APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Kenneth Workman, pled guilty in the Giles County Circuit Court to aggravated burglary, Class D felony theft, and Class D felony vandalism. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective four-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction and ordered restitution in the amount of $5000.00. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the amount of restitution is excessive. After a review of the record, restitution is reduced from $5000.00 to $2750.00. Otherwise, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Petitioner, Fredrick L. Brown, Jr., appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner claims that the concurrent life sentences he is serving for two first degree murder convictions are illegal and void because the second offense was committed while he was out on bail for the first offense and that, under these circumstances, Tennessee law mandates consecutive sentencing. A recent decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court compels our conclusion that summary dismissal was proper. The judgment of the Bledsoe County Circuit Court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Tarrean Nuby, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted first degree murder and aggravated robbery. On appeal, he alleges there was insufficient evidence for any rational jury to convict him of attempted first degree murder. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Artis Reese, was indicted on four counts of aggravated robbery, one count of possession of marijuana, and one count of aggravated criminal trespass. After a jury trial, the appellant was convicted of four counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated criminal trespass. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged two of the aggravated robbery convictions into the other two aggravated robbery convictions and imposed consecutive eight-year sentences on the resulting two convictions for aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a concurrent sentence of six months for aggravated criminal trespass, resulting in an effective sentence of sixteen years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, this appeal followed in which the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Because the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Charles A. Green, was convicted on his guilty pleas of three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The defendant, a Range I offender, received four-year sentences, with two counts to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of eight years. The effective sentence involved split confinement of one year in jail and seven years on probation. The trial court later found that the defendant had violated his probation by committing a new offense and revoked his probation. The defendant appeals, arguing that substantial evidence does not support that determination. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Chico McCracken, was convicted of one count of murder in the perpetration of a felony and one count of aggravated robbery. He petitioned for post-conviction relief claiming that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The post-conviction court dismissed the post-conviction petition, and we affirm that judgment.

A Franklin County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Jimmy Dale Pickett, of first degree premeditated murder and especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of life and twenty years, respectively. On appeal, the appellant claims (1) that he is entitled to a retrial because the State violated the rule of sequestration; (2) that the trial court erred by denying his motions to suppress his confessions; (3) that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to use a transcript, which had not been introduced into evidence, during deliberations; (4) that the trial court erred by refusing to give the jury a corpus delicti instruction; and (5) that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. Finding no errors requiring reversal, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Barry Brown, was convicted of three counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies.Two of the counts of aggravated robbery were merged, and the trial court imposed a thirty-year sentence on each conviction, to be served consecutively to each other for an effective sixty-year sentence in the Department of Correction as a persistent offender. The defendant appeals claiming that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict; (2) the trial court erred in failing to suppress pretrial statements made by the defendant; and (3) the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion to consolidate. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Pierre Andre Brown, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Eric Carter, appeals the trial court's order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's judgment pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Andre Neely, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After a review of the pleadings, the lower court’s order and the applicable law, this Court concludes that the lower court properly determined that the Petitioner’s claims were waived and properly dismissed the petition. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s dismissal.

Pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State of Tennessee, through the Attorney General, requested rehearing of the opinion filed in this case on January 17, 2007, which reversed the trial court’s summary dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus and remanded the case for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing related to the allegation that the petitioner’s sentence was illegal due to an improper offender classification.

The Appellant, Anthony Bonds , was convicted by 1 a Shelby County jury of attempted especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Bonds raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Following review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of conviction.

The appellant, Donnie Glenn Thompson, was indicted on one count of stalking his ex-wife. The appellant applied for pretrial diversion, and this request was denied by the district attorney general.  The trial court denied the appellant’s petition for writ of certiorari, holding that the district attorney general had not abused his discretion by denying pretrial diversion. This Court accepted the appellant’s application for interlocutory appeal and issued a judgment in which we reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the issue for further consideration by the district attorney general.  The district attorney general denied the appellant’s application for pretrial diversion a second time.  The appellant filed a second petition for writ of certiorari, which the trial court again denied. We have accepted the appellant’s second application for interlocutory appeal. Because the district attorney general considered the proper criteria when evaluating the appellant’s application for pretrial diversion, including evidence favorable to the defendant and because he articulated sufficient grounds for denying the appellant’s request for pretrial diversion, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that the district attorney general did not abuse his discretion

The State appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s granting the petitioner’s request for postconviction relief from his convictions for two counts of second degree murder and one count of attempted second degree murder and effective sixty-two-year sentence. In this appeal, the State claims that the trial court erred by concluding (1) that the petitioner received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and (2) that the petitioner did not voluntarily and knowingly waive his right to a twelve-member jury verdict. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred by granting the petitioner’s request for post-conviction relief and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Jamie Roskom, was convicted by a Bedford County jury of violating the Sexual Offender Registration, Verification, and Tracking Act of 2004, a Class E felony. On appeal, Roskom argues that he was indicted for failing to “register” as a sexual offender, which is a violation of section 208 of the Act; however, he was convicted of failing to “report,” which is a violation of section 204. See T.C.A. § 40-39-208(1), -204(c) (Supp. 2004). As such, Roskom asserts that he was not given notice of the crime for which he was convicted, and there is “no proof that [he] [committed] the offense for which he was indicted.” After review of the record, we agree and conclude that the indicted offense of failing to “register” impermissibly varied from the proof at trial, which established the separate offense of failing to “report.” Accordingly, Roskom’s conviction for violation of the “sex offender registration act” is reversed and dismissed.

The defendant, Kenneth D. Hoover a.k.a. Kenneth Johnson, appeals his convictions and sentence. The defendant was found guilty of second degree murder (Class A felony), reckless endangerment (Class A misdemeanor), and possession of a weapon with the intent to employ it in the commission of a felony (Class E felony). The defendant received an effective sentence of twenty-nine years. On appeal, the defendant alleges that the trial court erred in admitting certain autopsy photographs and erred in imposing an excessive sentence. After review, we affirm the judgments of conviction and sentencing.

Andrew Soimis, the defendant, appeals his conviction for second degree murder (Class A felony) on the sole ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. After review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient, and we affirm the judgment of conviction.

In May of 2005, the defendant, Jerry Lynn Osborne, Jr., was indicted for one count of theft under $500, seven counts of identity theft, and seven counts of fraudulent use of a debit card. In July of 2005, the defendant was indicted for one count of driving under the influence and one count of theft over $1000. He pled guilty to all of the indicted charges and received an effective sentence of four years in the Department of Correction. The defendant requested an alternative sentence of either probation or community corrections, which the trial court denied. The defendant now argues that the trial court erred by denying his request for an alternative sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Williamson County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Mark A. Schiefelbein, of seven counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. The trial court imposed a 12-year sentence for each conviction and ordered consecutive service, thereby yielding an effective sentence of 96 years. Aggrieved of the convictions and sentences, the defendant appeals and raises the following issues: (1) the trial court erred by failing to require the State to furnish discovery materials to the defendant; (2) the trial court committed reversible error by configuring courtroom seating to shield the public from viewing certain exhibits; (3) the trial court improperly instructed the jury, sua sponte, to disregard certain truthful testimony of the defendant; (4) the trial court’s repeated questioning of State’s witnesses created an appearance of judicial bias and improperly bolstered the State’s case; (5) the trial court committed reversible error in excluding defense-proffered medical testimony that a physical examination of the victim rebutted the occurrence of sexual penetration, contact, or injury; (6) the trial court permitted the introduction of inadmissible and highly prejudicial hearsay and opinion testimony; (7) the trial court erroneously permitted the State to examine the defendant about his knowledge that a “voice stress analysis” could detect stress in an individual’s voice; (8) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the defendant could be guilty of aggravated sexual battery if he acted intentionally, knowingly, or “recklessly”; (9) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the State could prove the mental state for aggravated sexual battery in the disjunctive by showing that the defendant acted intentionally, knowingly, “or” recklessly; (10) the trial judge should be disqualified from further involvement in the case; and (11) the defendant’s effective sentence is excessive, illegal, and unconstitutional. As an adjunct to the issues raised on direct appeal, the defendant also pursues Appellate Procedure Rule 10 interlocutory review to bar future prosecution of three related child rape charges that were severed, over his objection, from trial of the aggravated sexual battery and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor offenses. After thorough review of the record and careful consideration of the parties briefs, their oral arguments, and the applicable law, we hold that none of the errors require reversal of the defendant’s convictions for aggravated sexual battery or for aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. However, we hold that the incarcerative 96-years’ sentence is inconsistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing and does not provide a fair sense of predictability of the criminal law and its sanctions; therefore, we modify the defendant’s effective sentence from 96 years to 36 years. We order that the trial judge who presided at trial is disqualified from conducting any further proceedings in this cause. Finally, we dismiss the child rape offenses, as improperly severed, and hold that further prosecution on such charges is barred by
principles of double jeopardy.¹

The petitioner, Jacques B. Bennett, pled guilty to first degree murder in 1992 and was sentenced to life in prison. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the judgment against him was void because he was not present and not represented by counsel at his sentencing hearing and because the trial court did not follow statutory mandates in sentencing him. The trial court dismissed his petition without a hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Ayatolah W. Wallace, was convicted of three counts of aggravated kidnapping and sentenced to sixteen years in the Department of Correction as a Range II, violent offender. He argues that his convictions must be overturned in light of State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tenn. 1991), which precludes dual convictions for kidnapping and another accompanying felony when the movement or confinement supporting the kidnapping charge is merely incidental to that required to commit the accompanying felony. Because the defendant was convicted only of aggravated kidnapping, however, Anthony is inapposite. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Emanuel Lawrence Harris,¹ pled guilty to nine felony drug offenses and was sentenced to an effective term of twenty-three years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in ordering that some of his sentences be served consecutively. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Frank Ray Ruth, was indicted for thirty-seven counts of filing false sales tax returns and one count of Class C felony theft of property. The district attorney general denied the Defendant’s application for pretrial diversion. The trial court reversed, concluding that the district attorney abused his discretion. The State obtained an interlocutory appeal from this Court pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. Following our review of the record, the judgment of the Hamilton County Criminal Court ordering the district attorney general to grant the Defendant diversion is reversed. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

OnNovember 2, 2004, the appellant, Wiley Hawthorne, was indicted on one count of attempted first degree murder and one count of felony reckless endangerment. On July 27, 2005, a jury found the appellant guilty on both counts. On August 26, 2005, the trial court sentenced the appellant to twenty-two years for attempting to commit first degree murder and eighteen months for reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, the sentences to run concurrently. On September 9, 2005, the trial court denied the appellant’s motion for a new trial. The appellant filed a notice of appeal. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions on both counts of the indictment. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found the accused guilty of both counts of the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the appellant’s convictions.