APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Leodish Coe, pled guilty to fourth offense driving under the influence (DUI) and reserved a certified question of law. The question presented for review is whether the indictment properly charged a fourth offense DUI and whether the defendant’s present offense constitutes a fourth offense DUI under Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-403. After review, we conclude the answer to both questions is affirmative and affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The petitioner, Jose Ramirez, pled guilty to aggravated assault and the trial court, pursuant to a plea agreement, sentenced him to a three-year sentence to be served on supervised probation. The court dismissed the petition, finding that the petitioner had filed his petition outside the one-year statute of limitations period. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellants, Charles Thomas Lard, II, and Doreen Rebeca Gates Lard, each pled guilty in the Tipton County Circuit Court to possession of one-half ounce or more of marijuana with intent to deliver and to the manufacture of one-half ounce or more of marijuana, both Class E felonies. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Lards reserved the following certified question for consideration by this court on appeal: whether the trial court erred in denying their respective motions to suppress evidence and statements obtained by the police after a search of their home, based upon its finding that the Lards knowingly and voluntarily consented to the search. After thorough consideration of the arguments of the parties and the record on appeal, we affirm.

The defendant, Heath Alan Womble, pled guilty to possession with the intent to sell a schedule II drug, a class B felony, possession with the intent to sell a schedule III drug, a class D felony, and possession of a schedule IV drug, a class A misdemeanor, and received an effective total sentence of nine years and six months. The trial court denied his application for alternative sentencing and ordered that his sentence be served in confinement. He appeals the manner of service of his sentence, particularly the denial of community corrections. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Napoleon James Moore (alias), pled guilty to and was convicted of attempted possession of over .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, a Class C felony. In accordance with his plea agreement, he was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to five years in the Department of Correction. The manner of service of the sentence was left to the discretion of the trial court. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by denying probation. Following our review, we affirm the sentence of confinement ordered by the trial court.

Following a bench trial, Defendant, Michael D. Boon, was found guilty of driving under the influence (DUI), first offense, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days, to be suspended after serving forty-eight hours in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and contends that the admission of certain testimony violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the result that this court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal, but respectfully, I disagree with the holding that the habeas corpus petition was filed in an appropriate court.

Following a jury trial Defendant, Steven Allen Jones, was found guilty of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. On appeal Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of first degree murder and (2) the trial court erred by instructing the jury as to the punishment for first degree murder. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Paul Tobias Davis, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. In his petition, the Petitioner asserted that his sentence is illegal because he was denied pretrial jail credits. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition because the petition did not state a sufficient reason for not being filed in the county nearest to the Petitioner. On appeal, the Petitioner raises two issues: (1) whether a motion filed in the habeas corpus court to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure can operate to limit the jurisdiction of this Court; and (2) whether the fact that the convicting court possesses relevant records relating to a petitioner’s sentence and retains the authority to correct an illegal sentence at anytime is a sufficient reason under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-105 to file a habeas corpus petition in the convicting court rather than the court closest in point of distance to a petitioner. Following our review, we hold that motions filed pursuant to Rule 59 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure do not effect the jurisdiction of this Court in actions for habeas corpus relief and that the Petitioner presented a sufficient reason for filing his petition in the Davidson County Criminal Court. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the habeas corpus court and remand for the appointment of counsel and further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, James Polk, appeals from the dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief. Because Petitioner has presented this Court an inadequate brief and has improperly attempted to seek post-conviction relief in a case for the second time, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The defendant, Mario Morris, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of four counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony. After merging the four counts of aggravated robbery into two counts, the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to ten years at 30% for each of the aggravated robbery convictions and as a violent offender to twenty years at 100% for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction. Finding the defendant to be a dangerous offender, the trial court ordered that each of the sentences be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of forty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, because the record reveals that the defendant was improperly sentenced under the 2005 amendments to the 1989 Sentencing Act, we remand to the trial court for resentencing.

The defendant, Anthony Jerome Nichols, was indicted for one count of attempted first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of reckless endangerment. He was convicted of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault and assault. The trial court merged the aggravated assault and attempted second degree murder convictions and sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years, and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the remaining assault conviction. The sentences were set to run concurrently. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for attempted second degree murder and that the trial court abused its discretion by enhancing his sentence. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jeffrey Hopkins, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress his confession. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Appellant, Gary Aldridge, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The Appellant fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Dewayne Jones, of two counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony. Because the two counts alleged alternative theories of the same offense, the trial court merged the two convictions and sentenced the defendant as a Range I, violent offender to twenty-two years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, alleging that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, including that the State did not prove venue was in Shelby County; (2) the trial court erred in not requiring the State to elect which of the aggravated rape counts it wished to proceed upon; and (3) the trial court misapplied one enhancement factor. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Mario Andre McElrath, was convicted by an Obion County jury of attempted sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school zone, a Class B felony, and sentenced to ten years in the Department of Correction and a fine of $2000. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on the State’s violation of the rule of sequestration and in finding that the Drug-Free School Zone Act included criminal attempt as an offense that triggers increased sanctions. We conclude that these claims are without merit. However, based upon our plain error review, we conclude that the trial court improperly applied the Drug-Free School Zone Act to enhance the defendant’s sentence. Accordingly, we affirm the defendant’s conviction but remand for resentencing.

The Appellant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post conviction relief. The Appellant filed his petition outside the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Arthur Buford, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of first degree murder. See
T.C.A. § 39-13-202. He was sentenced to two life sentences to be served consecutively. The
petitioner contends the trial court erred in denying him post-conviction relief based upon the
ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude that no error exists and affirm the trial court’s
judgment.

The petitioner, Rodney R. Rye, filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of child rape, a Class A felony, and one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and his resulting effective twenty-two-year sentence. He contends that he entered guilty pleas that were unknowing and involuntary and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied relief, and we affirm that judgment.

The Appellant, Jacob Edward Campbell, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Davidson County Criminal Court. After a jury trial in 2002, Campbell was convicted of first-degree murder and robbery, and he was ordered to serve consecutive sentences of life imprisonment and ten years. On appeal, Campbell argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record on appeal and the arguments of the parties, we affirm.

Appellant, Carlos Bush, was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated robbery. As a result, Appellant was sentenced to serve fifteen years in incarceration as a Range II multiple offender.  After the denial of a motion for new trial and a timely notice of appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether the photographic lineup was unduly suggestive; (3) whether the trial court erred in allowing a witness to testify regarding Appellant’s prior incarceration; (4) whether the trial court improperly admitted hearsay testimony; (5) whether the trial court improperly refused to grant a recess to allow Appellant to prepare curative measures for alleged evidentiary errors; and (6) whether the trial court improperly enhanced Appellant’s sentence by applying an enhancement factor that was not determined by a jury in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). We determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, that the photographic lineup was proper and that the trial court did not improperly admit hearsay or statements about Appellant’s prior incarceration. With regard to Appellant’s sentence, we determine that review of the issue is not necessary to do substantial justice, and consequently, that no plain error was committed on the part of the trial court. Further, the application of enhancement factors (1) and (16) justified the enhancement of Appellant’s sentence from twelve years to fifteen years. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. The trial court merged the two murder convictions and sentenced the defendant to life in prison for first degree murder and twenty years for especially aggravated robbery, with the sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of two itnesses, a forensic psychologist and the defendant’s mother, who would have offered testimony regarding the defendant’s ability to form the requisite culpable mental state. The defendant also contends that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdicts. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of the two witnesses, and that the evidence produced at trial was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Carl Johnson, appeals the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Johnson, who was convicted of especially aggravated robbery, is currently serving a sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. Following the affirmance of his conviction on direct appeal, Johnson filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging numerous instances of ineffective assistance of counsel, which was denied. On appeal, this court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing “solely on the petitioner’s complaint of the ineffective assistance of counsel regarding lesser-included offense instructions and Owens.” Following an evidentiary hearing, during which Johnson challenged only trial counsel’s failure to request that aggravated assault be charged as a lesser-included offense of especially aggravated robbery, the post-conviction court again denied relief finding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request the lesser charge. In the instant appeal, Johnson challenges the denial of  relief. Following a review of the record and the law applicable at the time of trial, we find no reversible error and affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Paul Welcome, appeals the denial of his petitions for post-conviction relief and writ of error coram nobis. He asserts he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and that he is entitled to relief based upon newly discovered evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Derrick Settles, was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and two counts of possession of over .5 ounces of marijuana with the intent to sell. The jury sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole for one murder conviction, and the trial court ordered a consecutive life sentence for the other. The trial court also merged the possession offenses into a single conviction and imposed a concurrent sentence of one year for that conviction. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motions to suppress the evidence recovered from a search of his apartment and his confession because he lacked the intellectual capacity to validly consent to the search or effectively waive the rights guaranteed him by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.