APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Bobby Joe McCauley, pled guilty to first degree felony murder and received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. In this post-conviction appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel relative to his mental health condition and whether his plea was knowingly entered. The trial court denied relief, and we affirm that judgment.

The defendant, Szumanski Stroud, appeals from his Shelby County Criminal Court jury trial convictions of two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies, for which he received seven-year and six-month sentences, to be served consecutively in the Department of Correction as a Range II offender. In this appeal, he claims (1) that the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions, (2) that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the definition of “intentionally” and “knowingly” mental states, and (3) that he was excessively sentenced. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Antonio Lamar Osborn, appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify his probation order because more than thirty days had elapsed since the entry of the order. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Alberto Camacho, was indicted on six counts of theft and one count of impersonation of a licensed professional. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of four counts of theft over one thousand dollars, a Class D felony, two counts of theft over five hundred dollars, a Class E felony, and one count of impersonation of a licensed professional, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced Appellant to four years for each Class D felony and two years for each Class E felony. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently, for a total effective sentence of four years. The trial court further ordered Appellant to serve 200 days of the sentence day-for-day, with the balance of the sentence to be served on supervised probation. Appellant was also ordered to pay $750 per month toward restitution. Appellant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the charge of impersonation of a licensed professional and that his sentence is improper. Because the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, the trial court properly instructed the jury and the trial court properly applied enhancement factors (2) and (16), we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, because the trial court erred in imposing a sentence ordering Appellant to serve 200 days of the sentence day-for-day, we reverse that portion of the sentence and remand to the trial court for entry of an order deleting the requirement that the sentence be served day-for-day.

Defendant, Gregory Lee Smith, was indicted for aggravated rape. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of the lesser included offense of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to twelve years. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Katia Lenee Harris a/k/a Fuzzy, pled guilty to one count of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced her to ten years confinement based on the application of three enhancement factors. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when sentencing her. We conclude the trial court erred in enhancing the Defendant’s sentence based on enhancement  factors (1) and (10). Thus, we modify the Defendant’s sentence to nine years.

I respectfully dissent from the decision reached in the majority opinion. I believe the petitioner should be granted relief because he did not get the benefit of pretrial jail credits in this case as provided in his plea agreement.

I concur in the result and most of the reasoning in the majority opinion. I cannot agree, though, that the defendant committed the offense “to gratify the defendant’s desire for pleasure or excitement.” T.C.A. § 40-35-114(7).

The Petitioner, James Swiggett, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Swiggett is currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment as a result of his conviction for first degree murder. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in concluding that his petition failed to state a colorable claim for habeas corpus relief. After review, we affirm the judgment of the Johnson County Criminal Court dismissing the petition.

The Appellant, Marlon Fitzgerald, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Shelby County Criminal Court. Fitzgerald was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and theft of property. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the convictions and held that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions and that the trial court’s failure to charge the jury with lesser-included offenses was harmless error. Fitzgerald then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. After a review of the entire record on appeal and the arguments of the parties, we affirm.

The Appellant, Reginald Cortez Richardson, was convicted by a McNairy County jury of two counts of Class B delivery of cocaine and was sentenced, as a Range II offender, to concurrent  twelve-year sentences in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Richardson raises the single issue of whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions. Following review, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.

Following a jury trial, the petitioner, Edward L. Williams, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of life for the murder conviction and twenty-two years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On direct appeal, this court remanded for entry of an amended judgment reflecting a sentence of life with the possibility of parole and deleting any reference to a merger of the premeditated murder count and the felony murder count. The court further ordered that the sentences run concurrently rather than consecutively. The judgment of the trial court was otherwise affirmed. State v. Edward L. Williams, No. E2002-00325-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22462533 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Oct. 31, 2003), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2005). The petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief which the post-conviction court subsequently denied after an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner now appeals. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective. Following a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner was convicted by a jury of one count of felony possession of cocaine with intent to sell, a class B felony, and one count of felony possession of marijuana with the intent to sale, a class E felony. Petitioner was sentenced as a Range I offender to twelve years for the cocaine conviction and two years for the marijuana conviction to be served concurrently in the Tennessee Department of Correction and a $100,000 fine. Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed by this court. See State v. Boales, 2005 WL 517538, at *1. (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, March 3, 2005) perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 27, 2005). This Court also affirmed his sentence as to incarceration, but reduced the fine imposed to $50,000. See Boales, 2005 WL 517538. Petitioner timely filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the record of the post-conviction hearing, this Court affirms the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition.

The defendant, James William Gann, Jr., was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, arson, and setting fire to personal property. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(1), -14-301(a)(1), -14-303(a) (1997). He received a sentence of life with the possibility of parole for the premeditated murder conviction. The trial court imposed a sentence of six years for the arson conviction and two years for the setting fire to personal property conviction to be served consecutively to each other and to the murder conviction for an effective sentence of life plus eight years. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) that the trial court erred in the admission of certain evidence, (3) that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct, and (4) that his sentence is excessive. Upon our review of the record, there is no reversible error and the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Defendant, Walter Martin, was convicted of rape, a Class B felony, and sentenced to ten years at 100% in the Department of Correction. On direct appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish Shelby County as the proper venue for his trial and that he was erroneously sentenced. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and the Defendant’s sentence but remand for correction of two clerical errors made in the judgment of conviction.

The defendant, Richard Yarbrough, was convicted by a Knox County jury of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, the delivery of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The convictions for sale and delivery were merged, and the defendant was subsequently sentenced to eleven years for that conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the paraphernalia conviction, with the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, he contends that: the evidence was insufficient to convict him for the sale and delivery of cocaine because the sale was incomplete; the trial court erred in allowing a bag containing rock cocaine-like pieces of evidence to be introduced during trial; and the trial court erred in sentencing. After review, we conclude that no error exists and affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The defendant, Adrian Porterfield, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of voluntary
manslaughter, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to serve four years and six months in the county workhouse as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s judgment on grounds that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial erred in admitting a hearsay statement by the victim; (4) the trial court erred in not allowing evidence of drugs found on the victim’s body; (5) the trial court erred in not allowing testimony of a statement the victim made to police regarding his involvement in a robbery of the defendant; (6) the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing; and (7) the length of his sentence is excessive. We affirm the trial court but remand the case for a corrected judgment because the sentence imposed in the judgment conflicts with the sentence reflected in the sentencing hearing transcript.

I fully concur in the judgment of the Court that Appellant’s convictions and sentences should be affirmed. However, I disagree with the majority’s rationale concerning the striking by the trial court of Ms. Taylor’s testimony that she had never seen her husband intoxicated.

The Appellant, Davidson M. Taylor, appeals his convictions by a Shelby County jury for felony evading arrest in a motor vehicle and driving under the influence (“DUI”). For his felony conviction, Taylor received a one-year suspended sentence. Taylor was also sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the DUI conviction, with forty-eight hours to be served in confinement. On appeal, Taylor argues that the trial court misapplied established rules of evidence when it ruled that a defense witness’ testimony be stricken. Following review of the record before us, we find no error and affirm the judgments of conviction and resulting sentences.

After a bench trial, the Rutherford County Circuit Court convicted the defendant, Lavon Nunnery, of misdemeanor assault for threatening to turn his pit bulldog loose on his neighbor. The trial court subsequently sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county workhouse, to be served consecutively to the three-year sentence for assault with a deadly weapon for which he was on probation at the time of the instant offense. In a timely appeal to this court, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, arguing that the proof was insufficient to show that the victim reasonably feared imminent bodily injury from the dog. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Mindy Sue Dodd, was convicted by a Rutherford County jury of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder in the death of her husband, Sherman Henry Dodd. She received concurrent sentences of life in prison and twenty years. This court affirmed her convictions on direct appeal, and her application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court was denied. State v. Mindy S. Dodd, No. M2002-01882-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22999444, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 23, 2003), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. June 1, 2004). The petitioner sought post-conviction relief alleging, inter alia, denial of her constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court found that the petitioner had failed to show that her trial counsel was ineffective and dismissed her petition. Following our review of the record and the findings of the post-conviction court, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

Following a jury trial, Joseph Hall was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual battery. Defendant was sentenced to ten years for each count to run concurrently. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) the trial court erred by failing to require that the state provide defense counsel with taped forensic interviews of the victims; (2) the evidence was legally insufficient to convict Defendant of aggravated sexual battery; and (3) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted aggravated sexual battery. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Robert Christopher Maclin, was convicted of driving on a revoked license and possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to thirteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his cocaine conviction because he was not in possession of cocaine when he was arrested. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Weakley County Circuit Court jury convicted the petitioner, Allen Jean Stephens, of possession of more than one-half gram of cocaine with intent to sell and possession of drug paraphernalia, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to an effective sentence of twenty three years in confinement. This court affirmed the petitioner’s convictions. See State v. Allen Jean Stephens, No. M2004-00531-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 668 (Jackson, June 23, 2005), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 2005). Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief, and the post-conviction court denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to argue at his pretrial suppression hearing that no probable cause existed for a search warrant to be issued for his home and failed to argue on direct appeal that the trial court did not make a necessary finding of fact regarding the motion to suppress. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Christopher Brown, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgments of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.