court dismissed his petition without the appointment of counsel or an evidentiary hearing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Ricky Dale McDonald, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief.  He argues that he is currently held on an expired sentence that should be shortened due to post-conviction relief he was awarded in 1989. After careful review, we conclude that the petitioner is not presently held on an expired sentence and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Torrence Ladovia Reed, pled guilty in the Circuit Court for Giles County to four counts of sale of cocaine (Class B felony), two counts of delivery of cocaine (Class B felony), one count of conspiracy to deliver cocaine (Class C felony), six counts of conspiracy to sell cocaine (Class C felony), and one count of sale of marijuana (Class E felony). He received a total effective sentence of twenty-eight years. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief and alleged that his pleas were involuntary because his counsel was ineffective in failing to properly explain to him the difference between consecutive and concurrent sentences. After careful review, we find no grounds for which to grant relief, and we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, James D. West, entered guilty pleas in the Madison County Criminal Court to driving after having been declared a habitual motor vehicle offender, two counts of aggravated assault and two counts of reckless endangerment. He received an effective sentence of four years. On October 4, 2005, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Davidson County Criminal Court alleging that his sentence had expired. On January 5, 2006, the trial court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing or the appointment of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Wayne County Circuit Court dismissed Derrick Sawyers’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus
because the petitioner was not restrained of his liberty by reason of the challenged Davidson County convictions. The petitioner’s plea agreement called for a combination of consecutive and concurrent sentencing for three unrelated offenses, the last two of which were committed while the petitioner was on bond. Upon our review of the record and the applicable law, we vacate the circuit court’s order and remand.

A Williamson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, LaCorey Damont McKissack, of selling 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and fixed his fine at $20,000. The trial court approved the fine and sentenced the defendant to 11 years in the Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, the defendant contends that the fine and sentence are excessive. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Leroy Sexton, was convicted of rape of a child and was sentenced to serve twenty-five years confinement in the Department of Correction. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for new trial which was denied by the trial court. He now appeals arguing that he is entitled to a new trial because (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, and (2) the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the prosecutor to make improper statements during closing argument. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Michael Dwayne Edwards, was convicted by a Henry County jury of burglary and received a sentence of nine years as a Range III, persistent offender. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. State v. Michael Dwayne Edwards, No. W1999-00591-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 674671 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, May 16, 2000), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Dec. 4, 2000). On March 22, 2006, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his classification as a persistent offender. The trial court dismissed his petition without the appointment of counsel or an evidentiary hearing. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the petitioner received an illegal sentence as the result of an improper range classification.

The petitioner, Bobby Blackmon, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition and asserts that: (1) he was denied a full and fair post-conviction hearing; and (2) he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Upon review, we conclude that the petitioner received a full and fair hearing and effective assistance of appellate counsel. The judgment denying post-conviction relief is affirmed.

In this case appealed by Defendant Robert Barnett from the Criminal Court of Shelby County, we review the sufficiency of the evidence convicting the defendant of theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000 and aggravated burglary. We find the evidence sufficient and affirm the judgments.

The Defendant, Eric Williams, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery. On appeal, he alleges there was insufficient evidence for any rational jury to convict him of that crime.  Finding no reversible error exists, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the probation of Defendant, Efrem Ira McCory, and ordered him to serve his two-year sentence in confinement. In his appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. After a review of this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Ronnie R. Charleston, was convicted of felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and second degree murder. He was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to a total effective sentence of life imprisonment plus fifty-five years. On appeal, he presents two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; and (2) whether the trial court erred in determining the length and the manner of service of his sentences. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

On March 3, 2004, Petitioner, Christopher Schultz, pled guilty to two counts of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to serve two concurrent life sentences. On November 30, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief which the post-conviction court subsequently denied. In this appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying him post-conviction relief because his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After a thorough review of the record, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Defendant, Earnest Banks, pled guilty to burglarizing a motor vehicle. The trial court held a separate sentencing hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to three years as a Range II, multiple offender, to be served consecutively to a previous conviction. The trial court also denied Defendant’s request for alternative sentencing. Defendant appeals on the grounds that the trial court erred in setting his sentence above the minimum and in denying his request for probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Antonius Harris, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief which alleged that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Petitioner contends that trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective for failure to call certain witnesses at trial.  Petitioner also contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on self-defense as an affirmative defense and in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show any deficiencies in his counsel’s assistance or prejudice for failing to call Petitioner’s suggested witnesses. Petitioner’s challenges to the trial court’s jury instructions and the imposition of consecutive sentencing were raised in Petitioner’s direct appeal and thus have been previously determined. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Robert Weaver was convicted of one count of robbery, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, to ten years. Defendant does not appeal the length of his sentence. Defendant argues, however, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Travis Parson, was convicted of two counts of especially aggravated robbery and one count of criminally negligent homicide. He was sentenced to consecutive sentences of twenty years for each robbery conviction, and a concurrent sentence of two years for his homicide conviction, for a total effective sentence of forty years. On direct appeal, this Court ruled that the record did not support consecutive sentencing, and that dual convictions for especially aggravated robbery violated principles of double jeopardy. We therefore modified one of the convictions to aggravated assault and remanded that conviction for sentencing. His total effective sentence was amended and reduced to twenty years. In September 2004, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel was appointed and an amended petition was filed.  The post-conviction court subsequently denied relief. Petitioner now appeals that denial arguing that counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to present a second defense of misidentification, and (2) failing to call Petitioner’s mother to “bolster” his alibi.

I concur with the majority’s opinion regarding the evidentiary issue. I dissent from the majority’s opinion insofar as it finds insufficient evidence to support the convictions.

Following a jury trial, the appellant, Roshad Romanic Siler, was convicted of three counts of the sale of a counterfeit controlled substance, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of one year for each conviction, but suspended the sentences and placed the appellant on community corrections. The appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and an evidentiary ruling made by the trial court on appeal. Because we determine that the evidence was insufficient to support the appellant’s convictions, we reverse and dismiss.

The defendant, Marques¹ Douglas, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the guilty verdicts. After review, we affirm the judgments of conviction.

The pro se petitioner, James Brian Stevens, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief, arguing that the statute of limitations should have been tolled during the time that he spent on probation. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition as time-barred.

The appellant, Eric Michael Goldman aka Eric Forrest, was convicted of driving after being declared a habitual motor vehicle offender (Class E felony) and sentenced to four years in the Department of Correction as a multiple offender. He was also found guilty of driving on a revoked license, tenth offense (Class A misdemeanor), which was merged with the conviction for driving as a habitual motor vehicle offender. On appeal, he contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for the offense of driving after being declared a habitual motor vehicle offender; and (2) the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive and contrary to the law. After careful review, we conclude that no reversible error exists and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Carlos Angel, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.