APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Russell L. Tipton, was charged with reckless operation of a motor vessel and failure to observe the motor vessel light law. The appellant applied for pretrial diversion and has twice been denied. In the instant appeal, the appellant challenges the prosecutor’s second denial of his application for pretrial diversion. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the judgment of the trial court upholding the prosecutor’s denial of diversion and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The prescribed due process analysis in cases of multiple prosecutions involving kidnapping is vexing to prosecutors and courts, if not to defenders, because of the infinite possibilities for factual permutations. The present case presents an apt opportunity to illustrate the analytical challenges and shortcomings.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the aggravated kidnapping conviction should be reversed under State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991). I concur, though, in the majority opinion’s analysis and conclusions regarding the sufficiency of the evidence and consecutive sentencing.

The Defendant, Thomas Coburn, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, and attempted rape, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to nineteen years for the aggravated kidnapping and nine years for the attempted rape to be served consecutively in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts the following: (1) his conviction for aggravated kidnapping violated federal and state due process protections and should be vacated under State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991); (2) the evidence establishing identification is insufficient to support his convictions for attempted rape and aggravated kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the trial court erred in ordering the Defendant to serve consecutive sentences based upon the classification as a dangerous offender. We reverse the Defendant’s conviction for aggravated kidnapping. We affirm the conviction for attempted rape.

The defendant, David Threat, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery, for which he received concurrent sentences of life and twelve years, respectively. He raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to police; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting a store surveillance videotape into evidence; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his felony murder conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Michael Ray Carlton, was convicted of theft over $60,000 (Class B felony) and sentenced to eight years as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant now appeals his conviction and sentencing and presents the following issues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the trial court erred in its jury instruction regarding accomplice corroboration; (3) the trial court committed plain error in allowing certain testimony and in allowing improper comments in closing argument; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing by its order of incarceration. After review, we affirm the conviction but modify the manner of service of sentence to serve six months in the local jail or workhouse, with eligibility for work release if available, followed by supervised probation for the remainder of his sentence. We remand to the trial court for the determination and setting of restitution payments.

The appellant, Vanda Watkins, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and pursuant to the plea agreement, received a two-year sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the appellant serve his entire sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court erred by denying his request for probation. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Robert Charles Skinner, appeals from the judgment of the Dyer County Circuit Court, revoking his probation and imposing service of the remainder of his misdemeanor sentence in confinement. In this appeal, the defendant argues that the court erred in revoking his probation.  Following our review of the record, parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we determine no error exists in the court’s revocation of probation, and thus affirm the court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Glenn Bernard Mann, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Following our review of the record, parties’ briefs and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Connie Lee Arnold, appeals the Carter County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for child rape and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and resulting effective thirty-seven-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that (1) he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his attorney failed to file a motion for change of venue based on pretrial publicity and (2) the post-conviction court judge erred by refusing to recuse himself from this case. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the petitioner did not receive the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the postconviction court did not err by denying the petitioner’s motion to recuse. Nevertheless, we hold that the judge who presided over this post-conviction proceeding is disqualified from any subsequent proceedings in this case.

The Appellant, Michael Davis, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Davis raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury with regard to criminal responsibility for the conduct of another; and (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of conviction.

Defendant, Mitchell Ridley, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence and the imposing of a sentence of confinement. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Wilson County- The Defendant, David Lane Goss, was convicted by a Wilson County jury of driving under the influence. On appeal, the Defendant alleges the trial court erred when it: denied his motion to suppress certain oral statements he gave during the traffic stop; denied his motion to dismiss based on his claim that he was not properly taken before a magistrate; and denied his motion for judgment of acquittal. After a thorough review of the record and relevant law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Gerald Wells, was indicted for one count of aggravated robbery. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted as charged. The trial court sentenced Appellant as a Range II multiple offender to seventeen years for the conviction. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Because the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for aggravated robbery, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendants, Deddrick Parker, Taurus Driver, and Tremaine Roberson, were indicted for two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and five counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. Each defendant was convicted of both counts of aggravated robbery, and Roberson was also convicted of all five counts of aggravated assault, Parker of two counts, and Driver of two counts of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of aggravated assault. Roberson, Parker, and Driver were sentenced as Range I, standard offenders to consecutive sentences totaling thirty-five, twentyfour, and twenty years, respectively. In this consolidated appeal, they raise three issues: (1) the evidence is insufficient; (2) the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factors and in imposing consecutive sentencing; and (3) the trial court erred by not timely disclosing its prior relationship with an assault victim. Following our review, we remand for resentencing as to those sentences imposed on each defendant which exceed the minimum, affirm the remaining judgments, and remand to the trial court for a determination as to whether the sentences should be served concurrently or consecutively.

The petitioner, Tommy L. Watson, pled guilty to vehicular homicide (Class B felony) and reckless endangerment (Class E felony) in exchange for a sentence of twelve years. On appeal, he contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and submits that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After review, we conclude that no error exists and affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Gregory O. Cherry, was found guilty by a jury of possession of over .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, delivery of under .5 grams of cocaine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. As a result, he was sentenced to a total effective sentence of eight years. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve the effective eight-year sentence consecutively to sentences in case numbers 8395 and 8396.1 Appellant filed a motion for new trial. Appellant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress Appellant’s confession and improperly refused to suppress evidence obtained by a warrantless search of Appellant’s car. Appellant also contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions. Because the record does not indicate that the trial court denied Appellant’s motion for new trial, we determine that we lack jurisdiction to hear the case and dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, Gary Lee Marise, was convicted by a Carroll County jury of attempt to manufacture methamphetamine, a Class D felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to four years in the Department of Correction. He raises essentially three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in refusing his request for special jury instructions; and (3) whether he was denied a fair trial and the effective assistance of counsel due to the poor acoustics in the temporary courtroom,  which prevented some jurors from hearing his trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Larry Johnson, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to request an instruction on second-degree murder as a lesser-included offense of premeditated first-degree murder and did not raise the trial court’s failure to give such instruction as an issue in the motion for new trial. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The majority, relying upon the authority of McLaney v. Bell, affirms the grant of habeas corpus relief. However, relying upon the authority of the Tennessee Supreme Court cases discussed below, I must respectfully dissent. My reasons are two-fold.

The State appeals the habeas court’s grant of a petition for habeas corpus relief filed by the Petitioner, Anthony Keshun Goods. The Petitioner alleged in his petition that his sentence was illegal because he was sentenced to concurrent terms when the law required him to be sentenced to consecutive terms. On appeal, the State contends the statutory requirement of consecutive sentences does not apply to the Petitioner, his petition is not yet ripe, and the remedy set out by the habeas court is improper. Finding no error in the judgment of the habeas court, we affirm the grant of habeas corpus relief and remand the case to the Shelby County Criminal Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

The petitioner, Dennis Jarrett, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel as grounds for relief. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition as timebarred. The petitioner appeals the dismissal, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Rickey Williams, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree premeditated murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction on the definition of “knowing.” Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Guy Martin, was found guilty by a jury of aggravated robbery and intentionally evading arrest in a motor vehicle. As a result, the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of nine years. Following the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant initiated this appeal. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. As part of his argument that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the photographic lineup as unduly suggestive. Because the photographic lineup was not unduly suggestive and there was evidence presented from which a rational juror could conclude that Appellant committed aggravated robbery and intentionally evaded arrest in a motor vehicle, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, William T. Carter, of premeditated first-degree murder, see T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(1) (2006), felony murder, see id. § 39-13-202(a)(2), and aggravated robbery, see id. § 39-13-402(a)(2). On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding all three convictions. He also asserts that the trial court erred in finding that he qualified as a dangerous offender regarding the aggravated robbery conviction and that the trial court erred in ordering him to serve the aggravated robbery sentence consecutively to his firstdegree murder conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court; however, we remand for the execution of a proper merger of the first degree murder findings of guilt.