APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Knox County- The defendant, Jeffrey A. Sundahl, was charged with four counts of unlawfully and knowingly depriving the state of the realization of its lawful revenue by failing to remit sales tax revenue, a Class E felony; one count of unlawfully and knowingly delaying, hampering, impeding, obstructing, and thwarting the state in its collection of its lawful revenue by failing to register with the state under Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-6-601, a Class E felony; and one count of theft over $60,000, a Class B felony. The trial court dismissed all six charges on statute of limitations grounds. The state appeals the dismissals. We affirm the judgments of the trial court as to counts 1 through 5. We conclude, however, that the trial court wrongly applied a three-year statute of limitations to the theft count, count 6, and we reverse the judgment as to that count.

The Appellant, Shad Tankersly, was found guilty of violating his probation and ordered to serve his sentence in incarceration. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s decision to revoke probation, asking this Court to determine whether a warrant is required to initiate a probation revocation proceeding and toll the time limitation within which to revoke probation. We hold that T.C.A. § 40- 35-311 plainly requires the issuance of a warrant to initiate a probation revocation proceeding, and, that in the absence of the issuance of a warrant during the probationary period, as is the case here, there is no tolling of the period. Therefore, we reverse and remand the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was indicted for three counts of solicitation to commit first degree murder, committed while he was in prison for a previous, unrelated conviction. The defendant pled guilty to the three counts. As part of his plea agreement, he received three sentences of ten years each to be served concurrently. In a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court determined that the three concurrent sentences should be served consecutively to the sentence he was serving at the time the crimes were committed. The defendant appeals, arguing that he should have received concurrent sentences and that he was entitled to pre-trial jail credits for time served between the continuation of a parole hearing and his sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Raymond Lee Gibson, was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of one count of manufacturing methamphetamine. On appeal, he raises several evidentiary issues for our review and argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After review of the record, we are not persuaded that the evidentiary issues merit relief, and we hold that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the manufacturing conviction. The judgment of conviction is, therefore, affirmed.

The petitioner, Jamie Lou Haneline, appeals the Decatur County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction and error coram nobis relief. He contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that he is entitled to error coram nobis relief based upon newly discovered evidence. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Shannon Richard Hudson, was found guilty by a Hamilton County jury of three counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery. The three counts of aggravated sexual battery were merged, and the defendant received an effective twenty-seven-year sentence in the Department of Correction. He was sentenced to twenty years for the aggravated sexual battery conviction and to seven years for the attempted aggravated sexual battery conviction, to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of twenty-seven years. On appeal, he contends that: the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; the trial court erred in allowing the jury to have access to the indictment during their deliberation; and the trial court should have merged all of his convictions. After careful review, we find no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted the petitioner, Joseph W. Wilson, of three counts of aggravated rape and one count each of attempted second degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, and misdemeanor vandalism committed in 1999. He was sentenced to 71-years’ confinement. In 2005, he filed a post-conviction petition requesting DNA testing pursuant to the Post Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The court denied the petitioner's post-conviction petition, and on appeal he contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable law, we conclude that there is no reversible error in the lower court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Michael Hooper, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of
habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the
petition.

The defendant, Charles E. Harrison, waived his right to a jury and proceeded with a bench trial. The trial court found the defendant guilty of theft of property over $1000 (Class D felony), Driving Under the Influence (D.U.I.) fourth offense (Class E felony), driving on a revoked license (Class A misdemeanor), and violation of the implied consent law (Class A misdemeanor). The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of seven years and six months. The defendant received six years and six months as a Range II offender for the theft conviction; eleven months and twenty-nine days for the D.U.I. conviction; eleven months and twenty-nine days for the driving on a revoked license conviction; and five days for violation of the implied consent law. The misdemeanor sentences were imposed concurrently with each other but consecutively to the felony conviction. At the sentencing hearing, the D.U.I. fourth offense conviction was amended to D.U.I. third offense (Class A misdemeanor). The defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence to support the theft conviction, contending that the State failed to prove the defendant intended to deprive the owner of his property. We conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to support the theft conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Matthew Lee Rogers, appeals the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for habeas corpus relief. After reviewing the record and applicable law, we note that this Petitioner was recently granted a new trial on direct appeal, and his grounds for habeas corpus relief are now moot. Thus, we find no error in the judgment of the habeas court and affirm the denial of the habeas corpus petition.

The petitioner, Donald Clark, who was convicted of especially aggravated robbery, sought  postconviction relief from the Shelby County Criminal Court, which denied relief after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner presents several issues of the ineffective assistance of  counsel. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Appellant, Roger A. Weaver, Jr., appeals the sentencing decision of the Lauderdale County
Circuit Court. Pursuant to the terms of plea agreements stemming from two separate cases, Weaver pled guilty to the crimes of reckless aggravated assault, felony reckless endangerment, and aggravated assault and received an effective sentence of nine years in confinement. On appeal, Weaver argues that the trial court erred in denying non-incarcerative sentences for each conviction. After review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
 

Probation for the defendant, Greg Goff, was revoked after he tested positive for cocaine and admitted he had possessed and sold cocaine while on probation. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and that his sentence is excessive in light of the circumstances surrounding his violation and past criminal history. After review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the defendant’s probation. Further, we conclude that our review is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion in revoking the defendant’s probation and not the length of the sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Dennis Jarrett, was convicted of driving after being declared a
habitual motor vehicle offender, a Class E felony, and violation of the open container law, a Class
C misdemeanor. The jury found Defendant not guilty of violation of the seatbelt law. Following
a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III career offender to six years for his felony conviction. Defendant does not appeal the length of his sentence or the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his misdemeanor conviction. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his felony conviction; (2) the trial court erred in not granting Defendant’s motion for a mistrial; and (3) the trial court erred in excluding Defendant from the courtroom during his trial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

This appeal is before this Court after remand by order of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Petitioner, Dwight K. Pritchard, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that the guilty pleas he entered were not knowing and voluntary because the sentences imposed by the trial court were illegal. A recent decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court compels our conclusion that summary dismissal was proper. The judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court summarily dismissing the petition is affirmed.

The Appellant, Roy Gene Russom, was convicted by a Henderson County jury of violating the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender Act and was subsequently sentenced, as a Range II offender, to four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Russom raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Following review, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

The Defendant, Larry Daniel, appeals the sentence imposed after his probation was revoked due to an arrest for driving under the influence. Additionally, the Defendant asserts that the statute which prohibits credit from being given for time spent on probation is unconstitutional. After reviewing the record and applicable law, we find no error in the judgment of the trial court and affirm.

The petitioner, Marcus Nixon, was convicted by a Lauderdale County jury of rape of a child. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. State v. Marcus Vashawn Nixon, No. W2003-01909-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2058927, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 2004). The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for DNA analysis pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-304, that was denied by the trial court; the denial was affirmed by this court. Marcus Nixon v. State, No. W2005-02158-CCA-R3-WM, 2006 WL 851764 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 3, 2006). On September 15, 2005, he filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations. After the appointment of counsel, appropriate amendment to the petition, and a full evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Carl Anthony Watson, was convicted of rape, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years. This Court affirmed the conviction and sentence on appeal. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at his original trial, and that the post-conviction court erred in failing to grant a continuance of the evidentiary hearing. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The defendant, Alonzo Ladon Mason, appeals from his Bedford County Criminal Court jury conviction of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. He claims that the trial court erred in admitting a 9-1-1 tape recording into evidence and that the verdict is not supported by legally sufficient evidence. Because we disagree, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, James Albert Pippin, was convicted by a Putnam County jury of seven counts of aggravated assault and one count of resisting arrest. On appeal, he alleges the trial court improperly denied him judicial diversion at sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Klein Adlei Rawlins, was convicted by a Sumner County jury of aggravated child abuse and first degree felony murder. On appeal, he alleges that: (1) his right to counsel was violated during police questioning in jail; (2) the trial court erred when it allowed autopsy photographs of the victim into evidence; (3) the trial court erred when it allowed an unqualified witness to give expert testimony; and (4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Because we conclude that no reversible error exists, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, William Andrew Long, appeals from the sentencing decision of the Campbell County Circuit Court. In February of 2006, the Defendant pled guilty to kidnapping and robbery. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, he received an effective twelve-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender, and the trial court was to determine the manner of service. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by ordering a sentence of total confinement rather than a less restrictive alternative. After review, the sentencing decision is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Devonna Barbee, was found guilty of felony reckless endangerment (Class E felony). She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender, to a one-year community corrections sentence with sixty days to be served in jail. She appeals, contending the trial court erred by failing to grant her judicial diversion. After careful review, we conclude the trial court properly denied judicial diversion, and we affirm the judgment from the trial court.