APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The pro se Petitioner, Thomas Earl Williams, appeals the habeas corpus court’s order summarily dismissing his petition, arguing that the dismissal was erroneous for several reasons. Principally, he contends that he is entitled to relief because the sentencing statutes under which he was sentenced in 1974 were later found to be unconstitutional. Following our review, we conclude that his sentences are lawful and have not expired, and that his judgments are not void. Consequently, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s order of summary dismissal.

The Appellant, Elmer Harris, appeals his convictions in the Shelby County Criminal Court for aggravated robbery, criminal attempt to commit aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. The charges stemmed from incidents occurring at two different Memphis convenience stores on July 4 and July 10, 2004. Prior to trial, the State moved that the two separate indictments be consolidated for trial, and the trial court granted the motion for consolidation. On appeal, Harris presents two issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in consolidating the indictments for trial; and (2) whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support his convictions. We affirm Harris’ convictions; however, we conclude that double jeopardy protections require that the convictions for attempted aggravated robbery and aggravated assault be merged. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court for purposes of merger and for entry of corrected judgments of conviction.

The Defendant, Kristi Dance Oakes, pled guilty to one count of statutory rape. The trial court denied her request for judicial diversion or full probation and sentenced her to eighteen months, of which six months is to be served in the county jail, followed by twelve months of supervised community probation. She appeals that decision. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, after modifying the sentence. However, we remand for the correction of a clerical error in the judgment form.

The petitioner, Jermaine Hunter, appeals from the circuit court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

Petitioner, Timothy Baxter, pled guilty to a multitude of offenses on December 10, 2001. As a result of this negotiated plea, Petitioner received an effective sentence of twelve years. Petitioner did not file a petition for post-conviction relief until February 25, 2005, which was over two years outside the statute of limitations under T.C.A. § 40-30-102. On May 4, 2005, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition for being outside the statute of limitations. Petitioner did not file a notice of appeal within thirty days as required by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. On July 20, 2006, over a year after the post-conviction court filed its order dismissing his petition, Petitioner filed a motion for delayed notice of appeal. Five days later, the post-conviction court denied Petitioner’s request. On August 7, 2006, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the postconviction court’s dismissal of his motion for delayed appeal. Following a thorough review of the record, we dismiss Petitioner’s appeal on the grounds that there is no entitlement to a delayed appeal from the post-conviction court’s denial of Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief. In addition, it is not in the interest of justice to waive the timely filing of a notice of appeal in Petitioner’s case. Therefore, this appeal is dismissed.

The defendants, Shawn McCobb and Marcus Walker, were convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced as Range I, standard offenders to ten years in the Department of Correction. In their consolidated appeal, they argue that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions and the trial court erred in imposing ten-year sentences. Defendant Walker additionally asserts that it was error for the trial court to impose a fine over $50 and allow his impeachment with a prior conviction. Following our review, we affirm the convictions and sentences of the trial court but modify the fines imposed to $50 each.

I concur in the result and most of the reasoning in the majority opinion. I write separately because I believe the trial court should have, as it originally ruled, barred use of the defendant’s aggravated robbery conviction for impeachment. The main conduct of aggravated robbery that relates to dishonesty is essentially a theft. In the present case, the state had evidence of two prior theft convictions and two other acts of theft with which to impeach the defendant. To allow use, as well, of an aggravated robbery conviction in this aggravated robbery trial would add little probative value on the issue of the defendant’s credibility compared to the substantial prejudice it would have by involving an offense similar to the offense on trial.

The defendant, Marcus Dwayne Welcome, appeals as of right his Knox County Criminal Court jury conviction for criminal responsibility for aggravated robbery for which he received a sentence of twenty years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, he contends that double jeopardy precludes his conviction, that the verdict form incorrectly and prejudicially characterized criminal responsibility as a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery, that the trial court should have granted a mistrial based upon the witness’s reference to the defendant’s previous incarceration, that the trial court erred in ruling a prior robbery admissible for impeachment purposes, and that the trial court committed errors related to sentencing. Following our review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Tymetric Lejuan Graham, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to twelve years as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, he argues that his indictment charged attempted aggravated robbery only and that, therefore, the trial court erred in submitting the charge of aggravated robbery to the jury. We agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court. We remand for entry of a conviction and sentence for attempted aggravated robbery.

The defendant, Milton Lebron Byrd, was convicted of attempted first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court merged the offenses and sentenced the defendant to life without the possibility of parole as a repeat violent offender. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction and that the repeat violent offenders statute is unconstitutional in violation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and of his due process and equal protection rights. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Marlow Williams, was indicted in June of 2003 with six counts of aggravated robbery. In September of 2004, Appellant invoked the provisions of the Interstate Compact on Detainers to dispose of his charges in Tennessee. The Assistant Attorney General and Shelby County Criminal Court received the Request for Disposition of Indictment on October 4, 2004. Appellant was transported to Tennessee. A jury trial was held in September of 2005, where Appellant was found guilty of two counts of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced Appellant to concurrent ten year sentences, but merged Count 2 for a single sentence under Count 1. On appeal, Appellant argues that: (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss the indictment because his trial was held after the expiration of the 180 days provided for in the Interstate Compact on Detainers; (2) the trial court improperly admitted expert testimony on fingerprints; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; and (4) the trial court improperly sentenced him. We determine that the trial was not held in violation of the Interstate Compact on Detainers and that the trial court properly admitted expert testimony on fingerprints. Furthermore, despite the improper application of enhancement factor (3), the offense involved more than one victim, we determine that the trial court properly sentenced Appellant. As a result, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Melvin Cofer, was convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide and vehicular assault. As a result, the petitioner received concurrent sentences of twenty-one years and three years. The petitioner’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Melvin Cofer, No. W2002-01984-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 21729450, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jul. 25, 2003), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Nov. 24, 2003). Subsequently, the supreme court denied permission to appeal. The petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging, on numerous grounds, ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel was appointed and several amended petitions were filed. The petition was denied by the post-conviction court after a hearing. This appeal followed. Because the post-conviction court properly denied the petition, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

James Wesley Daniels, the defendant, appeals his convictions for premeditated first degree murder and attempted second degree murder. The defendant asserts as grounds for appeal that: the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; the trial judge erred in refusing to recuse himself; and the trial court erred in failing to take remedial action after the defendant was observed in restraints by some jury members. We have concluded that no reversible error is present, and we affirm the convictions.

The defendant, John Dupree, appeals the trial court’s judgment denying any form of alternative sentence. The defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to allow him to call witnesses during the sentencing hearing and in denying an alternative sentence. After careful review, we conclude that no reversible error occurred during the sentencing hearing and that the denial of alternative sentencing was proper. We affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The petitioner, Terrance N. Carter, pro se, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in Davidson County which was summarily dismissed. He appealed pro se and was appointed counsel by this court. His pro se filing challenges whether the trial court erred in dismissing his petition without an evidentiary hearing. His appointed counsel requests that his habeas corpus petition be treated as one for post-conviction relief and that this court order the Davidson County Court to transfer the matter to the Maury County Criminal Court to proceed as if the petition was for post-conviction relief. We conclude that, without express authority, we should not order a transfer in this case, and the summary dismissal is affirmed.

The petitioner, Macario Chism, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his 2007 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In the petition, the petitioner challenged the validity of his
multiple 1993 Shelby County convictions, which were the results of guilty pleas and included
convictions of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and aggravated kidnapping. The petition
alleged that the petitioner was free on bond on the charge of aggravated burglary when he was
arrested for nine of the other offenses, and he claimed that the partial concurrent alignment of the
resulting sentences rendered his judgments void. Because the petitioner failed to file a statutorily
compliant petition, we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner, Ronald Dennis Crafton, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. He contends that his judgments for rape are void because the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and because he was sentenced in absentia. Because the petitioner has failed to assert a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed

The defendant, after denial of his motion to suppress evidence, entered a plea of guilty to possession with intent to sell more than one-half gram of cocaine, a Class B felony. The negotiated sentence was eight years as a standard offender. The defendant appeals pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(I). After review, we conclude that denial of the motion to suppress was error. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and dismiss the charges.

The petitioner, Marcillo C. Anderson,1 appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.
He argues that counsel was ineffective due to his failure to: (1) adequately communicate with him
concerning his case; (2) provide him with discovery materials regarding his case; (3) adequately
investigate the case; and (4) adequately present proof that he was acting in self-defense. After
review, we affirm the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.

The defendant, David Milken, was convicted of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. He received concurrent sentences of life and twenty years. On appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in admitting certain photographs into evidence. We conclude that no error exists, and we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael Lindsey, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis and the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Because the petitioner has failed to allege appropriate grounds for coram nobis relief and because his petition for post-conviction relief is procedurally barred, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Lorenzo “Buster” Woods, pled guilty to one count of assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended upon the service of six months in the local jail. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying him full probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, but we remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting misdemeanor community corrections supervision for five months and twenty-nine days.

The defendant, Charles Stan Martin, was convicted by a Sevier County jury of one count of reckless homicide, a Class D felony, and received a four-year sentence to be served on probation. On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction, (2) the reckless homicide statute is unconstitutional as applied to him, (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a prior incident, (4) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on an alibi defense, and (5) the trial court abused its discretion in denying him judicial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Shelby County Grand Jury indicted Appellant for aggravated arson and vandalism over $10,000.00, but below $60,000.00. At the conclusion of a jury trial, Appellant was convicted as charged. The trial court sentenced Appellant to twenty-five years as a Range I Standard Offender for the aggravated arson conviction and eight years as a Range II Multiple Offender for the vandalism conviction. The trial court also ordered these sentences to be served consecutively. Appellant now appeals these judgments arguing that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions; (2) evidence of impeachment by prior conviction was improperly admitted; (3) the trial court improperly allowed the amendment of the indictment; and that (4) the trial court erred in enhancing the sentence and in imposing consecutive sentences. We have thoroughly reviewed the record and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Sidney Porterfield, pro se, seeks habeas corpus relief from his 1986 Shelby County first degree murder conviction and death sentence, alleging his indictment was void because it was returned by a grand jury from which women had been systematically excluded as grand jury forepersons.  He now appeals from the Davidson County dismissal of his petition.  The State contends that this court is without jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal and offered no explanation and, further, that the petition does not meet all the criteria set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-107.  Furthermore, the State contends that a void indictment does not deprive a trial court of jurisdiction, that the petitioner’s claim is not cognizable for habeas corpus relief because proof beyond the face of the judgment and record is required, and that our Supreme Court has rejected an identical claim regarding discrimination in the selection of a grand jury foreperson in State v. Bondurant, 4 S.W.3d 662 (Tenn. 1999).  After careful review, we conclude that the notice of appeal is not jurisdictional and may be waived in the interest of justice.  However, without explanation or request being filed, the interest of justice weighs against waiver; therefore, we dismiss this appeal.